Monday, June 30, 2008

Waiting For New President

<Megabubble Waiting For New President In 2009
'Numbers Racket' Exposes Potential Disaster For Economy, Markets


By Paul B. Farrell, Marketwatch | 30 June 2008

ARROYO GRANDE, Calif. (MarketWatch)— Remember that big ah-ha moment in the 1939 classic "The Wizard of Oz?" Dorothy wants to see the Wizard. His voice booms: "Do not arouse the wrath of the Great and Powerful Oz! Come back tomorrow!" Afraid, Lion, Tin Man, Scarecrow shake. Dorothy's dog runs up, tugs on a curtain. She chases Toto, pulls curtain open: "Who are you?" Dr. Marvel stutters: "Well, I— I— I am the Great and Powerful, Wizard of Oz." Dorothy: "You are? I don't believe you!" He replies: "No, it's true. There's no other Wizard except me." Dorothy's miffed: "Oh, you're a very bad man!" Wizard: "Oh, no, my dear. I'm a very good man. I'm just a very bad Wizard."

2009 Sequel: Script Exposes Diabolical Cover-Up Conspiracy

Flash forward: Real life, Washington, new leaders, a new Congress, old wizardry. Be forewarned: No matter who's elected president, America will soon see a massive statistical curtain pulled back, exposing a con game of historic proportions. And when that happens, you and I will suffer another ear-splitting global meltdown, bigger than today's housing-credit crisis, dragging us deep into a recession and bear market for years.

Cast: New 'Leading Man' From Old Nixon Political Machine

Yes, the lead character pulling back the curtain is none other than Kevin Phillips, a former Republican strategist for Nixon, and today America's leading political historian. Phillips just published "Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics & the Crisis of American Capitalism," everything you need to know about today's credit meltdown.

Scene 1: Numbers Racket Hiding Behind Washington Curtain

Opening shot: Phillips pulling back the curtain, exposing charlatan Wizards in a brilliant Harper's Magazine article: "Numbers Racket: Why the economy is worse than we know." Far worse. Buy it, read it— this is essential reading if you really want to understand the depth of today's political as well as economic impending meltdown, and the harsh realities facing Washington, Wall Street, Corporate America, and Main Street in 2009 and beyond ... harsh because we cannot cover up the truth much longer.

Scene 2: Statistics, Washington's New Wmds, A Time Bomb

"If Washington's harping on weapons of mass destruction was essential to buoy public support for the invasion of Iraq, the use of deceptive statistics has played its own vital role in convincing many Americans that the U.S. economy is stronger, fairer, more productive, more dominant, and richer with opportunity than it really is. The corruption has tainted the very measures that most shape public perception of the economy," especially three key numbers, CPI, GDP and monthly unemployment statistics.

Scene 3: Backflash, 'It's always the cover-up, stupid!'

As I read further I couldn't help but think about similar traps politicians got themselves (and us) into. Remember nice guys like Scooter Libby and Bill Clinton: The crime wasn't their original stupidity, but their lying during the cover-up. Here, Phillips reviews endless statistical cover-ups since the 1960s and concludes there was no "grand conspiracy, just accumulating opportunisms." I call it plain old greed. And every step of the way the media went along with the con game played by politicians and economists.

Scene 4: Real numbers torture us ... like water-boarding!

How bad is it? "The real numbers ... would be a face full of cold water," says Phillips. "Based on the criteria in place a quarter century ago, today's U.S. unemployment rate is somewhere between 9% and 12%; the inflation rate is as high as 7% or even 10%; economics growth since the recession of 2001 has been mediocre, despite the surge in wealth and incomes of the superrich, and we are falling back into recession."

Scene 5: Most Economists Hushed, Work Inside Conspiracy

Compare that to the phony stats Washington feeds the press and public: Unemployment 5%, inflation 2% and long-term growth at 3%-4% (actually more like 1%). For example, just last week the L.A. Times reported that while "gasoline prices are up more than 20% from a year ago and food prices have risen 5%," Washington says "inflation was fairly mild last month." A Wells Fargo economist shook his head in disbelief: That report isn't "worth the paper it was printed on." Most economists are quiet, working for the conspiracy.

Scene 6: No integrity, they cannot be trusted to tell truth!

The same can be said of any government report, every speech made by today's leaders: All hype, lies and propaganda intended to deceive us. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's clearly playing the game: Remember what the former Goldman Sachs CEO told Fortune last July as our credit meltdown was metastasizing into a worldwide contagion: "This is far and away the strongest global economy I've seen in my business lifetime." He has no credibility. He knew the truth. He knew the government's "numbers racket;" after all, he helped create the problems years earlier at Goldman.

Scene 7: There's Enough Kool-Aid For Everyone To Drink

The plot's unraveling: The lies accumulate and compound one on top of the another ... get passed on ... keep mounting ... forcing successive new generations of politicians to drink the same poisonous Kool-Aid ... keep the lies alive ... going strong ... till everyone believes the lies are really "the truth," or at least an inconvenient truth ... as the hoax becomes the conventional wisdom ... not only by Washington, Wall Street, Corporate America and the media, but also 300 million Main Street Americans.

Scene 8: Inflation statistics are America's new 'guillotine'

The biggest of all lies is with inflation. Understating inflation "hangs over our heads like a guillotine," says Phillips. Yet if Washington told us the truth "it would send interest rates climbing and thereby would endanger the viability of the massive buildup of public and private debt (from less than $11 trillion in 1987 to $49 trillion last year) that props up the American Economy." So we keep sipping the Kool-Aid.

Scene 9: Washington and Wall Street delusional in 'Land of Oz'

"Were mainstream interest rates to jump into the 7% to 9% range— which could happen if inflation were to spur new concern— both Washington and Wall Street would be walking on quicksand," warns Phillips. "The make-believe economy of the past two decades, with its asset bubbles, massive borrowing, and rampant data distortion, would be in serious jeopardy."

Scene 10: Cover-Up Failing ... King Really Has No Clothes

Yet everyone still acts paralyzed, unable (or unwilling) to do anything to stop this lethal musical chairs charade ... till it's too late, or a catastrophe wakes us. Meanwhile, we act as if we had no choice but to put up with the crashes of 1987 and 2001 and 2007/8. Just "normal" bull/bear cycles. So, like lemmings driven over a cliff, we'll blindly accept the next crashes, as they increase in frequency and intensity. Next in 2011? As war debt piles? As reforming health care, Social Security and Medicare are delayed? As we deny and deceive ourselves, perpetuating the lie ... except noticing perhaps, out of the corner of our eye, at the edge of the screen, a curtain's being pulled open, slowly, our once-mighty statistical king, the Wizard of Washington, really has no clothes on.

Scene 11: Millions Of Co-Conspirators In Massive Cover-Up

Still, we let ourselves be conned. Why? "The rising cost of pensions, benefits, and interest payments— all indexed or related to inflation— could join the cost of financial bailouts to overwhelm the federal budget," says Phillips. But it's a heads-we-lose-tails-we-can't-win bet. "As inflation and interest rates have been kept artificially suppressed, the United States has been indentured to its volatile financial sector, with its predilection for leverage and risky buccaneering" Yes, Wall Street and the rich love playing this game.

Scene 12: Rich get richer hiding under 'statistical camouflage'

So who really "profits from the low-growth U.S. economy hidden under statistical camouflage?" he asks rhetorically. Certainly not the masses: "Might it be Washington politicos and affluent elite, anxious to mislead voters, coddle the financial markets, and tamp down expensive cost-of-living increases for wages and pensions?" Yes, yes, yes, a voice screams off-camera! Then a gun shot rings out ... dull thud ... silence ... haunting music builds, filling the theater ... signaling the end of this tragi-comedy ... although like Sartre's "No Exit," you know this drama will never end ... until ... the next sequel ...

Roll credits: Who was that masked man?

Kudos to the masked curtain-puller. Yes folks, it's the same Kevin Phillips who wrote "American Theocracy, The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century;" "The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath;" "American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune, and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush" and others. In his "Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich," Phillips warned us that "most great nations, at the peak of their economic power, become arrogant and wage great world wars at great cost, wasting vast resources, taking on huge debt, and ultimately burning themselves out." Slowly, fade to black ....

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Sunday, June 29, 2008

The Greater Depression

Casey Files: The Greater Depression
And What You Should Do About It


By Doug Casey, The International Speculator | 29 June 2008

For international investment expert Doug Casey, there's more than a recession on the horizon... he recommends battening down now for the rough seas ahead... with some special information about making sure your investments can weather the coming storms.

I believe in the existence of the business cycle. That's partly because almost everything in life is cyclical, which has been recognized at least since the tale about Joseph and the seven fat years and seven lean years. The Austrian school of economic thinking explains why the business cycle keeps coming around and does so without relying on a soothsayer to interpret your dreams. I urge you to read the appropriate chapters in either Crisis Investing for the Rest of the 90's or Strategic Investing for a full explanation.

But, in a nutshell, government intervention in the economy— through taxes, regulation and, most importantly, currency inflation— causes distortions and misallocations of capital that must eventually be unwound. The distortions degrade the general standard of living, and the economy goes into a recession (call that an incomplete cleansing). Or it goes into a depression— wherein the entire sickly structure comes unglued.

The last real depression took place in the 1930s. The economy very nearly went over the edge again in the early '70s and again in the early '80s. Both times massive re-inflation of the currency papered the problems over (but at a cost). Meanwhile, most importantly, continuing technological innovation and increased savings (motivated by the fear of bad times) led to recovery. Since then we've had 25 years of what Herman Kahn predicted would be "The Long Boom."

Unfortunately, much, much more severe taxes, regulations, and inflation have caused much, much more severe distortions in the economy— especially over the last 15 years. And the boom was financed largely by debt, which made everybody feel and act much wealthier than they really were. It's as though you borrowed a million dollars and spent it all on wine, song and high living.

For a while, you'd have a high standard of living and perhaps have a lot of fun. But eventually, when you either paid the money back with interest or were forced into bankruptcy, your standard of living would take a painful drop. The U.S., in particular, has been living far above its means, burning up its own capital and trillions more borrowed from abroad.

This isn't news to readers of International Speculator or even the intelligent layman who follows the news. Oddly enough, there's one glaringly obvious thing that is not in the news today at all. That's the fact that interest rates— nominal rates too, but especially "real," after-inflation rates— are close to their lowest levels in history. And in today's extraordinarily risky environment, they're artificially low. This, and the reasons for it, should be headlines.

All over the world, but especially in the U.S., currencies are being inflated radically; M3 is rising at about 18% per year. Without exception, interest rates eventually reflect inflation. Therefore interest rates are going to rise radically. Governments are currently suppressing rates by lending money cheaply and promiscuously, to keep both borrowers and commercial lenders from going under.

But rates are soon going to explode -especially long-term rates. My guess is that we'll see at least the levels of the early '80s, which would mean 15%+ for long-term Treasury bonds. And I'll say that's coming within a couple or three years at the outside.

The government wants low rates, obviously, because low rates make it a lot easier for homeowners to pay their mortgages, among other things. But they forget that low rates also discourage saving— which is the one thing that can actually bring down real rates. Officialdom is between a rock and a hard place, and they're choosing to inflate the currency.

Their hoping to stave off an epidemic of bankruptcy among consumers who borrowed and among the financial institutions that did the lending. The effort will fail and both groups will go bankrupt, simply because the whole society has been living above its means. That will result in large-scale commercial bankruptcies and unemployment.

Higher interest rates will absolutely hammer the economy.

It seems to me a near certainty that we're about to enter something I have long called "The Greater Depression." I suspect it will be inflationary (in the direction of what Germany underwent in the early '20s, or Zimbabwe today), rather than what the U.S. had in the '30s. I should somehow trademark the term "Greater Depression," except that I'm sure Boobus americanus would then blame me for it.

Here I'd like to pinpoint my prime candidate for the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, since it almost seems America has been reading pages from their playbook since day one. Many reasons have been evoked for the fall: moral turpitude, unrestricted immigration, barbarian invasion, Christianity, lead pipes, etc., etc. My candidate is economic stagnation brought on by taxes, regulation and inflation. I'd love to discuss that assertion in detail, but that's not what this article is about.

What should you do?

Reduce your standard of living NOW (while the situation is still under control), greatly increase your savings (in gold, which is real money) and rig for greatly changed patterns of production, consumption, employment and business for a considerable time. The hurricane that's just starting to hit the economy will both trigger and worsen problems in other areas. Starting with politics, because nearly everyone today believes the ridiculous notion that the government should guide the economy.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Saturday, June 28, 2008

Warren Buffett's Doings

Warren Buffett's Doings

Warren Buffett says he supports InBev's takeover of Anheuser-Busch (BUD). Buffett owns 5.7% of BUD and stands to make $600 million if the deal closes. Buffett is set to meet with BUD chief August Busch IV this week. Maybe the sage will get involved through a financing deal, like he did with Wrigley. However he does it, it's a good bet Buffett wants to be involved. The InBev deal would create the biggest brewer in the world. Buffett likes big competitive advantages, and world-dominating scale is a great one.

The world will continue to drink plenty of beer. (I'm doing my part!) So owning the No. 1 brewer should be a pretty good bet over the long term. I'm still short Lehman Brothers in my monthly Extreme Value letter, but maybe I should reconsider. None other than Hank Greenberg, the man who built the largest company (AIG) in the largest business in the world (insurance), says he's buying "a pretty good sized stake," in Lehman Brothers' equity. Greenberg made the announcement last week, after Lehman announced it would raise new equity capital.

At about the same time Greenberg was revealing his investment plans, AIG, the company he built, was getting a new CEO: its chairman, Robert Willumstad. Willumstad contacted Greenberg immediately. The two are scheduled to meet today. Hank Greenberg is to AIG what Buffett is to Berkshire Hathaway, perhaps more so. Buffett is famously hands-off with the managers of his 70+ subsidiaries, many of whom are independently wealthy and run their businesses because they love it.

The issue of Buffett's succession has been discussed widely in the press, but nobody ever talks about Greenberg's succession. AIG's stock has fallen since his 2005 departure, and with good reason. Greenberg, unlike Buffett, is hands-on. It's harder to imagine AIG without him than Berkshire without Buffett. AIG is worth a look. But it's such an enormously complex beast, I doubt it's possible for a single outsider working alone to really get a handle on it.

BofA/CFC 'Takeover'

Bank Of America / Countrywide Financial 'Takeover'

In case there was any wonder why banks are losing billions on bad loans... Last April, a woman received a credit-card application addressed to her then 5-year-old son. As a test, she had her son fill out the application, absolutely truthfully, and send it in. Young Bennett accurately wrote in his year of birth as 2002, his annual income as $0, and confirmed that he neither owns nor rents a home. He signed his name in a childish scribble. Shortly thereafter, Bank of America granted Bennett a new card with a $600 spending limit.

Maybe BofA's credit-card underwriting really is a crackerjack operation. If it is... how would we know? [[Well, after all, this is the bank that's still buying Countrywide Financial for $4 billion— with many, many times that liability in sub-prime mortgages.: normxxx]]

01/11/2008 05:57 PM by Dan Gobis

Do YOU all realize YOU probably helped Fund the Deal with Bank of America and Countryide?

Bank of America is able to use some of Countrywide's losses to offset its own taxable income.

The tax break could total about half a billion dollars over the first five years, according to an estimate by tax guru Robert Willens, who left Lehman Brothers Friday after a 20-year run and will be in business as Robert Willens LLC starting next week.

Bank of America can use a total of $1.35 billion of Countrywide's losses to shelter its income. (That's five years of $270 million annual losses.) If Countrywide's embedded losses when Bank of America buys it exceed $1.35 billion, Willens says, the bank will be able to deduct the rest of the losses, without limit, starting in the sixth year. The losses could be worth considerably more to Bank of America starting in the sixth year, depending on how big Countrywide's losses are when Bank of America formally acquires it.

As part of the deal, the government likely agreed to guarantee BofA against Countrywide-related losses. (There was nothing in the press release about that, so let’s give them the benefit of the doubt and say BofA is shouldering all of the risk and at this price it believes the risk is worth the reward.)

"Catching The Falling Knife"

There has been wide speculation for the last several months that the government is behind the scenes, urging BAC to rescue CFC.
The government would not allow CFC to fail, since it would create a domino effect much worse than the S&L crisis and LTCM. The failure of CFC would have triggered many counterparties conducting OTC derivative trades with CFC to fail, which would have brought the whole OTC derivative market including all large investment banks to their knees, similar to the LTCM situation in 1998. [[The Glass-Steagall act (now defunct) made it quite clear: the government/taxpayers were not going to bail out investment banks! But, I forgot, these days ALL banks are 'investment' banks.: normxxx]]

Countrywide faces numerous borrower lawsuits, and is under investigation by federal and state regulators for alleged lending abuses, issues which are normally assumed by the acquiring company in a takeover [[but, for the most part, issues which can be quietly dropped: normxxx]].

The bulk of the actions against Countrywide are individual claims connected to foreclosure cases across the country, with assertions ranging from violations of federal lending laws during loan origination, to duping elderly borrowers into taking out unnecessary high-interest loans, to mishandling loan payments, according to Ira Rheingold, executive director of the National Association for Consumer Advocates, whose members represent homeowners facing foreclosure lawsuits.

There are a number of other suits that could blossom into costly headaches for the company. In California, shareholders filed six suits this past fall against the company, Chief Executive Officer Angelo Mozilo and other executives in federal court, claiming they issued false and misleading statements about the company's health. The suits have been consolidated, and the company hasn't responded [[However, the Republican-packed court has already demonstrated that it frowns on such shareholder suits.: normxxx]].

Furthermore, the company faces at least 12 class-action suits alleging borrower abuse. BofA must also take care that plaintiffs don't try to empty its deep pockets.

Europe's Terminal Crisis

GEOPOLITICS—EUROPE: Has Europe's Terminal Crisis Begun With A Triple No Vote?

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.Co.UK | 26 June 2008

The ultra-Europeans have overplayed their hand. We can now glimpse a chain of events that will halt, and reverse, this extremist push towards an Über-state that almost no one wants. The attempt to override the triple "No" votes of the French, Dutch, and Irish peoples has brought the EU to a systemic crisis of legitimacy. One line too many has been crossed. Any sentient citizen can see that the 'process' has become unhinged.

While "Europe" blunders on as if nothing has happened, it is now an open question whether the Lisbon Treaty— née Constitution— will ever come into force, whether the EU will ever acquire the machinery of an economic, diplomatic, and military power, and whether the euro will ever have a polity to back it up. [[Or, even some Eurobonds.: normxxx]] Henceforth, Brussels will struggle to retain powers already amassed. Functions will flow back to the nation states, the proper venue for authentic democracy.

For three decades— from Rome to the Single European Act in 1986— there were no treaties. Then the pace quickened: Maastricht, Amsterdam, and before the ink had dried on Nice, the ideologues hatched The Constitution. This was the final throw of the Monnet Project: an attempt to lock in the framework of a proto-state [[a United States of Europe: normxxx]], crowned by a supreme court with overweening jurisdiction, before the ex-captive nations of eastern Europe joined and rendered such ambitions impossible. The deadline slipped.

The failure of this gambit became clear this weekend when the Czechs and Poles refused to mug Ireland; or put another way, when they insisted on upholding the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, unlike our own craven government. "The treaty is dead," said Czech president Vaclav Klaus. "To pretend something else is undignified— if we live in a world where one plus one equals two." It is fitting that the central Europeans should emerge as the champions of due process. Their own memories of Soviet methods are fresh.

Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, cut his teeth as a journalist with Afghan guerrillas fighting Soviet forces in the Hindu Kush. Whatever the Irish decide to do, he said, "we'll respect it". How refreshing. It was France's Nicolas Sarkozy who set off this debacle, sweeping aside the verdict of his own electorate to revive a rejected text. He aimed to score points as Europe's mover and shaker: instead, he charged into the complexities of EU politics with his trademark flippancy.

Louis XIV (1638–1715), by Hyacinthe Rigaud (1701)

Well might Mr Sarkozy rail at the Irish. "Bloody fools. They've been stuffing their faces at Europe's expense for years and now they dump us in the s***," he yelled. Mr Sarkozy still thinks that Ireland can be made to vote again in a few months. Who is the bloody fool? [[He dreams again of a French empire; of a return to the "greatness" that was France under Le Roi Soleil, the "Sun King," Louis XIV: normxxx]] Yes, the Irish voted twice on Nice. That was another world. The Nice "No" came below radar, on a tiny turnout, after scant debate.

This time the contest has been electric. The Irish were warned day after day that rejecting Lisbon would be catastrophic. They rejected it any way, by national instinct, unwilling to sign a blank political cheque. As premier Brian Cowen now admits, Ireland's swing from boom to bust played its part in the vote. "That overall economic landscape is not likely to improve in the short term," he said. Quite.

A property bubble— caused by EMU interest rates of 2% until 2005— has left Ireland with frightening household debt of 176% of gross domestic product. The country now faces a quadruple shock: a credit crunch, rising interest rates in Frankfurt, a plunge in sterling and the dollar versus the euro, and a sharp slowdown in its Anglo-Saxon export markets.

Italy is not happy either, judging by prime minister Silvio Berlusconi's latest tantrum. "The euro is hyper-valued and it is crippling our exports. Europa is culpable for not intervening," he said, launching into a stream of invective against the EU [[and Jean-Claude Trichet, a French civil servant who is the current president of the European Central Bank since 2003: normxxx]]. The fast-moving events of the past two weeks must have market consequences.

Note that German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier said Ireland should "exit" the EU temporarily. Did he forget that Ireland is an integral part of monetary union? His reflex is not only unpleasant, it also reveals that Germany views peripheral members of the eurozone as 'dispensable'. It is an invitation for hedge funds to "short" EMU bonds from the Club Med states. Can one still presume that Germany will do 'whatever it takes' to shore up EMU in a crisis, if only to safeguard its half-century investment in Europe's new order?

Clearly, the euro break-up risk has been hugely mispriced. The survival of EMU does not depend on Lisbon as such, although the failure of the treaty would make it harder for the EU to orchestrate a covert bail out [[of favored member-states? : normxxx]]. But there is a deeper issue at stake. As the Bundesbank warned long ago, EMU will eventually buckle under strain over time without the cement of political union. This means a de facto EU treasury, a unified wage system, and the plausible prospect of a debt and pensions pool. None of this exists. Nor will it.

The ideologues ignored the warning. Indeed, they saw EMU as the great catalyst, forcing the pace of Europe's integration. This fuite en avant [["headlong rush": normxxx]] has proved a grave miscalculation. It forgot about the voters. The elites will now have to face the great euro storm of 2008 to 2009 with the limited tools they have, bridging the economic chasm between north and south as best they can. Good luck. Viel Glück.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Friday, June 27, 2008

When CB's Clash, Markets Crash

When Central Bankers Clash, Stock Markets Can Crash
Is It To Be Inflation, Stagflation, Or ...


By Gary Dorsch, Editor, Global Money Trends | 27 June 2008

Hyper-inflation in the commodities markets is rivaling the US housing collapse and the global banking crisis, as the biggest threat to the world economy. Finance ministers from the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Britain, and Russia, have expressed their alarm over the doubling of agricultural, energy, and key raw material prices from a year ago, which is pushing inflation rates around the world, to their highest in three decades.

Crude oil briefly touched $140 a barrel, and the price of corn, used to make ethanol, hit $8 /bushel. Chinese steelmakers agreed to pay 96% more for Iron ore from Australian miner Rio Tinto, a five-fold increase since 2003. Steel prices have soared almost 50%, this year, as coal and iron ore prices continue to climb and global demand shows little sign of abating. Dow Chemical is raising prices on a wide range of its products by 25%, due to sharply higher energy and raw material costs.

Sharply higher shipping costs, driven by rising oil prices, have increased the cost of transporting a standard 40-foot container from Shanghai to the east coast of the US from $3,000 when oil was priced at $20 per barrel, to $8,000 today, with crude oil around $135 /barrel, according to CIBC World Markets analysts Jeff Rubin and Benjamin Tal. The Baltic Dry Index, which monitors merchant shipping costs on forty major export routes for dry commodities, is 50% higher from a year ago.

South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak noted on June 16th, that inflation was the biggest challenge the global economy has faced in 30-years. "It’s no overstatement to say that the world is faced with the gravest crisis since the oil shock of the 1970’s, with oil, food and raw materials prices skyrocketing," he said. A week later, Myung-bak switched his government’s top policy goal to fighting inflation, and within hours, the Bank of Korea (BoK) sold US$1 billion from its foreign currency stash to bolster the Korean won against the dollar, to help keep import costs down.



Smaller tier central banks are moving to combat inflation pressures, with tougher monetary policies. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) raised its key lending rate by a half-point to 8.50%, it’s highest in six years, and increased the ratio of deposits banks keep with it by 50 basis points to 8.75%, to fight inflation, now raging at 11 percent. The Bombay Sensex index fell below 14,000 points for the first time in 10-months, after the RBI tightened it monetary policy. The Indian stock market has lost more than 30% in 2008, one of the worst performing Asian indices this year.

Beijing lifted retail gasoline and diesel prices by 18% last week, the first hike in eight-months and biggest ever one-off rise, which could push the overall inflation rate to 9% next month. A week earlier, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) hiked the bank reserve ratio by a full-percent to 17.5%, soaking up 422 billion yuan, and knocked the Shanghai stock market 14% lower over the next four-days. "Surely higher energy prices will put some pressure on the CPI, so we may need a stronger policy against inflation," warned PBoC chief Zhou Xiaochuan on June 20th.

Brazil’s central bank hiked its overnight Selic rate by a half-point rate to 12.25% on June 5th, to bring inflation down from a two-year high in Latin America’s commodity powerhouse. The latest half-point rate hike pushes the real interest rate, adjusted for inflation, to 7.25%, the highest among the world’s 52-leading economies. On June 19th, Brazil’s central bank chief Henrique Meirelles signaled a third rate hike, to bring inflation down from a two-year high in Latin America’s largest economy.



Futures contracts in Sao Paulo project a 1% Selic rate hike to 13.25% by year’s end. "It’s necessary to slow domestic demand in order to balance the whole equation and to avoid the pass-through of the wholesale price increases as a result of the raw materials component to retail prices," Meirelles warned. Inflation in Brazil climbed from an eight-year low of 3% in March 2007 to 5.9% in the 12 months to mid-June, and above the bank’s 4.5% upper target for a sixth month.

Brazil’s central bank expects the inflation rate will accelerate further to 6.3% in the third quarter of 2008. The Brazilian real strengthened to 1.591 to the US$, a nine-year high, and is +9% higher this year, the biggest advance among the 16 most-traded currencies against the dollar. The central bank is using a stronger currency to hold down import price inflation, and appears to be adjusting its overnight loan rate in reaction to trends in global commodity markets.

South Africa’s central bank hiked its overnight repo rate by 50 basis points to 12%, to counter surging inflation, extending a tightening cycle that has lifted the lending rate 500 basis points higher since June 2006, to a 5-year high. South Africa’s CPIX inflation hit 10.4% year-on-year in April, and producer prices are 12% higher. Eskom, the electric utility, is raising electricity rates by 27% due to a doubling of coal prices from a year ago. RBSA chief Tito Mboweni is warning the markets of higher interest rates ahead, and "Yes, it will be painful," he said on June 23rd.

ECB And Fed In Game Of High Stakes Poker

Central bankers of fast-growing emerging economies are navigating through the stormy seas of commodity inflation by tightening monetary policies. But the "Group of Seven" central bankers have acted in a different fashion. The British, Canadian, and US central banks are focused on the global banking crisis, and the slide in US home prices, and have lowered their interest rates, while the Bank of Japan has stood motionless. But the European Central Bank was moving in the opposite direction, and guided Euro-zone money market rates to their highest in 7 years.

And when powerful central bankers clash— moving in opposite directions— nasty accidents can happen in the global stock markets. Tighter monetary policies in the emerging economies is an interesting side-show, but what is really rattling the global stock markets these days, is the looming battle of wits between the two most powerful central banks, the Fed and the ECB, which hold diametrically different views over how to cope with the twin-evils of the "Stagflation" trap.

"The world has been staging a run on the greenback, with damaging results if it continues," warned former Fed chief Paul Volcker on April 9th. "Concerns about recession are rife, and the Fed will be tempted to subordinate the fundamental need to maintain a reliable currency, to the impulse to shore up a flagging economy. The danger is that you lose both battles, as in the 1970’s, and wind up with "Stagflation,"— the twin-evil of a stagnating economy plagued by high and rising inflation.



Since the sub-prime mortgage debt crisis erupted into full bloom last summer, the Fed has chosen to counter the "Stag" part of the equation, by slashing the fed funds rate 325 basis points to 2%, and far below the inflation rate. American consumer confidence has plunged to a 16-year low in June, largely due to a 18% erosion in home prices since the middle of 2006, which has slashed $4 trillion in household wealth, or more than $50,000 for each US homeowner.

However, the ECB wasn’t deterred by a plunging Euro-Stoxx banking sector, and instead, stayed focused on fighting commodity inflation and curbing double-digit money supply growth. The ECB guided the three-month Euro Libor rate to 4.95%, it’s highest in seven-years, and used a stronger Euro to partly shield the Euro zone from the "Commodity Super Cycle," which is wrecking havoc in the US-dollar linked economies from Hong Kong, the Persian Gulf, and to the United States.

Meanwhile, the Fed’s aggressive rate cuts couldn’t stop the bleeding in the US banking sector, nor end the slide in US home prices. The Fed’s "super-easy" money policies are bound to fail, in the opinion of the ECB, since a "sound money" policy is the bedrock for a healthy economy. "Challenging as the present global economy may be, the rules for monetary policy-making are not altered," said ECB chief Jean Claude Trichet on June 3rd. "Inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the long term and price stability is the responsibility of the monetary authorities."

"In demanding times of significant market correction and turbulences, it is the responsibility of the central bank to solidly anchor inflation expectations to avoid additional volatility, in already highly volatile markets," Trichet said on Jan 23rd. "In this new financial landscape, monetary policy has a stability dimension that central banks simply can no longer ignore," said Bank of Italy chief Mario Draghi on June 11th. "Central banks need to consider persistently rapid growth of money and credit aggregates as early warnings of financial imbalances, and thus to monitor a wider set of indicators, and not just inflation statistics," Draghi declared.

Is the ECB Hijacking Fed policy?

Crude oil prices have multiplied seven-fold since 2001, and surged 40% since January, to now stand above $135 a barrel. Yet the hyper-Inflationists at the Bernanke Fed and US Treasury,— the "Plunge Protection Team," didn’t recognize that their cheap dollar policy was backfiring on the US economy and stock market, until crude oil prices jumped $16 per barrel in two-days, on June 5-6th.

The "crude oil vigilantes" are energized on heavy dosages of steroids, flexing their muscles, and ready to jack-up oil prices, whenever the Bernanke Fed shows a willingness to devalue the US dollar. Recognizing that the devaluation game had run its course, Fed chief Bernanke did a 180-degree turn on June 3rd and vowed to defend the dollar, as Mr Volcker had advised nearly 2-months earlier. [[Like the 'old' Fed, 'too little too late' yields stagflation at best or a double-dip recession at worst.: normxxx]]

"We are attentive to the implications of changes in the value of the dollar for inflation and inflation expectations," Bernanke told the International Monetary Conference in Barcelona, Spain. "The Fed’s commitment to price stability and maximum employment will be key factors insuring that the dollar remains a strong and stable currency," he said, signaling an end to the Fed’s rate cutting campaign.

However, the ECB hawks seized upon Bernanke’s vow to defend the US dollar, to telegraph a baby-step 0.25% rate hike to 4.25%. The ECB hawks have been itching for months to lift the repo rate, anxious to combat inflation, which is raging at a +3.7% annual clip in the Euro zone, its fastest in 16-years. "We could decide to move our rates a small amount in our next meeting in order to secure the solid anchoring of inflation expectations," said ECB chief Trichet on June 5th.



"The ECB is not split, we have sent a clear message to the markets about what to expect in the near future, we have to let deeds follow words," said Bundesbank chief Axel Weber on June 5th. The benchmark 2-year German schatz yield soared by 80 basis points to a seven-year high of 4.80%, after Weber’s warning, and snuffed out the German DAX rally at the 7,200-level. The ECB isn’t afraid to pay the price of weaker Euro-zone stock markets, in order to keep inflation under control.

The ECB’s rate hike signal jolted the German 10-year bund market, which plunged into a free-fall to its lowest levels since July 2007, lifting its yield to 4.65%. Given the close synchronization in the G-7 bond markets these days, the tremors erupting in the Frankfurt are also felt in Tokyo and New York, where government bond markets came under attack by the global inflation vigilantes.

The downward spiral in the German bund market widened the Euro’s interest rtate advantage over the US dollar, leaving the greenback on shaky ground and vulnerable to speculative attack. Bernanke would be under heavy pressure to match a second ECB rate hike to 4.50%, to defend the value of the dollar. In essence, the ECB could hijack US monetary policy, and force the Fed to guide the federal funds rate higher, in order to shake-out speculators in the crude oil and commodities markets.



The US Treasury’s "Plunge Protection Team" (aka, 'PPT') has fought a relentless campaign to prevent a bear market from materializing in the Dow Jones Industrials. The PPT’s unleashed its total arsenal— the largest Fed rate cuts in 25-years, negative (real) interest rates, swapping Treasuries for risky mortgages, $165 billion in tax rebates, and intervention in stock index futures. The PPT also convinced the Bank of Canada and England to lower their lending rates, to provide artificial life support for the US dollar against the Loonie and the British pound.

But the PPT’s safety-net for the Dow Jones Industrials was ripped by the ECB hawks, plunging 1,000-points, led lower by the plummeting German bund market. US 2-year T-note yields jumped 65 basis points to 3.05%, the largest weekly increase in 26-years. To put out the fire, the Fed leaked word to syndicated columnist Robert Novak on June 16th that Bernanke wouldn’t be bullied into rate hikes by the ECB. "Speculation that the Fed is about to begin inflation-fighting interest rate increases appears to be dead wrong. Bernanke disagrees more with the European position than is reflected by his public statements," Novak wrote.

Furthermore, the "Fed chairman feels high oil and gasoline prices threaten contraction more than inflation. The depressing impact on the oil-driven American economy is especially menacing in his view," Novak added. Yet sky-high energy prices can inflict more damage to the US economy and the stock market, than a few baby-step Fed rate hikes to stabilize the greenback.

The point of maximum stress could unfold if the ECB carries out a second rate hike to 4.50% in September. That would put enormous pressure on Bernanke to hike US interest rates to defend the dollar. On June 13th, the godfather of the US sub-prime debt crisis, "Easy" Al Greenspan warned, "If you’re going to keep inflation rates down, the Fed is going to have to put increasing pressure on the money supply and reserves, and as a result we’re going to see interest rates rising."

On June 25th, Trichet held his cards close to his vest. "I didn’t say that we envisage a series of rate increases. That being said, of course, we never pre-commit. The observers in the market know that pretty well." However, the central bank chief of the Netherlands, Nout Weilink said tackling inflation must take precedence over slowing growth. "It is way too early to judge on what should happen in the second half of this year. This means all options should be kept open," he said.

Bank of Japan is Inflating the Crude Oil "Bubble"

Venezuela’s energy minister Rafael Ramirez and OPEC chief Abdullah al-Badri agree that oil markets are well-supplied, and that sky-high oil prices have nothing to do with global production levels. "The US economy is in a crisis that is devaluing the dollar and boosting the price of oil and food around the world. Financial speculators are migrating to futures contracts, which are considered safer than other investments," Ramirez explained.

While the weak dollar against the Euro gets most of the blame for the sky-high price of crude oil, the dollar’s strength against the Japanese yen is also elevating the energy markets these days. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) has kept its overnight loan rate pegged at 0.50% for sixteen months, which is nurturing inflation worldwide. Global "carry traders" are borrowing Japanese yen at 1% or less, and converting the yen into US dollars, in order to purchase energy futures in New York.



In his first major blunder, rookie BoJ chief Masaaki Shirakawa scrapped his predecessor’s policy of gradually raising Japan’s borrowing costs, and signaled a green light for "carry traders" to bid oil prices higher. [[They no longer have to worry about BoJ raising their rates unexpectedly.: normxxx]]"The outlook for economic activity and prices is highly uncertain. It is not appropriate to predetermine the direction of future monetary policy. We need to pay utmost attention to the downside risks to the economy," he said on May 12th— switching to a 'neutral' policy.

Now the BoJ’s super-low interest rates are boomeranging on the Japanese economy. Wholesale prices for petroleum, coal, and gasoline prices are up +28% from a year earlier. Japan’s oil import bill soared 53% to $12 billion in May, and soaring steel and iron ore prices are hammering Japanese carmakers, such as Honda and Nissan, whose operating profit might drop 32% this year. Japan’s total import bill is up +12% from a year ago, narrowing its trade surplus by 46% to 485 billion yen ($4.7 billion). A half-point BoJ rate hike to 1% is now necessary to shake-out the "yen carry" traders in the energy markets. Don’t count on it anytime soon.

Can the ECB Subdue the Gold market?

On June 25th, Warren Buffett told CNBC television viewers that "inflation in the US is exploding and really picking up. Whether it’s steel or oil, we see it everyplace," he said. A few hours later, the Fed halted its aggressive rate cutting campaign, leaving the fed funds rate unchanged at 2%, but signaled it’s in no hurry to rein-in hyper inflation. "Uncertainty about the inflation outlook remains high." However, "the FOMC expects inflation to moderate later this year and next year."

The Fed is admitting that its hands are tied by the banking crisis and the slide in housing, and is afraid to lift the fed funds rate ahead of the US elections. The Fed thinks the "Commodity Super Cycle" is a speculative bubble ready to burst under its own weight. Therefore, corrective action by the central bank isn’t required. The Fed is letting inflation seep deeper into the economy in order to support Wall Street bankers, and has squandered the last ounce of its anti-inflation credibility.

That’s good news for gold bugs, who put were on the defensive by Bernanke’s bluff about defending the dollar. The Bernanke Fed is holding the fed funds rate far below inflation. In the 1970’s, this condition stoked hyper-inflation, and the Bernanke Fed is repeating the same blunder. Still, a psychological barrier that is blocking a spirited gold rally is the ECB’s move to ratchet German interest rates higher.



The ECB is the solo inflation fighter within the G-7 clique. The ECB has guided the German schatz yield to seven year highs, but so far, has only knocked the European gold market about 8% lower. The ECB’s anti-inflation efforts are thwarted by the "super easy" money policies of the BoJ and the Fed, while the Bank of Canada and England show no inclination to reverse their rate cuts anytime soon. However, the ECB is starting to get some back-up support in the battle against inflation from central banks in the emerging world.

Still, geopolitical events can overtake the ECB’s battle with the simmering gold market. US military chief Admiral Michael Mullen is expected in Israel this week, amid speculation of a possible aerial strike aimed at Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. "Obviously, when Chairman Mullen speaks with the Israelis, they will no doubt discuss the threat posed by Iran," said Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell on June 25th. "The US is committed to resolving the nuclear threat posed by Iran through diplomacy and international sanctions, while at the same time holding out the option of a military strike, if necessary," he warned.

Speculation about a possible Israeli strike heated up this week after former UN ambassador John Bolton told London’s Daily Telegraph that Israel could strike Iran’s nuclear sites between the November 4th election and January. "According to Israeli security sources, Iran will have an operable nuclear weapon by 2009. That’s not a very long time," said CBS consultant Michael Oren on June 25.



Gold prices jumped by $30 /oz amid a perfect storm, in early New York trading on June 26th, with investors attracted to the yellow metal’s "safe haven" status. Citigroup shares fell to their lowest level in nearly a decade after Goldman Sachs said the largest US bank might take $8.9 billion of write-downs in the second quarter. OPEC chief Chakib Khelil predicted, "Oil prices will probably be between $150-170 during this summer. The devaluation of the dollar against the Euro will probably generate an $8 rise in the price of oil," he told France 24 television.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Warren Makes A Bet

Warren Makes A Bet

By John Mauldin | 26 June 2008

The Sage of Omaha made a bet that was written up in a recent Fortune magazine article. Basically, Warren Buffett bet that the S&P 500 would outperform a group of funds of hedge funds over the next ten years. A million dollars to someone's favorite charity is on the line. This week we will analyze the bet, using it as a springboard to learn about valuation and value investing. As we will see, there are times that making a bet on the S&P 500 to outperform hedge funds (or bonds or real estate or whatever asset class) makes sense and times when it doesn't.

Warren Makes A Bet

Buffett is the clear winner in investing, and his wisdom is followed by a large legion of fans, among which I am one. So, let me get myself in trouble and disagree with him on a small matter. Carol Loomis (one of my favorite financial writers) writes in this week's Fortune about a bet that Warren Buffett made with a hedge fund management company. You can read the fascinating story here. Quoting:

"And to that there is a certain history, which began at Berkshire's May 2006 annual meeting. Expounding that weekend on the transaction and management costs borne by investors, Buffett offered to bet any taker $1 million that over 10 years and after fees, the performance of an S&P index fund would beat 10 hedge funds that any opponent might choose. Some time later he repeated the offer, adding that since he hadn't been taken up on the bet, he must be right in his thinking."

A New York firm, Protégé Partners, which manages $3.5 billion in a fund of hedge funds, decided to accept that bet. Basically, Buffet and Protégé each put $320,000 into 10-year zero-coupon Treasury bonds that will be worth $1 million in 10 years. The bet is straightforward. Protégé has chosen five funds of hedge funds, and these funds must return more than the S&P 500 over the 10 years beginning January of 2008. (The list of funds is a secret.) The winner gets the $1 million donated to their favorite charity.

Which way would you bet? If the online response at Fortune is any indication, 90% of you would bet with Warren. As one enthusiastic responder wrote, "How can you bet against Buffett? I'd bet my life savings on it ..." Well, Tom, you might want to hedge your bet. Even Warren said he thinks his odds are only 60%. The basic premise of Buffett's position is that the high fees simply eat up any potential for extra profits, over those of a simple index fund. As Buffett writes:

"A number of smart people are involved in running hedge funds. But to a great extent their efforts are self-neutralizing, and their IQ will not overcome the costs they impose on investors. Investors, on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a group of funds of funds."

And he is right about the fees. Hedge funds, and especially funds of funds, must do much better than average to overcome their high fees. Loomis sums it up as follows:

"As for the fees that investors pay in the hedge fund world— and that, of course, is the crux of Buffett's argument— they are both complicated and costly. A fund of funds normally charges a 1% annual management fee. The hedge funds it puts that money into charge an annual management fee of their own, which for funds of funds is typically 1.5%. (The fees are paid quarterly by an investor and are figured on the value of his account at the time.)

"So that's
2.5% of an investor's capital that continually goes for these fees, regardless of the returns earned during a year. In contrast, Vanguard's S&P 500 index fund had an expense ratio last year of 15 basis points (0.15%) for ordinary shares and only seven basis points for Admiral shares, which are available to large investors. Admiral shares are the ones 'bought' by Buffett in the bet.

"On top of the management fee, the hedge funds typically collect
20% of any gains they make. That leaves 80% for the investors. The fund of funds takes 5% (or more) of that 80% as its share of the gains. The upshot is that only 76% (at most) of the annual return made on an investor's money accrues to him, with the rest going to the 'helpers' that Buffett has written about. Meanwhile, the investor is paying his inexorable management fee of 2.5% on capital.

"The summation is pretty obvious. For Protégé to win this bet, the five funds of funds it has picked must do much, much better than the S&P."

True. But the growth of hedge funds and fund of funds suggests that some think there is value there that is worth the fees. But let's set aside that argument for now, and look at the prospects for the bet between Protégé and Buffett.

It's All About Values

As I wrote in Bull's Eye Investing (Amazon.com) and occasionally stress in my writing, the long-term returns you get from index fund investing are very highly correlated with the P/E (price to earnings) ratio at the time you make your initial investment. The P/E is price divided by earnings. If the ratio is 10, then earnings are about 10% of the stock price. If the ratio is 20, they are about 5% of the stock price. The higher the price, the less earnings you get for your invested dollar. However, a rising P/E ratio can be a major boost to stock market returns.

If you make your investment when valuations are low, you return is going to be much higher over time than if you make your investment when valuations are high. Look at this graph from South African partner Prieur du Plessis of Plexus:



Prieur divided the S&P 500 into five groups based on the initial P/E ratio and then calculated what the returns would be for the next 10 years, after inflation. He also used a 10-year average of the P/E ratio, to take out the fluctuations caused by one-off events, recessions, etc. As you can see, and long-time readers should expect, if you invest when stocks are at their cheapest, you can make a remarkable 11% on average for the next 10 years after inflation. As stocks get more expensive in terms of their P/E, returns begin to fall. Real returns for the last group are only 3.2% on average.

We are currently in the range of the highest valuations. If you make the generous assumption that inflation will be 3% over the next decade, you are talking about a 6% total return, based on historical averages. Not bad, but not what a lot of investors are hoping for. Remember that 6% number, as we will revisit it in a moment.

One of my basic premises is that we need to look at markets in terms of valuation and not just price. Markets go from high valuations to low valuations and back to high. The round trip can take the better part of 30-40 years. These are long-term secular markets, and they are mean-reverting. By that I mean that markets will go both well above and well below the long-term mean average over time.

To see how well correlated long-term returns and P/E ratios are, you can go to www.frontlinethoughts.com and click on the link where it says "get the stock market graphs here" on the upper right-hand side. You can see what your returns would have been in any period of time since 1900. Then check at the top to see what the P/E ratio was at that time. If the return numbers are white, then P/E ratios were falling and returns were either negative or low. When the numbers are black, that means P/E ratios were rising, and returns are also likely to be good.

Look at the following charts from Vitaliy Katsenelson (author of the most excellent book Active Value Investing, and one I recommend to anyone interested in value investing.) Again, these are 10-year trailing P/E ratios. Notice how the P/Es always go back below the average? And we are a long way from the average now. There are two ways that we can get back to low P/Es. Either the stock market can go down or earnings can go up faster than prices (or some combination thereof). The stock market bottomed in 1974 in terms of price, but in terms of valuation the market took another eight years to get to its low. Then in 1982, with valuations below 10, the stock market was a coiled spring ready to explode.



Let's look at one more chart from Vitaliy. This chart shows the one-year trailing P/Es. Today, if you go to the S&P 500 tables at Standard and Poor's, you find the current P/E ratio is a heady 22, with the long-term one-year average being 15.2. There is a long way to go before we get to anything we can call mean reversion.



Hedging Your Bet

Now, let's look at how Warren's bet would have done in the bull market years of 1990-99. We will compare how a fund of hedge funds index from hedgefund.net did between 1990 and 1999, to the S&P 500.

(Note: these hedge fund indexes are representative of funds of funds in general, but you cannot invest in them. They have problems like survivor bias; they don't have all the fund of funds, just the ones that report, etc. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Further, the hedge fund climate is much different today than in 1990. But the indexes are the best proxy we can find if we want to do a comparison.)

The S&P 500 rather handily beat the hedge funds. The S&P 500 went from 353 to 1469 in those 10 years, for an average total return (including dividends) of 433%, or an average 18.2% a year. The hedge fund index returned 14% a year for a total return of 271%, net of fees. The standard deviation for the S&P 500 was 13.38% and for the hedge funds was a lower 7.87%, so the hedge funds were a lot less volatile. Still, buy-and-hold index investors were rewarded for the risk. The chart below shows how $1,000 invested might have grown over the 10 years.



Now, let's look at the last 10 years, from May 1998 to May 2008. Here we use a fund of funds index from Barclayhedge.com. Now, we find a different story. The market returned 4.21% on average, or a total of 51%, with a standard deviation of 14.7%. The hedge fund index returned 7.7%, with a standard deviation of 5.1%. So, you got a lot less return with a lot more volatility, if you stayed with the S&P 500.



Of course, there was a nasty bear market in 2000-2002, and a roaring bull market in the 1990s. But let me make one observation. In 1990 the P/E ratio was 15 and had been below 12 just a few quarters earlier. In 1998 the P/E ratio was 27.8, almost double what it was eight years earlier. A lot of the difference came from the starting point of stock market valuations.

Where are we today? The P/E ratio is 23.2. Earnings are dropping as we work our way through a very tough economy. As I have written elsewhere, I think the recovery, such as it is, will take at least two years before we can get back to 3% growth, because the twin bubbles of the housing market and the credit crisis will take at least two years to work themselves out. 1-2% growth in GDP for the next two years is not an environment for significant earnings growth. It is also not an environment in which stock markets are likely to thrive.

Roughly 20% of the S&P is financial stocks. Do you think they are likely as a group to start reporting robust earnings growth over the next two years? They are deleveraging, which will not help earnings growth. There are more write-offs to come. A significant portion of the S&P is tied to US consumers, who are pulling back. On the other hand, there are some very large multinational corporations that are benefitting from a weak dollar, as both their exports rise and their foreign subsidiaries profit.

But the climate is not favorable to robust earnings growth for the next few years. That will make it tougher for the stock market to keep up with the funds of hedge funds.

Mean Reversion Of National Wealth

One more thought pointed out to me by Woody Brock: National wealth is a mean-reversion machine. That is a fundamental basic truth in economics. Over very long periods of time (multiple decades), growth in national wealth will equal growth in nominal GDP. And by national wealth, I am referring to our homes, stocks, bonds, real estate, etc.

Now, nominal GDP has been running about 5.5% for a long time. But between 1981 and 2006, US national wealth grew at an astounding 7.2%, from $10 trillion to $57 trillion. Mean reversion, or getting back to the average, means that national wealth must dip below 5.5% for an extended period of time. Woody thinks that from 2009 to the end of the next decade, we could see national wealth grow between 2.5-3%, well below our recent experience.

National wealth is likely to fall this year and maybe next as housing values drop. This drop in wealth and slower growth means that consumers are not likely to return to their previous "shop till we drop" mode. And that is a serious pressure on earnings. Graham taught us that in the short run the stock market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a weighing machine. And what it weighs are earnings.

I have little doubt that earnings will rise at 6-8% on average over the next 10 years. The 1990s saw earnings more than double over 10 years, and the back of my napkin says that is around 8% annualized growth, although earnings dropped by 50% over the next three years. Over the very long run, earnings are going to grow at the level of nominal GDP, or around 5.5-6%. For the stock market to do more than 6%, P/E levels would have to rise to even loftier levels than at present. Can it happen? Sure, it did in the late '90s; but we saw how that ended.

Let's go back to the graphs from Katsenelson. If P/E ratios continue the process of mean reversion and continue to fall, that will be a serious headwind for stock market growth. And we have no example in history where valuations did not revert to the mean. That doesn't mean that this time it couldn't be different. But that is not usually the way to bet. If it was 1990 and a lower P/E, or 2002 and low P/Es (on a normalized basis), when the stock market outperformed the hedge funds, then I would not want to bet against Warren.

But with today's valuations, a Muddle Through Economy staring us in the face for the next two years, a potential and serious tax increase in 2010 that would prolong any recovery and be even more problematical for earnings and stocks, I think the absolute-return funds will win this time. In the end, it will depend on how good the funds of funds are that Protégé picked, but these are savvy managers. They want to win, and I bet they picked the best they could find. We will find out each year at the annual Berkshire meeting how the bet is coming along. Right now, the market is down 10% and the hedge funds are down about 2%, but this is a long race. The first five months mean very little. But the real winners will be the charities they have picked. And that is a good thing, no matter who wins the bet.

Now, if Buffett had bet that Berkshire would do better than the funds of funds, I would not take that bet. But that is another story.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Poor Augery For Unemployment Rate

June Conference Board Data Augurs Poorly For The Unemployment Rate

By Paul Kasriel | 26 June 2008

T.S. Eliot might have been off by a couple of months. It looks as though June might turn out to be the cruelest month instead of April. Earlier this month, the Buffalo Fed branch and the Philly Fed reported that manufacturing activity had deteriorated in their regions. Today the Richmond Fed corroborated the message from its regional brethren with a report showing that its composite manufacturing survey index dropped to minus 12 in June from minus 3 in May. At the same time that Richmond was reporting, the Conference Board released its June consumer confidence, or lack thereof, report.

Wow! Gasoline at 4 bucks a gallon really knocks the wind out of consumers' sails, to mix transportation metaphors. Chart 1 shows that the June reading on the present-conditions component of consumer confidence dropped to its lowest level since September 2003. But Chart 1 also shows that, in June, the expectations component of consumer confidence fell to its lowest level in the history of the series. Folks are so bummed out that they don't even want to take a vacation (see Chart 2), much less buy a house or a car.

Chart 1


Chart 2


Not only are high gasoline prices getting people down, but the job market also apparently is a downer. The spread between the percentages of respondents saying that jobs are hard to get minus the percentage saying that jobs are plentiful hit its highest level since December 2003. Chart 3 shows that there is a high correlation, 0.87, between this spread and the level of the unemployment rate. So, you might want to prepare for some pyrotechnics on Thursday morning, July 3.

Chart 3


Case-Shiller House Price Index Declines— Light at the End of the Tunnel?

The Case-Shiller Composite 20 house price index dropped at an annual rate of 18.5% seasonally adjusted (by me) in April compared with March. This was a relatively sharp slowdown in the rate of descent as the March month-to-month annualized decline was 24.2%. On a year-over-year basis, this house price index descended at its fastest rate to date, 15.3% vs. 14.3% in March (see Chart 4). If, in fact, the slowdown in the rate of price decreases on a month-to-month basis is signal, not noise, then perhaps we are nearing an inflection point in house prices.

That is, the trend in house prices will still be down for months to come, but the rate at which these prices are declining might be moderating. This would be "less bad" news for households and for holders of home-mortgage-related debt. But before these mortgage holders pop the champagne corks, keep in mind that the Case-Shiller home price index screens out foreclosure auction sales (hat tip on this point to Eugene Xu of Deutsche Bank Securities via Michael Nicoletti, an independent housing market analyst). Also keep in mind, as can be seen in Chart 4, that the month-to-month changes in the price index are "noisy."

Chart 4


Paul L. Kasriel, Director Of Economic Research
The Northern Trust Company
Economic Research Department

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Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Priced For Poor Returns

Us Stock Market Priced For Poor Returns
Click here for a link to complete article:

By Rich Toscano and John Simon | 26 June 2008

In early 2007 we wrote an article summarizing the risks in the U.S. stock market. The article cited a study by legendary value investor Jeremy Grantham in which it was shown that, on average, long term stock market returns have corresponded quite well with valuations at the time of investment. Here we reproduce Grantham's study with updated data and a variation or two, followed by some thoughts about where we are now in the markets and what to do about it.

Valuations And Long-Term Returns

The idea behind the study is fairly simple. We took 100 years' worth of monthly data on the S&P 500 stock market index. For each month, we calculated two figures: the market's average valuation during the month, and the 10 year total returns on the market dating from that month. Here is a little more detail on the calculations, for those interested. (If you are not interested, feel free to skip the next two paragraphs).

The market valuation is a modified price-to-earnings ratio based not on the past year's earnings, as are typically used, but on the past 10 years' worth of earnings. This technique is recommended by Yale professor Robert Shiller (who also provided most of the data for this study) in order to smooth out the shorter-term ups and downs in market earnings that result from the booms and busts of the business cycle. Earnings are also adjusted for inflation to provide an even comparison between periods with different levels of inflation.

We think that this method of valuation makes a lot of sense for long term investors because it smooths out earnings spikes and troughs and provides an indication of how expensive stocks are compared to a sustainable level of earnings. The 10-year future return for each month includes both stock price appreciation and dividends. Returns are also adjusted for inflation.

Once we had each month's valuation and return, we separated all the months out into five quintiles based on valuation (i.e., cheapest through most expensive) and determined the average annualized 10-year return for each quintile. The chart below shows the results.



Clearly, starting valuation has been quite predictive of average long-term returns. People who bought in the cheapest 20% of months enjoyed an amazing average 10-year return of 15.7% per year after inflation. Their counterparts who bought during the most expensive 20% of months averaged just 3.4% per year. And at every quintile in between, higher valuations led to lower average returns.

As one might expect given the above results, people who bought at high valuations were also a lot more likely to lose money even after 10 years. A full 33.3% of the time periods in the highest valuation quintile led to real 10-year returns that were negative, while the lowest valution quintile didn't contain a single period of negative real returns. As a matter of fact, the very worst annualized return for the lowest valuation quintile was 4.9%. It is typical to believe that higher rewards go hand in hand with taking more risk, but this study indicates that investors who heed the message of valuations can enjoy higher returns with lower risk.

Incidentally, valuations predict average returns on shorter timeframes than 10 years. For instance, the 7-year return results looked very similar to the above with a 17.3% return for the cheapest quintile and a 3.9% return for the most expensive quintile. Averages are similar even for shorter timeframes. The problem is that the variation among the numbers comprising those averages gets higher and higher as the timeframe gets shorter, rendering the predictions less and less useful.

This makes sense— a market that's overvalued or undervalued may stay that way for years, but as time goes on the market is more and more likely to have reverted to a more normal valuation (with a commensurate impact on returns). In case anyone thinks that 100 years ago is ancient and irrelevant history, we also ran the study for the past 50 years and achieved very similar results, with the cheapest quintile sporting an average real return of 15.0 percent versus just 3.1 percent for the most expensive quintile.

Where Are We Now, And What To Do

With the S&P 500 at 1,377.20 as of this writing, we fall comfortably within the most expensive 20% of time periods as measured by the price to 10-year real earnings ratio. As a matter of fact, we fall comfortably within the most expensive 10% of time periods. This means that we are in a situation that has, on average, led to very poor long-term returns for buyers of the S&P 500.

So what does one do?

We'll start by talking about what not to do.

Conventional wisdom has it that the stock market returns 10% per year over the long term, so at any given time you should just close your eyes, go all in to a stock market index fund, and forget about it. Hopefully the above study sheds some light on why this is a poor approach. As the chart shows, that 10%-per-year figure includes lengthy periods of widely disparate returns. And starting valuations provide a pretty good idea of the kinds of risks and returns that can be expected in the future.

All in all, the strategy of buying the entire market regardless of prevailing valuation just doesn't make sense to us.

Granted, people who go all in to the U.S. stock market right now may end up getting decent long-term returns. It has happened, even at these valuation levels, and even over 10-year time frames. But it's been fairly rare, and unless "this time is different," history suggests that the stock market is likely to provide poor long-term returns and a higher risk of loss from this level of valuation.

At the same time, staying out of the market entirely entails its own risks. With short-term interest rates below the rate of inflation, cash is a sure loser for all but the shortest time periods. For this reason, as we warned in our inaugural article appearing on this website, cash is anything but a safe haven. Bonds are even worse, generally speaking, because we feel that they are seriously underpricing long-term inflation risk.

The solution, we think, is to stay invested, but to carefully choose your investments rather than indiscriminately buying the entire stock market. The above study treats the entire stock market as a single unit— this is useful to get an idea of overall valuation, but it's certainly not a limitation that we suffer as investors. The ability to invest in individual sectors, in other countries, and in alternative asset classes is important to investors trying to navigate high-risk, high-valuation markets like this one.

We firmly believe that there are great profit opportunities in any market, and this one is no different. But when markets are broadly overvalued, it is that much more important to choose your investments carefully. It is crucial to stay cautious, skeptical, and patient; to diligently seek out good values and avoid the risks that are being underestimated by others; and to analyze the economic and monetary trends and understand their likely effects on the markets and the world.

Such analysis is exactly what we do here at Pacific Capital Associates. Feel free to visit our commentary archive if you're interested in our thoughts on the risks and rewards to be found in today's markets.

  M O R E. . .

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

New Homes— Taking Longer To Move

New Homes— Taking Longer To Move The Merchandise

By Paul Kasriel | 26 June 2008

I hope the Census Bureau can count the number of people in the U.S. better than it can count the number of new homes sold. The first estimate of a given month's sales is notoriously off. So, we should take the first estimate of May sales and inventories of new homes with a grain of salt. Be that as it may, May new home sales retreated 2.5% to an annualized pace of 512 thousand units. The low sales rate for this cycle to date is 501 thousand established in March. The sales region that really put a dent in the total was the wild West, where sales declined 11.63% to a cycle low annual rate.

But I want to concentrate on the difficulty developers are having in moving their "merchandise" and what the supply looks like relative to demand. Chart 1 shows that it took a record high 8.5 months for builders to sell a home after it was completed. Also chart 1 shows that the months' supply of completed homes at the May sales rate was a record 10.1 months. The bottom line is that that the bottom in the housing market and house prices is nowhere in sight.

Chart 1


The Nondefense Market For Durable Goods— The Big Picture

Chart 2 shows that in May, shipments of durable goods excluding defense were down year-over-year 4.4%; new orders for the same were down 4.3%. Both started to soften in late 2006 when the tentacles of the housing recession began squeezing other sectors of the economy. The housing recession is taking its toll on the demand for discretionary consumer goods, which is reflected in the contraction in durable goods activity.

This year, there has been a bit of a rebound in shipments and new orders for nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft (see Chart 3). Relatively strong export demand probably is playing a role here. This export demand is likely to allow the U.S. manufacturing sector to escape the degree of contraction it often suffers in recession. If, however, the manufacturing surveys reported by the New York Fed's Buffalo branch, the Philly Fed and the Richmond Fed are any guide, June durable goods orders and shipments data could be quite weak.

Chart 2


Chart 3


The Norwegian Krone as the Next Reserve Currency?

Today, the Norges Bank, the Norwegian central bank, raised its policy interest rate 25 basis points to 5.75%. That puts the Norges Bank's policy rate 293 basis points over the May year-over-year CPI inflation rate on a harmonized basis (see Chart 4). Notice that the Norges Bank was raising its policy rate in the first half of 2007 as the inflation rate was falling. The Norges Bank is offering savers an "honest" return on their funds. Isn't this what you would look for in a reserve currency's central bank?

Chart 4


Fomc Stays On Hold, Keeping Its Options Open

The Fed is less worried about a death spiral in real economic activity and more worried about upside risks on inflation than it was at the end of April. This does not mean that the economic downside risks and inflation upside risks are equal in the eyes of the FOMC. In my opinion, the Fed remains more worried about weaker economic activity than it is about a wage-price spiral. Recent data suggest that housing is nowhere near a bottom, capital spending remains weak and the labor markets continue to soften.

The next element of aggregate demand to cave in will be state/local government spending. The jury still is out as to whether consumer spending is out of the woods. The motor vehicle producers would say "no." Meanwhile, industrial metals prices appear to have topped out, crude oil prices have edged lower, and one of the Fed's favorite market-based measures of inflation expectations— the implied 5-year inflations expectations 5 years forward— has fallen back in range (see Chart 5). My bet is that the FOMC remains on hold for the rest of the year as consumer spending softens again and headline inflation moderates in the third quarter.

Chart 5


Paul L. Kasriel, Director Of Economic Research
The Northern Trust Company
Economic Research Department

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

Global Recession Watch

Global Recession Watch: A Dozen Significant Economies Are At Risk Of A Hard Landing

By Nouriel Roubini | 25 June 2008

Which countries around the world are at risk of a hard landing, i.e. a sharp growth slowdown and an outright recession? Following the U.S. the list is now growing. Countries now at risk of a hard landing now include: the U.S., the U.K., Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Latvia, Estonia and a few other central-south European countries.

Let us start the countdown and see the details of the recession risks in each one of these countries

The United States is already in a recession; while headline GDP figures still show positive growth in Q1 many other indicators show that the US economy entered a recession in Q1: monthly GDP (as measured by MacroAdvisers) is down since February through April (so far available data); employment has been falling for five months in a row; most components of aggregate demand (durable and non durable consumption, residential investment, capex spending by the corporate sector) are already in negative growth territory; industrial production and manufacturing production are falling. So both on the demand and supply side it is clear we are in a recession. The only open issue is whether this will be a short and shallow V-shaped recession lasting six months (as the consensus forecasts) or a longer and deeper U-shaped recession lasting 12 to 18 months (as being argued in this forum).

The worst housing bust since the Great Depression, the US consumer being shopped out, saving-less, debt-burdened and with plunging confidence, a worsening credit crunch and financial crisis that is spreading well outside of the subprime mortgage market, oil now above $130 a barrel, inflation rising leading to stagflationary risks and constraining the Fed’s behavior are all reasons why this will be a severe and protracted recession.

What about the rest of the world?

A hard landing recession is now highly likely in the UK, Spain and Ireland where housing bubbles even larger than the one in the U.S. are now going bust. In these three economies the credit bubble was not limited to housing; you also had— as in the U.S.— a surge in unsecured consumer debt (credit cards, etc.) that became excessive. Add to this bust the effect of overvalued currencies and real appreciation leading to large current account deficits and you get a dynamics very similar to that of the US.

In the rest of the Eurozone Italy and Portugal also look close to a recession. There the deflation of smaller housing bubbles is one factor. More importantly the strong Euro is really hurting the competitiveness of all of the Club Med Eurozone members (Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece). These countries— whose exports tend to be more labor intensive and lower value added— were already losing export market shares to China and Asia even before the euro strengthened so much. But a euro close to 1.60 relative to the US dollar and the sharp appreciation of the euro relative to Asian currencies is really a massive problem for the Club Med.

Add to these woes of these countries— and more generally of the Eurozone economies— the following additional bearish factor: oil close to $140 (that even converted into a stronger euro is much more expensive in euro terms than a year ago). The effects of the liquidity and credit crunch affects European corporations' ability to borrow even more than their US counterparts as they rely more on bank financing rather than capital markets; the fact that real domestic demand— especially consumption has been anemic in the Eurozone as real income/wages have been anemic; the fact that a lot of the growth of the Eurozone— especially Germany— was driven by net exports that will now slow because of the US recession and global slowdown; and finally the fact that the ECB— worrying about inflation— is on hold and likely to hike rates while at least the Fed has confronted downside risks to growth via a 325bps easing in the Fed Funds rate. So no wonder that— after a good Q1— growth is sharply slowing down in Europe and the Eurozone, including Germany (as a euro close to $1.60 hurts even an export super-power such as Germany) where the forward looking Ifo survey now suggests seriously weakening business confidence. And the latest figures for industrial production in the Eurozone show an outright contraction.

So, in summary in the European/Eurozone area UK, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal are headed to a hard landing recession while growth is slowing down dramatically in the rest of the Eurozone.

Another major economy at risk of a recession is Japan. In the last couple of years Japan was growing at an anemic but ok rate for two main reasons: a weak yen and the strong growth of exports to the U.S. driven by strong U.S. growth. But now the yen is much stronger than in the past and the U.S. recession is already taking a toll both on Japanese exports to the U.S. and the U.S. sales of Japanese subsidiaries (such as the auto transplants of Japanese car-makers in the U.S.).

In addition to the double whammy noted above, there are two additional negative shocks to the Japanese economy: first, with oil well above $130 a barrel a country like Japan that imports every single drop of oil is hit by a nasty stagflationary shock; second, a variety of measures of the Japanese corporate sector signal weakening of performance, profitability and confidence. Put these four negative shocks together and Japan— after a good Q1— is slowing down sharply and headed towards a likely recession.

Canada may also be headed towards a recession. Its GDP actually fell by 0.3% y/y in Q1 because of falling inventory and residential investment. 75% of Canada’s exports go to the U.S; thus a U.S. recession has significant effects on Canada, even if rising commodity prices have benefited the commodity exporting provinces of the country. In addition to the U.S. contraction there are other negative factors slowing down Canada: high credit costs and a strong Canadian dollar crowding out non-commodity exports; are offsetting strong commodity exports and buoyant domestic demand. Also with inflation rising, the Bank of Canada is now constrained in its willingness to cut further policy rates.

New Zealand is now most likely already in the middle of a mild recession. Consumption is declining as urban households are hit by a bursting housing bubble, high debt servicing burdens, high interest rates, and high fuel and food prices. The service sector (accounting for 67% of GDP) has slowed down sharply and experienced a sharp drop in employment. Even rural households are in trouble in spite of high commodity prices: a severe drought has reduced farm production.

Thus, falling exports, plus the increasing profits paid to the foreign owners of New Zealand's oil fields are widening the current account deficit, already one of the largest among advanced economies. The central bank has hiked interest rates because of its inflation concerns. And the consensus forecasts Q1:08 GDP growth is at at -0.3% q/q followed by another contraction in Q2.

Finally, even some emerging market economies are at risk of financial stress and hard landing, especially the Baltic states and some central-south European economies. All the three Baltic countries are experiencing a sharp growth slowdown, with some analysts calling for outright recessions. Both Latvia’s and Estonia’s GDP contracted in Q1 (-1.9% and -0.5%, respectively), while Lithuanian growth was close to zero. Weak domestic demand is the main driver of the slowdown, propelled by tighter credit conditions and a real estate market bust after the bubble of the last few years. Adding to Baltic troubles is double-digit inflation, which is eroding consumers’ spending power and leading to concerns of stagflation.

In Central-South Europe Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary have twin fiscal and current account deficits, balance sheet vulnerabilities (currency and maturity mismatches), overvalued currencies (especially Bulgaria and Romania). While their growth is still positive, they are most at risk that a sudden stop of capital inflows and worsening global credit conditions may lead to financial pressures (reduced availability and rising cost of foreign capital to finance their external imbalances and thus pressures on their currencies and other asset markets).

Given that the housing boom in some of these countries was financed mostly in foreign currency mortgages there is a risk that a sharp downward movement in their currencies would lead to a severe balance sheet effect that would create financial stress for the household sector. Thus, conditional on a serious U.S. recession and a global economic slowdown these countries are vulnerable to financial stresses and risk a hard landing.

For more details on the countries at risk of a hard landing see also the RGE Monitor coverage of Global Recession Monitor: Which Countries Are on the Brink of Recession?

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

USA 2008: The Great Depression

USA 2008: The Great Depression

By David Usborne In New York, The Independent, UK | 1 April 2008

Food stamps are the symbol of poverty in the US. In the era of the credit crunch, a record 28 million Americans are now relying on them to survive— a sure sign the world's richest country faces economic crisis.


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.

Disadvantaged Americans queue for aid in New York.


We knew things were bad on Wall Street, but on Main Street it may be worse. Startling official statistics show that as a new economic recession stalks the United States, a record number of Americans will shortly be depending on food stamps just to feed themselves and their families. Dismal projections by the Congressional Budget Office in Washington suggest that in the fiscal year starting in October, 28 million people in the US will be using government food stamps to buy essential groceries, the highest level since the food assistance programme was introduced in the 1960s.

The increase— from 26.5 million in 2007— is due partly to recent efforts to increase public awareness of the programme and also a switch from paper coupons to electronic debit cards. But above all it is the pressures being exerted on ordinary Americans by an economy that is suddenly beset by troubles. Housing foreclosures, accelerating jobs losses and fast-rising prices all add to the squeeze. Emblematic of the downturn until now has been the whole communities of houses seized in foreclosure all across the country, and myriad families separated from their homes. But now the crisis is starting to hit the country in its gut. Getting food on the table is a challenge many Americans are finding harder to meet. As a barometer of the country's economic health, food stamp usage may not be perfect, but can certainly tell a story.

Michigan has been in its own mini-recession for years as its collapsing industrial base, particularly in the car industry, has cast more and more out of work. Now, one in eight residents of the state is on food stamps, double the level in 2000. "We have seen a dramatic increase in recent years, but we have also seen it climbing more in recent months," Maureen Sorbet, a spokeswoman for Michigan's programme, said. "It's been increasing steadily. Without the programme, some families and kids would be going without."

But the trend is not restricted to the rust-belt regions. Forty states are reporting increases in applications for the stamps, actually electronic cards that are filled automatically once a month by the government and are swiped by shoppers at the till, in the 12 months from December 2006. At least six states, including Florida, Arizona and Maryland, have had a 10 per cent increase in the past year. In Rhode Island, the segment of the population on food stamps has risen by 18 per cent in two years.

The food programme started 40 years ago when hunger was still a daily fact of life for many Americans. The recent switch from paper coupons to the plastic card system has helped remove some of the stigma associated with the food stamp programme. The card can be swiped as easily as a bank debit card. To qualify for the cards, Americans do not have to be exactly on the breadline. The programme is available to people whose earnings are just above the official poverty line.

For Hubert Liepnieks, the card is a lifeline he could never afford to lose. Just out of prison, he sleeps in overnight shelters in Manhattan and uses the card at a Morgan Williams supermarket on East 23rd Street. Yesterday, he and his fiancée, Christine Schultz, who is in a wheelchair, shared one banana and a cup of coffee bought with the 82 cents left on it. "They should be refilling it in the next three or four days," Liepnieks says. At times, he admits, he and friends bargain with owners of the smaller grocery shops to trade the value of their cards for cash, although it is illegal. "It can be done. I get $7 back on $10."

Richard Enright, the manager at this Morgan Williams, says the numbers of customers on food stamps has been steady but he expects that to rise soon. "In this location, it's still mostly old people and people who have retired from city jobs on stamps," he says. Food stamp money was designed to supplement what people could buy rather than covering all the costs of a family's groceries. But the problem now, Mr Enright says, is that soaring prices are squeezing the value of the benefits.

"Last St Patrick's Day, we were selling Irish soda bread for $1.99. This year it was $2.99. Prices are just spiralling up, because of the cost of gas trucking the food into the city and because of commodity prices. People complain, but I tell them it's not my fault everything is more expensive." The US Department of Agriculture says the cost of feeding a low-income family of four has risen 6 per cent in 12 months. "The amount of food stamps per household hasn't gone up with the food costs," says Dayna Ballantyne, who runs a food bank in Des Moines, Iowa. "Our clients are finding they aren't able to purchase food like they used to."

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Shakeout Roils Hedge-Funds

Shakeout Roils Hedge-Fund World
Big Firms Gain Clout As Field Matures; Parking The Maserati


By Gregory Zuckerman, WSJ | 19 June 2008

The hedge-fund business— among the most reliable fortune-producing machines in recent years— is going through a brutal shakeout. Just a few years ago, traders found it relatively easy to quit Wall Street jobs, hang out a hedge-fund shingle and cash in. Investors beat down the doors with eagerness reminiscent of the late-1990s dot-com frenzy. It took only a decade for the industry to grow to 8,000 funds from a few hundred.
• What's Changing: After years of rapid growth, the hedge-fund business is maturing— and smaller funds are taking the hit. The inflow of new money from investors has already been slowing and hedge-fund returns have been flat, adding to the pressure.
• The Backstory: Investors view larger firms as safer amid market turmoil, and more service-oriented.
• Big Picture: Some funds are so huge, they now behave more like traditional investment banks.
• Big Difference With The Banks: Hedge funds make much fatter paydays for their staff. Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies, Steven Cohen of SAC Capital and Kenneth Griffin of Citadel Investment Group all earned at least
$1 billion last year.
• The Next Test: The possibility of a wave of withdrawals at the end of this month— the next quarterly date on which many investors are permitted to pull out their money.

But now smaller hedge funds, including top performers, are shuttering, and even brand-name traders are finding it tougher to get new ones off the ground. Only 1,152 new funds were launched in 2007, down almost 50% from a 2005 peak, according to Hedge Fund Research Inc. Because so many funds closed last year or merged into others, the business expanded by just 589 funds overall, the smallest increase in six years.

Managers of hedge funds— private partnerships that cater to wealthy individuals and institutions and are less regulated than, say, mutual funds— like to think of themselves as a unique breed, capable of racking up big profits from opportunities that ordinary investors overlook. But in fact their profession is tracing the path of other businesses, whether autos or computers, that enjoyed rapid growth, led by aggressive entrepreneurs, before confronting deep challenges. And just as, say, eBay Inc. and Yahoo Inc. left rivals in the dust, or Vanguard Group and Fidelity Investments came to dominate the mutual-fund world, the largest hedge funds, such as Och-Ziff Capital Management, D.E. Shaw & Co. and Paulson & Co. are pulling away from the pack. By the end of last year, 87% of all the money in the business was handled by funds managing $1 billion or more, and 60% was held by managers sitting on $5 billion or more.

The dominance by the largest funds has been accelerating: In the past two months alone, the world's largest public hedge-fund company, Man Group PLC, increased assets by $4 billion, to $78.5 billion. The shift is helping the big funds play a more powerful role in shaping the business and financial landscape. Last month, for example, Carl Icahn's fund, Icahn Associates, launched a bitter fight with Yahoo to try to gain control of its board. His hope is to entice Microsoft Corp. to revive its interest in buying Yahoo.

Although that looks increasingly unlikely, it would theoretically yield a payday of hundreds of millions of dollars for Mr. Icahn's firm. The megafunds increasingly behave more like sprawling investment banks, replete with layers of management, rather than swashbuckling investment vehicles. Some funds even have started offering basic corporate loans, a field traditionally left to regular banks.

Sterling Credentials

The transformation of the hedge-fund business caught Bertrand des Pallieres off guard. For years, Mr. des Pallieres cashed hefty paychecks as a top trader at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and then at Deutsche Bank AG, before leaving last year to launch a hedge fund of his own. He had sterling credentials— and a terrific running start: Deutsche Bank indicated it would invest hundreds of millions of dollars with his new firm, SPQR Capital LLP, according to Mr. des Pallieres.

He rented swanky office space in London's upscale Mayfair district and dangled generous pay packages to staff his fund. Mr. des Pallieres got so distracted launching the business that, last summer, he forgot to pay the parking bills on his $160,000 blue Maserati Cambiocorsa. The coupe was impounded for three months before he noticed. Mr. des Pallieres set lofty goals for his fund. "We thought a billion dollars was a good figure to count on," he says. But just over a month ago he shelved the project and fired half his staff. Deutsche Bank had second thoughts about becoming an investor, Mr. des Pallieres says, and he couldn't find other takers.

Deutsche says it never committed to making the investment.

Today, Mr. des Pallieres has a more modest goal of investing smaller sums in infrastructure assets such as ports and bridges, a longer-term play. "You benchmark yourself against the firms that started two or three years ago, and you get depressed," he says. On the winning side are goliath funds run by money managers like Daniel Och. The 47-year-old Mr. Och, who left Goldman Sachs in 1994 to launch Och-Ziff, made $1 billion last year when his firm went public. While the general perception is that successful hedge funds post eye-popping gains, that's not his selling point. So far this year, none of his funds have gained more than 1.2%, though he is still beating the overall market.

When Mr. Och meets potential investors, he emphasizes his firm's risk-management skills, including a track record that includes only 20 losing months in its 15 years. Over the same period, the S&P 500 has had 59 losing months. Investors like the sound of that. Och-Ziff managed $33.3 billion at the end of the first quarter, up 30% from a year earlier. Investors "particularly appreciate how we preserve their capital" in market dips, Mr. Och says.

Indeed, simply racking up top returns isn't enough in the current mood. Xerion Capital Partners LLC scored compounded annual returns averaging 21%, after fees, in its five years of existence. Nevertheless, last year its founder, Daniel Arbess, saw that large institutions such as pension funds and endowments were becoming reluctant to put in new money. They told Mr. Arbess they wanted to see a bigger client-service team and that Xerion, with several hundred million in assets, was simply too small. So in October, Mr. Arbess sold his firm to much bigger Perella Weinberg Partners, a $3 billion firm formed by banker Joseph Perella. Now, institutional investors are once again showing interest.

'Tough to Manage'

"The bar has gone up, it's tough to manage $250 million to $500 million," says David McCarthy, a 20-year hedge-fund pro. He recently shuttered his own fund, which invested in other hedge funds, even though its returns topped the market last year. The reason: Investors kept telling him the $300 million firm was too small. Pressures like these reflect the changing nature of hedge-fund investors themselves. Traditionally, the investors were wealthy individuals seeking the hottest funds with the biggest returns. Pension funds often were wary, viewing hedge funds as risky.

Now, however, institutional investors are changing that view. Pensions, charities and endowments increasingly are investing in hedge funds in part because of the potential to make money even in a down market. (The funds attempt to do that by making bets on both rising and falling prices.) However, institutional investors tend to prefer larger funds with brand-name recognition, and avoid scrappy upstarts. "We used to be more hesitant to give money to large funds, the fear was they wouldn't perform as well as others, but that hasn't been the case lately," says Brett Barth, who helps run BBR Partners LLC, a $4 billion New York firm that invests in hedge funds. That said, the larger the hedge funds get, the tougher it likely will be to stay nimble and generate outsized returns.

Despite the tougher environment, hedge funds remain an extremely lucrative business. Most charge investors a management fee of least 1% of assets invested, then 20% or more of any gains. Overall, the $1.9 trillion hedge-fund industry is holding up. The average fund is flat this year, through May, according to Hedge Fund Research. That beats the decline of 3.80% in the Standard & Poor's 500 in that period, though it's below the gain of 0.94% in the Lehman Brothers bond index. Last year, the average hedge fund gained 10%, compared with returns of 5.5% for the S&P 500 and 7.8% for the Lehman index.

But because of their fee structure— which includes a percentage of gains— many funds find it hard to pay their employees if they can't generate gains. At the same time, the debt-market turmoil of the past year has undermined a key hedge-fund investing strategy. Until recently, funds routinely amplified their returns by investing lots of borrowed money. However, as bank lending has tightened, that strategy has taken a serious hit. Smaller and newer funds are having the most trouble arranging this kind of borrowing.

The more challenging market conditions mean the gap between winning and losing funds is widening. Last year saw the widest divergence between top-performing funds and bottom-performing funds in more than five years, according to Hedge Fund Research. The top 10% of funds scored gains averaging 62% last year, while the bottom 10% had losses of 14%. Brad Alford, who once picked hedge funds for the Duke Endowment, a charity established by the family that founded Duke University, and now runs Alpha Capital Management LLC, an Atlanta financial-services company that caters to wealthy individuals, says he is placing fewer clients in hedge funds.

That is partly because there has been a rush of competitive products, such as low-cost mutual funds that try to act like hedge funds. "We used to invest in hedge funds because we got stocklike returns with bondlike volatility," Mr. Alford says. "Now we're getting bondlike returns with stocklike volatility." Another reason he's turning away from hedge funds is tax-related: Short-term profits from hedge funds are taxed at a 40% rate, which is higher than taxes on long-term trading gains from other kinds of investments.

Pushback From Investors

Mr. des Pallieres, the founder of SPQR Capital, didn't expect so much pushback from investors. He had been in a division at Deutsche Bank that had anticipated— and therefore profited from— last year's mortgage-market crisis, and imagined there would be rich investment opportunities in the aftermath. So last year he rushed to launch his own hedge fund. Deutsche Bank's interest in his firm gave him confidence, he says. Early meetings with other potential investors also seemed positive.

By last fall, however, the outlook darkened. He read a news report that the Deutsche Bank executive he was negotiating with had left the bank. It soon became clear that the big German bank wasn't going to ante up. "Deutsche Bank invests in hedge funds and other investment vehicles whenever we think the opportunity is attractive," a bank spokeswoman said. Executives at other banks still seemed interested in investing in his fund. Until, that is, Mr. des Pallieres realized that some of them were suddenly fighting to keep their own jobs, rather than focusing on his hedge fund.

"People kept getting fired" in the middle of negotiations, Mr. des Pallieres recalls.

To boost morale of his staff, he told employees he was confident investors would turn up. But Mr. des Pallieres was spending as much as $1 million a month keeping the firm operating. Then, in January, when fellow London-based hedge fund Peloton Advisors suffered billions of dollars of losses in a matter of days, his remaining investors backed out. Mr. des Pallieres and his girlfriend went to a resort on the Maldives for a week's vacation, trying to figure out what to do.

When he returned, he called a meeting for the firm's employees, telling them he wasn't willing to fund the business anymore. Mr. des Pallieres is refocusing the firm on the narrower business of investing in infrastructure assets such as bridges. He's also cutting his expenses. But he's hanging on to the Maserati. "It's not that bad," Mr. des Pallieres says.

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Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

New Crisis Threatens Healthy Banks

New Crisis Threatens 'Healthy' Banks

By David Cho, WP | 22 June 2008

Late Loan Payments Hurt Smaller Lenders That Dodged Subprime Mess

Peter Fitzgerald, a former U.S. senator from Illinois, founded Chain Bridge Bank in McLean. Because of the trouble in home-equity and commercial real estate loans, he says, "you will have some economic Darwinism" among banks. (photo by Gerald Martineau— The Washington Post)


Increasing struggles by consumers and businesses to make payments on a variety of loans, not just mortgages, are setting off a new wave of trouble in the financial sector that is battering even institutions that had steered clear of the subprime-home-loan debacle. Late payments on home-equity loans are at a record high, according to fresh data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. The delinquency rates on loans for cars, small businesses and construction are spiking to levels not seen in a decade or more.

Unlike last year, when soaring mortgage defaults sparked a crisis of confidence in the financial system, the root of these problems is the downturn in the broader economy. Simply put, consumers and businesses are strapped for cash with job losses growing and retail sales falling, economists said. "We are not finished with the mortgage problem, but you are starting to see increased delinquencies in other forms of consumer debt," said Paul Kasriel, an economist at Northern Trust Securities. "We are in the eye of the hurricane. We had the first wave of the credit crisis, and it was quite damaging. But there's another wave coming, and it's likely to be as destructive."

The institutions most at risk in this new phase of the credit crisis are regional and local banks, many of which stayed away from subprime mortgages. These firms are key drivers of economic activity in communities across the country. Without them, consumers would lose a source of personal loans. Small businesses would struggle to stay afloat. Construction companies often can't finance local projects without these banks.

Because they have fewer options than big Wall Street firms for raising emergency funds, these regional and local banks tend to be more vulnerable in a crisis. In the Washington area, the stock prices of several local banks have already plummeted, with shares of Virginia Commerce Bank falling nearly 50 percent and Alliance Bank dropping about 45 percent since the beginning of the year. Others swung to a loss in the first quarter after remaining profitable through last year's financial turmoil. The Federal Reserve put at least one, Millennium Bankshares of Reston, under close scrutiny this month out of concern for its financial condition.

The market values of some of these banks have fallen below their book value, or what accountants say the firms' assets are worth minus their debts. This is a sign that investors expect more losses this year. The market value of Virginia Commerce is about $142 million, below its book value of about $175 million, while Alliance's market value has dwindled to $18.4 million, compared with its book value of $44 million. The situation is worse in the Southwest and Midwest, where several community banks are teetering and a few have already collapsed.

Even as this second wave erodes the stability of the country's banks, it is already taking a heavy toll on ordinary borrowers. Vanessa Chavez and her family took out a home-equity loan in 2003 to pay for some remodeling of their District home and for the medical bills for her pregnancy. Their monthly payments, once the new loan was added to their mortgage, jumped from about $2,000 to $3,700. Chavez had hoped to help pay the bill by getting a high-paying job.

But the economic downturn sabotaged her plan, and she finally took a job as an assistant manager at a Domino's Pizza. Late last year, her mother declared personal bankruptcy, hoping to get the house payments lowered. "We're doing everything we can to stay in the house," said Chavez, 21. "We've been going through tough times, so we're trying to do as much as we can, even if it is killing us." For lenders, there is little recourse when a home-equity loan defaults or a homeowner declares bankruptcy. They can seize the collateral for the loan, in this case the house, only after the primary mortgage is paid off.

From October to March, $6.7 billion in home-equity loans became delinquent, increasing the total by 45 percent, according to SNL Financial. The delinquency rate is now 2.24 percent, according to the FDIC, which began tracking the data in 1991. Losses at banks are going up as a result. J.P. Morgan Chase absorbed $450 million of home-equity-loan losses in the first quarter, up from $248 million in the previous quarter. It said its total home-equity losses could double by the end of the year.

Smaller banks have even more exposure to such loans. Overwhelmingly, the institutions that hold the most home-equity loans are regional banks, such as SunTrust Banks and National City, according to Fitch Ratings. Late payments and defaults in every other major category of consumer debt also rose in the first quarter, the American Bankers Association reported. Auto loans issued through car dealers have a delinquency rate of 3.13 percent, the highest since at least 1990, according the ABA.

"The rise in consumer credit delinquencies is consistent with a rapidly slowing economy," said James Chessen, the ABA's chief economist. "Stress in the housing market still dominates the story, but it's a broader tale of an overall weak economy." Businesses are also feeling the pain of relying too much on credit. Construction and development loans, a specialty of regional and local banks, hit a delinquency rate of 7.18 percent at the end of March, the highest in 14 years, according to the FDIC. In October, the rate was 3.22 percent.

The trend worries regulators. "Right now, too many community bankers are having too hard a time coming to grips with the problems that have emerged in their commercial real estate portfolios," Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan said in a speech last month. In the Washington area, home-equity and commercial real estate loans represent a significant share of the banking business, and the trouble in these two areas is a source of deep concern, said Peter Fitzgerald, a former U.S. senator from Illinois who founded Chain Bridge Bank in McLean.

"The banks around here all have an extraordinary concentration in real estate," said Fitzgerald, adding that his bank has followed conservative lending practices since opening in August. "And what will happen is you will have some economic Darwinism. The banks with the strongest balance sheet will not only survive but will go on to prosper." But even the region's healthiest banks are anxious about the prospect of a prolonged recession.

"We are pretty upbeat right now; our guys are feeling really good," said Bernard H. Clineburg, chairman and chief executive of Cardinal Bank. The firm recorded a profit of $2 million in the first quarter, attributing the result to conservative lending policies. "But if people keep losing their jobs, at some point everyone is going to feel the pain," Clineburg said. "If it keeps going, I don't think anyone escapes."

ß§

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Monday, June 23, 2008

The Thin Red White & Blue Line

The Thin Red White & Blue Line
Metaphors For A Broken Economy


By James Macfarlane | 20 June 2008



Bill Cosby used to tell an anecdote about driving in San Francisco for the first time, and how he got stuck at a red light atop a steep hill. He figured that by the time he got his foot off the brake and onto the gas he would have rolled backwards into the bay and drowned. On the basis that dying in such a manner would not qualify for entrance into Heaven, his solution to the dilemma was to not move. Instead he hollered to the guy behind him; "Come around idiot, come around!" This didn't work however because the guy behind him was too busy shouting "Come around idiot, come around!" to the guy behind him. And so on.

Bill's conundrum, that the person downstream from you is unable to comply because he is in the same jam as you, is a metaphor for the current state of the US economy, which is a short step away from a recession the likes of which we have not seen in our lifetimes. The trouble with the economy— well, there's actually more than one— but one of the biggies boils down to a single word— leverage. Let me explain.

Leverage Works— Until It Doesn't

To be leveraged, in an economic sense, means you control an asset by putting up fewer dollars than the asset is actually worth. Leverage has existed ever since there were systems of monetary exchange. In modern times, a home loan is an example. If you buy a house for 20% down and make payments totaling 25% of your income, you've got reasonable leverage (with the bank supplying most of that 'lever'). Leverage in this case is a good thing; a tool used to create a thriving economy by enabling you to 'purchase' a home to live in while you are still young enough to take most advantage of it.

However moving into a house you buy for 0% down and making payments totaling 50% of your net income might be a bit too much leverage. Everyone of course is aware of the sub-prime mess. But not everyone is aware that over-leveraged investments have permeated every facet of our economy, from personal credit to commercial credit... in the US and across the globe. Leveraged economies get into great trouble when the assets being leveraged lose value. That's happening now.

Most of us understand, either anecdotally or through personal experience, what this means for say, a 'highly leveraged' home loan. The property can suddenly be worth less than you paid for it. Ouch! Try refinancing your way out of that Adjustable Rate Mortgage that just adjusted upward, while the property has just appraised downward. But we have peaked out on leverage across the board, and the process of de-leveraging, if you will, is going to be painful. More so than the mainstream financial press is letting on. It's something you may want to get ready for.

It Ain't Just Housing

The issue with leveraged investments extends well beyond bad loans from the so called sub-prime crisis. It has now morphed into 'the global credit crisis'. Everyone is leveraged. Consumer debt is at an all time high... savings an all time low. What's more, we consumers are leveraged in ways we are not even aware of. Sub-prime loan risk long ago left the local bank where the mortgage or loan was born, and has leaked into investment vehicles typically considered safe. Even if you personally do not have a troubled sub-prime mortgage, your investments/retirement plans may well be dependent on the returns from such loans, and they stand to sustain a loss if those 'free-rent' borrowers default.

How could that happen? You have perhaps heard the terms credit derivatives and credit swaps? These innocent sounding names refer to financial instruments used to 'redistribute risk'. The terms went mainstream earlier this year as the press broke the news on the Bear Sterns debacle and other credit nightmares. When money is as cheap and plentiful as it has been, 'sub-prime' loans were made with as great a frequency as sub-prime mortgages. The banks have always known though that these loans were risky.

To 'deal' with that risk, they 'sliced' and 'diced' them and repackaged them into groups (aka, 'tranches') of 'investment' vehicles called credit derivatives. The derivatives were then eventually sold to a buyer who [was supposed to] earn an income stream from the mortgage/loan payments contained in the derivative. In return for 'fees', the packager of these mortgages/loans into derivatives guaranteed that if any of the loans in the group were defaulted on, the 'packager' (or his agent) would handle the details of the foreclosure process.

But since there could be 'slices' from several thousand mortgages/loans in any one package, a few defaults would hardly have much impact on the value of these packages (and, moreover, the riskier mortgage/loan packages were supposed to carry the highest interest rate and were generally bought by hedge funds who were willing to take on the added risk for the added interest rate). It's kind of an insurance policy, wherein the price of (interest paid on) each policy (derivative) is based on the supposed credit worthiness of the loans as a group. That all sounds good except...

The problem with these derivatives over the past few years is that they have been traded around and repackaged so often that the true risk of the underlying loans has become obscured [[and, in any case, was grossly underestimated: normxxx]]. Moreover, although they are packages of long term mortgages/loans— 5 to 30 years, they have been traded freely over-the-counter, and so have a present value which is only remotely in line with their eventual total return (which, since it is highly dependent on how many of the packaged mortgages/loans eventually default, is largely unknown at this time)! Early on, such derivatives often ended up with a far higher credit rating than they warranted [[and, today, they probably have lower credit ratings than warranted— but no one knows: normxxx]].

And investment in these questionably rated instruments is pervasive. For example they are widely owned by just about everyone— from townships in Norway to most pension funds (and, much to their chagrin, even the bond insurers Ambac and MBIA). And those hedge funds that bought the more speculative packages (or 'tranches', as they are known in the lingo) are in turn widely held by pension and similar conservative plans due to their "higher than market" yields.

[ Normxxx Here:  The whole notion was, if you had a whole lot of these risky investments, the total would be less risky, because only a certain percentage would go belly up— so the high returns earned by the other risky investments would more than make up for the losses. The statistical models that proved this were mathematically impeccable! That is, except for one thing. All of the models assumed that the individual risks were 'independent'— that there was little or nothing in common among these risks, so that if one failed there was no reason to believe that the probability that any other would fail would be greater. In other words, the academic 'quants' who dreamed up these models in their ivory towers simply had no notion of the common effects of a recession— or even of a brief market panic, such as last August. They were to learn!  ]

When the 'true' value and impact of such funds are eventually accounted for on the books, many people will be receiving shocking balance statements in the mail. An example of how ubiquitous these derivatives are is that discount broker E*Trade and monoline insureres Ambac and MBIA and many other highly conservative businesses are teetering on the verge of bankruptcy because they tried to get a little extra yield on their static funds by investing in— guess what— …derivatives. Who knew?

We now return to Bill Cosby's dilemma and how it applies to the current state of affairs concerning bad loans. Financial institutions are required to maintain a certain level of equity, or 'margin', on the loans they took out at lower interest rates to buy these "high yielding" derivatives. But, if the properties backing the loans drop in value, the financial institution must come up with enough cash to reestablish a minimum level of equity. It's called a 'margin call'. What happens is that the phone rings one day and a voice on the other end of the line says something to the effect of "Hey, you idiots have to come up with a pile of $$ to cover these loans!".

(... pause . . .)

Shit! They weren't expecting that. Why? Because investments like residential and commercial real estate have been going up in value for so long [[pretty much the lifetime of most investors today! : normxxx]], everyone pretty much forgot that one day they might go down.

But that's just the first domino to fall. The borrower doesn't have a pile of money lying around— or any place handy to get it quickly, if at all. Why? They're over-leveraged. They bet the farm on the premise the investments would continue to rise. But wait. Hold the phone. Although a home mortgage/loan can not receive a margin call, the financial institution may have granted certain loans that do require a minimum amount of equity be maintained.

If such loans are using depreciating assets such as real estate for their margin/collateral, they have likely dropped in value as well. So the financial institution, needing some quick cash, picks up the phone to issue a margin call of its own. We know what will be said when the phone is answered. "Hey, you idiots have to come up with a pile of $$ to cover this loan!". But alas, the line at the other end is busy. I Wonder why?

Answer. Everyone is over leveraged. A version of the above scenario played out recently with global investment banking firm Bear Sterns. Bear Sterns was up to its neck in 'bad' derivatives [[i.e., those containing lots of defaulted and defaulting mortgages/loans: normxxx]]. As the diminished value of the depreciated loans were reflected on the books (a process called 'marking to market'), Sterns came due for the dreaded margin call. It could not produce the required funds however, so the Federal Reserve stepped in to provide the needed liquidity. This was unheard of, but if the 'Fed' had not bailed them out, the dominos would have started falling BIG TIME. Sterns was considered too big to fail.

All this over-leveraging has gone on for many years now, and the chickens are finally heading home to roost. Meaning, major cracks are appearing in the financial credit markets/system, and their continued functioning is in question [[and, without it, we'll all be reduced to barter: normxxx]]. Bear Sterns was hardly the only bad boy on the block.

Other banks are in similar trouble and we will be hearing from them shortly [[and many of the "NOT too big to fail" have already failed, so the FDIC is running out of funds: normxxx]]. And it won't just be investment banks, but rather banks with names you will recognize [[like, perhaps, your checking or savings bank, around the corner! : normxxx]].

Are you familiar with the term "Fractional Reserve System" from high school economics? It's the system that allows a bank to keep only a fraction of its deposits in reserve. The rest of the deposits can be lent out. Meaning, not everyone can take their money out of the bank at once; but if enough people try to do so, we have a bank run [[which the Fed was set up to backstop: normxxx]]. Kind of an important system. So how are bank reserves doing today? Take a look at the chart below:


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.

The banks have negative reserves! This is not to be taken lightly

The chart is a not-so-pretty picture showing that the amount of bank reserves has actually fallen way into the negative. Ouch. That's more 'leveraging' [[and a fancy way of saying the banks are insolvent! : normxxx]], and just like Cosby's line of stuck cars, all the banks are in the same jam. By the way, this chart was not made by some dufuss with a copy of Photoshop. It's from the Federal Reserve itself. The insurer of these banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is aware of this sad state of reserves and has beefed up its staff, including calling employees out of retirement, to prepare for the onslaught of bank bankruptcies it is expecting.

Banks have failed en mass before during recessions, and we have gotten through it. But it must be recognized that due to all the overleveraging, the crisis upon us now could be much worse than any previous one. Put simply, the FDIC can only cover about 1% of all insured deposits [[but fear not, the Fed can always print more IOUs— aka, Federal Reserve Notes— and lend them as much debt as they need: normxxx]].

Can you imagine what would happen if a financial shock took place such that large numbers of depositors rushed to the bank to become withdrawers? The music is going to stop and not everyone will have a chair. Would you want to be at the end of that line? Have you ever seen the movie It's a Wonderful Life with Jimmy Stewart? Do you now believe that I'm not just being paranoid in sending out this warning?

What we have been living out for the past 20 years— about since the beginning of the [Federal Reserve Chairman] Alan Greenspan era— is a version of one of the oldest con games in the world: the Ponzi scheme. The Ponzi system works great and makes everyone money… right up until it doesn't. It has to break down at some point. The Dot-com bubble of 2001 gave way to the housing bubble, which gave way to the credit bubble. It's become a bubble economy. But in the end the bubble always pops. The party must end. There is a boom. Then there is a bust.

We should have had a more serious bust (recession) after the Dot-com bubble. Instead, interest rates were lowered [[effectively below zero, if you subtract inflation; and we are there again now: normxxx]] and a housing/credit bubble was encouraged in order to forestall an economic downturn (yes, the sub-prime mortgage fiasco was no accident, but that's a different article). Our economy at this point is akin to a forest that has not been allowed to burn for many a year. We know what happens to such forests. All it takes is one single incident, one match, and... poof. What should have been a natural, periodic, and predictable process— a 'slow burn'— totally explodes and gets completely out of hand. The longer the 'natural' burning is suppressed, the worse the damage when it finally cannot be longer surpressed.

Our economic system, i.e. our way of life, is a tinderbox. This is not an exaggeration. The Federal Reserve most certainly knows this, and it's why they did something in March of 2008 that has never been done in their 95 year existence— they provided funds to a non-Federal Reserve bank. The Fed bailed out Bear Sterns. Sterns owed money it couldn't pay and had lied about that fact right up to the end. Its debts exceeded its assets to the tune of trillions of dollars of devalued derivatives (that's trillions, with a T).

If a derivative pool of that size had been defaulted on, one of the most important elements that glue an economy together would have burned to the ground right there: Trust. The only reason institutions are willing to lend money to each other [[in various guises: normxxx]] is if that they trust the monies will be paid back. Money is not [normally] lent if there is no reasonable expectation of it being returned [[hah! Explain that to those 'mortgage/loan originators': normxxx]]. Without these loans between financial institutions the economy is crippled [[and, the Fed has been fighting since last August to get the banks, in particular, to trust each other again: normxxx]]. Capitalism runs on capital.

From the Federal Reserve's point of view, Bear Sterns had to be bailed out. If it hadn't been, we may well have reached the tipping point that would have commenced the giant, painful process of instantaneous de-leveraging of the economy [[euphemistically referred to as the system "freezing" or "seizing" up: normxxx]]. The Fed is pulling out all the stops to forestall that day. So as it stands, the dominos remain upright... for the moment. This blessing gives you and me time to take precautions.

So Where Do We Stand?

Funny, things do seem a bit better now, don't they? Bear Sterns was saved. 'Precautions have been taken'. 'Adjustments have been made'. 'Measures have been put into place'. The stock market came back. We're probably out of the woods, right? Wrong. Here is what my research has revealed: There are a whole bunch of Bear Sterns out there. Way, way too many to be saved by the Federal Reserve.

And it's not just the financial and investment houses. Everyone is leveraged, and asset prices are falling. The math has turned against us. The party has gone on for far too long. The booze (easy money) should have been cut off years ago. But our then bartender at the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, would not hear of it. Let the good times roll, said Greenspan. Make a toast to Uncle Al, the borrowers'/freeloaders' pal.

You need to know that right now a lot of effort is being made to convince Americans [[and, indeed the 'masses' the whole world over: normxxx]] that the worst is over. There are loads of newspaper articles inferring so. There are fewer ugly stories about financial Armageddon [[that one's easy: the public is tired of hearing about it, and anyone who continues to warn is swiftly denigrated (Swift Boated?): normxxx]]. Most importantly, a truly unbelievable amount of money is being spent to convince you, the American consumer (not to mention the world), that the worst is over.

The stock market is being propped up by these funds[!?!] The price of gold is being forcibly manipulated downward by this money (google 'plunge protection team')[!?!] It's a dog and pony show designed to do one thing; make it appear the worst is over. Everything is all right now. It's ok to keep pouring the low interest loans and continue the party. But beware the man behind the curtain. His powers are limited. And there is a steep price to pay for what he is doing.

What we are going to see over the next few months and years are a series of gradual revelations regarding the truth about the economy as events force these truths to the surface. They can be suppressed no longer. Where we stand is that the trends we are seeing in the first half of 2008, higher energy and food prices, shortages, rising unemployment, reductions in our standard of living, etc. are going to continue. Here's why:

Inflation And The Falling Dollar

The aforementioned issue of trust when lending money now goes a step beyond the question of "Will I get paid back"? The question has been amended to "Will I get paid back with anything of value"? Dollars are worth less and less these days. This is the other shoe dropping, and it will have far reaching consequences which have already begun.

Inflation is back. It's standing on the front porch, and is poised to bust through the door. But like the Shark in the old Chevy Chase/Saturday Night Live skit, it's been disguised to look far more innocent than it truly is. Meaning, the rate of inflation reported in the news vis-à-vis the government sourced Consumer Price Index (CPI), is a deception. Inflation is much higher than reported. To begin with, the cost of food and energy has been removed from the usually proffered index. Think about that. What if you removed food and energy from your monthly expenditures?

Two of the three most important expenses in our daily lives (shelter being the third) are not factored into the cost of living index. Hello? Additionally, there is reason to believe that even the items still remaining in the CPI are being fudged. The true rate of inflation is far higher than stated by the government (try 10-15%, depending on your 'market basket'). That of course should be no surprise to the person paying the bills in your household.

Where does inflation come from? It's partially due to more and more people worldwide bidding for a relatively finite (or even decreasing) amount of goods per capita. That's supply and demand 101. But inflation is greatly exacerbated by Federal Reserve policy. The Fed has the power to set short term interest rates, and the artificially low rates we have seen for years now causes the supply of money to rise (exponentially, due to more loans being made under the fractional reserve system and the fact that we have gotten into the habit of using debt as money).

A basic law of supply and demand states that more $$ chasing the same amount of goods cause prices to rise [[That's supply and demand 201: the more plentiful that money is— relative to everything else— the less its value: normxxx]]. With the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) running only about 1% this year (1% more goods), while the money supply has recently been increasing at 12-25%, the difference will result in more inflation— above and beyond any 'normal' increased scarcity of goods.

There's more. As most folks know, this country continues to spend money far faster than it takes it in. The war, natural disasters, tax rebates, missing money from the Treasury (4 trillion or so), homeland security, entitlement financing, the bailout of troubled financial firms, and all our other expenses are taking their toll. As a general rule, any debts not paid for by taxes or borrowing is paid for simply by printing more currency (this is known as monetizing the debt— and feeds directly into monetary inflation because of supply and demand 201).


The US dollar is in near freefall


Inflation also has an impact on the US dollar overseas, as its value drops further and further. The dollar is the world's 'reserve' currency. This means more trading is done around the world in US dollars than any other currency. Remember that most consumer goods are now purchased from overseas. A falling dollar makes foreign goods more expensive. It keeps taking more and more dollars to buy those foreign goods. The above chart measures the US dollar in relation to a mix of other currencies [[in proportion to their importance to us as a trading partner: normxxx]]. It is one of the most widely watched of all economic indicators. Notice the direction of the trend.

Don't forget that most of our oil is imported now. The price of oil rises in lock-step to a falling dollar— again, above and beyond normal market forces. These factors add to the fires of inflation even further because a critical commodity like oil is used in so many products, a rise in its price alone is going to force prices of nearly everything else up further. The rocketing price of oil is one of the biggest cracks in the dike.

Adding It All Up

We've reached a critical point in our experiment in our democracy. The Achilles Heal of free enterprise and 'pure' democracy is greed— and we are seeing insatiable greed manifested on an unparalleled scale, as everyone fears that his neighbor is profiting more from the system than he is [[it has traditionally been the downfall of many old European cultures, where everyone was so afraid that his neighbor was gaining some advantage, that he would himself gladly suffer the worst conditions if he could only be assured that his neighbor was no better off! : normxxx]]. The price of freedom is eternal vigilance, yet we have unfortunately allowed the foxes to guard the hen house. We simply haven't been paying attention. Basic freedoms are slipping away. We're out of money.

In the last 20 years America has gone from the world's greatest creditor nation to the world's greatest debtor nation. America now owes more money to more people in more places than anytime in its history (or, indeed, for any nation any time in history). The interest on the nearly 10 trillion dollar national debt is pushing one half trillion dollars a year (third largest federal budget expense item). Yet we have been told for years that deficits don't matter. Oh yeah?

At some point the Chinese (and the rest of the world) will not be willing to buy any more of America's debt. But again, The Federal Reserve has made it crystal clear what it will do when it comes to providing needed liquidity to the economy; they will then simply print money. The Fed will print all the money required to bail out every Bear Sterns that comes out of hibernation to 'fess up' about how much they have lied about all the bad paper on their balance sheets [[Check out the recent history of Argentina, who tried this ploy most recently: normxxx]].

And, they will print money for anything else related to keeping the economy afloat. The current Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke, wants the same thing Alan Greenspan wanted; keep the party going at all costs. Don't let the forest burn. One thing is almost certain however... the forest will eventually burn. I have written this article because I believe we are close to that day, and if precautions are taken you won't get as badly burnt as the guy down the street.

Now it's hard to tell exactly how and when an economic bombshell will manifest itself. The future is always in motion, so the key is to focus on the well founded trends that are likely to continue. What's really interesting by the way, is that the future can be considered as especially unpredictable right now. A lot of the old rules don't apply. We are in unchartered waters, with many changes coming upon the earth. Climate changes, geologic changes, social changes, changes in our solar system, and more [[Doom! Doom! Doom! And to think, just a few short years ago— under that much reviled Bill Clinton— we thought that we had never had it so good!: normxxx]].

Therefore it's important to factor that in to planning for the future. What I am trying to say is that while the state of the economy alone necessitates precautions be taken, the overall unpredictability of the near to intermediate future not only does not invalidate the need to take precautions, it underscores the need to do so. For the thinking person, uncertainty begets contingency planning.

Could The Great Depression Occur Again?
You should also know that a key piece of legislation put into law under FDR after the Great Depression has been systematically dismantled. The
'Glass-Steagall Act' placed certain restrictions on Federal Reserve banks, and kept mortgage banking and investment banking separate in order to mitigate the chances of another mutual collapse and depression. The law was systematically dismantled begining with the Nixon era and finally given its coup de grâce under the Clinton administration.

That's called Human nature! Once we are sufficiently removed from a disaster (in time and/or space), we simply assume it can/will never occur again— so, why put up with all of those silly annoying safeguards?

The Trends Tell Us Our Immediate Future

Here is a list of what we can likely expect as the future moves into present time (now through 2012):

  • Inflation up

  • Long term interest rates up

  • Gold and silver up

  • Energy prices up

  • Unemployment up

  • Volatility way up

  • Food prices up

  • Personal and municipal bankruptcies up

  • US dollar down

  • Real estate down

  • Equity markets down

  • Personal freedoms down

Inflation will continue to rise, at least for certain sectors of the economy. The action of the Federal Reserve dictates it will likely rise substantially over the next couple of years, starting yesterday. Don't forget that the CPI (Consumer Price Index) is compromised, and does not tell the true story of inflation. Increased demand for resources will drive prices up even further as literally hundreds of millions of people around the world move from poverty to the middle class, and will want the same things we want.

Long term interest rates will rise as lenders become convinced inflation is here to stay. Lenders will not lend money at a loss (although short term rates may be artificially tamped down by the Fed for the moment, the Fed has little control over long term rates) [[until they start buying those long term bonds in earnest: normxxx]].

Precious metals are just that; precious. There is only so much gold and silver, and that is why these metals are such a reliable store of value. Real inflation of our currency was not possible until gold was disconnected from the dollar. A currency not tied to a solid commodity such as gold is doomed to fail [[largely because its amount is then free to increase without limit; see supply and demand 201, above: normxxx]]. History tells us that. And as high as gold and silver have climbed so far this decade, they are destined to go far higher. Inflation guarantees that [[maybe not; other things— such as oil futures— can be substituted for 'money': normxxx]].

Energy prices will likely go higher, though probably not in a straight line. Energy pricing is affected by both monetary inflation, a declining dollar, and natural supply and demand. The perceived shortage of crude oil and other raw materials is causing the price of these goods to rise. This perception may or may not be correct, but it's perception that counts.

Unemployment will continue to rise as the economy continues to contract. High food and energy prices, and the global credit crisis, are two big factors. Unemployment begets more unemployment as out of work Americans buy less. This also increases foreclosures. Leveraged loans go into foreclosure quicker. With a glut of empty houses on the market, the building trades, lumber industry, et al start to recess. More unemployment. It's a house-of-cards. The government can't stop this. They can make it worse.

Volatility will reign supreme. The markets have much to digest as the various economic forces battle it out. For a period of time, perception that the world economy as a whole is slowing will drive the price of raw materials and finished goods down (less demand). At other times real or perceived shortages of the same items, due to hording or actual demand, weather, war, or politics (a form of war), will send prices through the roof.

Food prices are subject to the statements in the previous paragraph but are a special case for several reasons, not to mention that we need food every day to live. There are a number of forces at work that may make food not only expensive, but many items outright hard to buy at any price. That's scary, but you must understand that we live in a "just-in-time" economy. Costco does not make its products at the warehouse store. Food is not grown in the back yard. It comes from other states, and other countries— sometimes only hours before it is displayed and purchased at retail.

There is a complex pipeline that gets food from the field to the grocery store, and there are cracks throughout the system, from the genetically modified seeds planted in the ground to the rising cost of getting products to market. The food supply line is very tight at present. Take wheat. Although a record wheat crop is projected for 2008, we currently have the lowest inventory of wheat in the US in 60 years. The entire world has only a 60 day supply.

Personal bankruptcies will rise as a down economy leaves many with no choice. City government bankruptcy filings will go up dramatically as bad investments and a reduced tax base break an already strained system of delivering basic services.

The dollar will continue to fall, again due to the action of the Federal Reserve. It won't be a straight line down, but the overall trend is down, down, down. This means the prices of imports— especially oil— is up, up, up.

Real estate may not come back for quite a while. This is one sector that is deflating, not inflating. Rising mortgage rates, a population with less money or no money and maxed out on credit, combined with a serious oversupply of housing means we may not see new highs in residential real estate for the foreseeable future. Commercial real estate is not far behind.

The stock market is due to come down dramatically. Stock prices are ultimately based on a company's earnings, and a slowing economy means lower earnings. Although the market currently seems to be looking ahead to better times (as of the first half of 08), think about all the warnings stated earlier in this article. There is good reason to believe[!?!] that the equities markets are being propped up with large sums of money, making us believe that investors value these companies higher than they actually do. There is currently a very unusual divergence between consumer confidence numbers (down) and stock indexes (up); further evidence that the stock market might be weaker than it appears [[but, fortunately(?) only a very small percentage of higher income consumers are also investors! : normxxx]]

Personal freedom is likely to become even more restricted. I believe that the threat of terrorism has been used as an excuse to abrogate our rights. Keep your eyes open and be prepared to exercise your right to protest. (Hint: google "RFID human rights" and/or "national ID card" for starters).

Finally, let me underscore one last time that it is the action of the Federal Reserve that sets the biggest [inflationary] trend of all. The Fed can be counted on to bail out failing institution after failing institution and prop up the economy with inflated dollars. That's not good. It could lead to hyper-inflation and/or a total breakdown of the all-important trust factor. But the Fed just refuses to let the party die. [[So far, despite all of this purple rhetoric, the Fed has only bailed out a few really, really big banks; the rest have been left to 'dangle in the wind'— which is NOT to say that 'BB and the gang' really know what they are doing…: normxxx]]

To continue the metaphor, the Fed is supposed to be the designated "party-poopers" of the nation. They are supposed to card the people entering the bar, and cut off the booze when lampshades start getting unscrewed. Meaning, they are supposed to crank up short term interest rates when inflation rears its head. Fed Chairman Paul Volker did this in the 70's to kill off what is known as stagflation (a recession with rising prices).

It worked. 20% interest rates hurt like Hell, but the economy— just as the proverbial forest allowed to burn— recovered strongly. But the current Fed, supposedly a team of professional party-poopers, have turned out to be party-promoters— and now it may be too late. Example: The Fed is now swapping US guaranteed securities in exchange for 'junk' debt as a way to get this garbage off the street [[and keep the current holders 'solvent': normxxx]], thus transferring the burden to the US tax payer! [[True enough, we are ALL bailing out the banks! Too bad no one is trying to recover those hundreds of millions and billions of dollars in 'compensation' that those directors and executives responsible for all of this simply walked away with. Maybe a little old fashioned 'vigilante justice' is in order!: normxxx]]

If the trust in our system fails, we will wake up to an economic nightmare. Everyone will head for the exits at once. Meaning, people will try to sell their stock before the other guy does. Folks will try to get their money out of the bank ahead of everyone else. Families will try to buy and hoard food and other commodities, forcing governmental control and rationing into play, as with the rice shortage scare.

What To Do?

All we can do is hope for the best and plan for the worse. As a point of reference I will share with you the best advice I have run across.

  • Lighten up on equity investments (securities)

  • Buy gold and silver

  • Buy and store non-perishable food

  • Become a farmer

  • Stock up on the non-food basics (toilet paper?)

  • Keep some cash on hand

  • Take additional security precautions; beef up your home security

  • Buy a super-high gas mileage vehicle like a motorized bicycle, and don't let its tank go below half full

  • Conduct a "disaster preparedness test"

Securities, once a safe bet, are not so secure anymore. A number of things could bring about a bear market, with many already noted throughout this article. Many believe we are already in a bear market. Several likely events could cause a sudden, precipitous drop in the markets [[e.g., any financial "accident": normxxx]]. The reverse is less likely [[e.g., the discovery of a cheap and plentiful substitute for oil! The rising cost of energy is a big part of out present problem; and the reverse would also be true— even the onrushing problem of a shortage of potable water is no problem if we had a source of sufficiently cheap energy. : normxxx]].

The best take on the stock market I have heard is that we will undergo a stair-step drop in prices over the next few years; i.e. a sharp drop in stock prices, a sideways consolidation process, then another stair-step down. So, you may want to think about allocating a portion of funds, including any retirement funds you have direct control over, to alternate investments. There are a couple of thoughts below, but if you have a substantial nest egg I suggest you seek out a financial investment counselor not wearing rose-colored glasses.

When paper money loses its value people turn to real money. This means gold and silver. History teaches us this. Buy gold. In fact, I was speaking with a fellow investor a few weeks ago, and we both agreed that if we could only invest in one single vehicle, it would be gold/silver. Repeat, although a bit contrarian even with today's relatively elevated precious metals prices, gold and silver are probably the safest investments you can make. You will almost surely preserve your wealth, and possibly multiply it, if it rises faster than inflation [[but beware, once upon a time, the same was said about real estate! : normxxx]] So. Did I mention...? Buy gold.

Stock up on food. Fill the pantry with foodstuffs that have at least a 1-3 year shelf life. Fill the garage if you want. What will it hurt? If it's business as usual over the next few years, your car gets a little oxidized from being out in the elements and you have a bunch of food to eat (should keep you from the 'free' food pantry for some months if you lose your livelihood). But seriously, I often hear advice that at least a six month supply is wise. Plant a 'victory garden'. There's a novel idea.

I remember moving into a new house in suburbia as a six year old, and noting that my parents went to great lengths to get rid of the various vegetables that would sprout up like weeds through the backyard lawn each year— in a prior incarnation the back yard had been a vegetable garden [[WWII Victory garden?: normxxx]]. Everything old is new again.

It would also be wise to stock up on staples in general. Toilet paper, candles, soap, gasoline, propane, medicine, water— the stuff you take camping— remember, these can also be used in place of worthless paper money to get things you've run out of or forgot to stock. Solar panels and solar (or magneto) battery chargers are a great idea. Also think for a moment about the security of your family. If there is an interruption of power and/or food and/or water for more than a few days, there are unprepared people who will begin to get desperate. Desperate people do desperate things.

In the event of pervasive disaster, the local authorities and rescue centers— even the hospitals— will be quickly overwhelmed and can't be counted on. And don't assume you can get cash out of the ATM [[or gasoline from a gas station using electric pumps— which is ALL of them! : normxxx]]. Keep some on hand.

Finally, think about conducting a disaster preparedness test. Take a weekend home and see what it is like to go without power and transportation. Yeah, turn off the lights. The purpose of the test is to see if you have all the stuff you need to survive off the grid if need be. It's seems weird to talk about power interruptions, but the electrical power infrastructure is one more thing that's in a precarious, maxed-out state. The more self-sufficient you become, the better you will weather the coming storm.

Final Thoughts

So what is the thin red white & blue line? It's the distance between having enough food on the table... or going without. It's the space between having the choice to drive your car as far as you choose... or gas rationing. It's the difference between having all the freedoms Americans have enjoyed for generations... or seeing them evaporate under the guise of 'government protections'. There used to be a wall between these extremes. An impenetrable shield between the thinkable and the unthinkable. But the wall has shrunk to where we can now peer through it— it's virtually transparency [[and, modern technology has had more than a little to do with this: normxxx]].

To be fair, one could certainly point out that the stage has been set in the past for some kind of universal disaster to befall us... yet it did not occur. Y2K would be an example. However, the reason I feel it's more likely to happen this time around is that things, including potential disasters, are getting more complex[!?!] There is a change in the wind. Many people I talk to feel it. The world is changing… people are changing. We seem to be approaching… who knows what?[!?!] Even nuclear terrorism is no longer unthinkable. I urge you take precautions even if it appears for a time that we are out of the woods.

I believe also that the future is somewhat malleable. We tend to create our own realities… our own futures. Although it seems impossible that we Americans, or even the entire human species, can avoid some amount of disruption and discomfort over the next few years; regardless, we must keep a strong positive attitude. It's important that we all do so. We must envision that the world is going to end up OK [[well, anyways, it always has in the past such 'transition' periods: normxxx]]. It's just that we have reached an apex of selfishness and greed, and it appears that an overdue 'cleansing' is coming.

The wisest words I heard lately are these: In the next few years it's not going to be about where you live, but about whom you live with. Make friends with your neighbors.

ß§

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Friday, June 20, 2008

Decade's Worst S&P 500 Profit Drop

Oil Producers Mask Decade's Worst S&P 500 Profit Drop

By Michael Tsang and Darren Boey | 19 May 2008

(Bloomberg)— Take away Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhillips and profits at U.S. companies are the worst in at least a decade. Without the $70 billion that oil producers earned in the last two quarters, profits at companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index tumbled almost 30 percent last quarter, the biggest decreases for any quarter since Bloomberg started compiling data in 1998. Energy companies made up almost half the income growth reported by S&P 500 companies in the first three months of 2008 as oil prices surged past $100 per barrel.

The results leave the benchmark for American equities vulnerable to declines as oil companies' costs balloon and production slips, according to Bank of America Corp., Charles Schwab Corp. and Allianz Global Investors. The industry is getting less profit from a barrel of oil than at any time since 2005, just as the rest of the U.S. economy is sputtering. Still, energy shares posted the S&P 500's steepest gains in the past year, bloating their representation to 15 percent of the index.

"It's kind of a Catch-22," said Joseph Quinlan, 49, New York-based chief market strategist for the investment management unit at Bank of America, which oversees $643 billion in client assets. "The better energy does, the weaker the rest of the S&P. It masks some of the weakness."

Earnings Disparity

Energy companies in the S&P 500 reported an average 25.9 percent gain in first-quarter profit, the biggest of the index's 10 industry groups, data compiled by Bloomberg show. For the broader market, earnings declined by 18.3 percent, based on the 441 companies in the S&P 500 that already announced results.

The drop increases by 7.7 percentage points when profits for energy producers are stripped out, according to Bloomberg data, making the contribution of oil companies the biggest in at least 10 years. Even after taking out financial firms and consumer companies that reported lower earnings, oil profits accounted for almost half of the overall gain of 11.02 percent for the S&P 500, Bloomberg data show. Today, the S&P 500 rose 0.1 percent to 1,426.63 as most stocks declined on the New York Stock Exchange.

The divergence in the earnings of oil companies from the rest of corporate America indicates that the S&P 500's two-month, 12 percent rally may not be sustainable, according to Neil Dwane, who oversees about $139 billion as chief investment officer for Europe at Allianz Global Investors' RCM unit in Frankfurt.

Saved The Market'

U.S. economic growth ground to a halt in the second quarter, according to economists' estimates compiled by Bloomberg. The last time the U.S. gross domestic product didn't increase was in 2001, during the last recession. "The oil sector saved the market," said Dwane. "Ex-oil, the numbers show falling earnings and with data highlighting a U.S. recession, we can expect more earnings downgrades." Energy companies globally are spending a record $369 billion on exploration and production in 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. estimates. The cost to find and develop a barrel of oil quadrupled to $18 last year from $4 in 2000.

Even so, output from outside the 13 members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will meet only about 20 percent of the growth in world demand in the next four years, according to the International Energy Agency in Paris. Earnings at energy producers are lagging behind the rise in oil prices as a result. Analysts estimate that oil companies in the S&P 500 will earn an adjusted $55.49 per share, or 44 percent of a barrel of oil that closed at a record $127.05 today.

Falling Production

That's the smallest margin since September 2005 and about half the profit U.S. energy producers extracted from crude when it traded below $50 a barrel in January 2007. Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips, the three largest U.S. producers, all produced less oil in the first quarter. Chevron, whose reserves fell to the lowest in almost a decade last year, will spend more than $400 million a week this year to find reserves and tap discoveries.

Exxon, located in Irving, Texas, has climbed 14 percent since the S&P 500's low on March 10. San Ramon, California-based Chevron has gained 21 percent, while ConocoPhillips, located in Houston, had advanced 20 percent. Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd.'s Dominic Rossi says that betting against energy stocks is a losing proposition because oil prices will stay above $100 a barrel.

Target Surpassed

Oil will rise to between $150 and $200 per barrel in two years as supply increases fail to keep pace with demand from developing countries, Arjun N.Murti, an analyst at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. in New York, wrote in a report May 5. The analyst first wrote of a "super spike" in oil prices on March 30, 2005, when oil closed at $53.99 a barrel. At the time, Murti predicted crude may climb as high as $105 in the next several years.

Murti was proven correct as oil prices touched $100 for the first time in January. Investors who failed to take heed missed out on a more than doubling of oil prices and a 99 percent climb in energy stocks in the S&P 500. "We can't see oil falling below $100 from here," said Rossi, who manages the $756 million Threadneedle Global Equity Fund in London. "It's time investors accepted triple-digit oil and started positioning portfolios accordingly." That didn't stop some of the world's biggest hedge funds from reducing their shareholdings in Exxon, Chevron and ConocoPhillips in the first quarter.

Caxton, Atticus Sell

Caxton Associates LLC, the $12 billion New York-based hedge fund run by Bruce Kovner, sold its entire 430,955 share stake in Exxon in the first quarter, according to Securities and Exchange Commission filings released last week and compiled by Bloomberg. James Simons's Renaissance Technologies Corp., a $30 billion hedge fund firm based in East Setauket, New York, unloaded all the 54,600 shares that it held in Chevron last quarter. Atticus Capital LP, which oversees about $19 billion and is run by Timothy Barakett in New York, cut its holdings of ConocoPhillips by 15 percent after dumping 1.81 million shares.

For Liz Ann Sonders, chief investment strategist at Charles Schwab, the "real" price of oil should be closer to $80 a barrel. The San Francisco-based firm, which oversees $1.4 trillion for clients, is "underweight" energy shares on expectations that oil prices will retreat. A 37 percent decline in crude oil to $80 would have a bigger impact on the S&P 500's performance than five years ago, when oil and natural-gas companies only accounted for 5.8 percent of the index's value, according to Bloomberg data.

Half of the world's 10 biggest companies by market capitalization— Exxon, Beijing-based PetroChina Co., Moscow-based OAO Gazprom, Rio de Janeiro-based Petroleo Brasileiro SA, and Royal Dutch Shell Plc, located in The Hague— are now energy companies, at a time when the marginal cost of producing a barrel of oil is climbing. "A lot of that margin which dropped to the bottom line, that's gone," Bank of America's Quinlan said. "The easy money is behind us, for both the oil companies and investors."

ß§

Normxxx    
______________

The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Thursday, June 19, 2008

Crisis Is Headed Next

Where The Financial Crisis Is Headed Next
Interview With Sy Jacobs, Founder, Jam Asset Management


By Lawrence C. Strauss, Barron's | 26 May 2008

Three years ago, hedge-fund manager Sy Jacobs told Barron's that serious trouble was brewing in the housing market, predicting that "the bursting of the housing bubble [would] be a dominant theme for investing in financial stocks in the next decade." He was right. Jacobs, 47, is the founder of New York's JAM Asset Management, which runs two funds, both focused on financial stocks and closed to new investors. The larger entity, JAM Partners, follows a market-neutral, long-short strategy and has close to $300 million in assets. As of May 21, the fund's year-to-date total return, net of fees, was 9.6%, versus a 4.5% loss for the S&P 500. Its annualized return since inception in 1995 (through April 30) was 16.6%, compared with 9.9% for the S&P. The $45 million JAM Special Opportunities Fund invests in illiquid private-equity holdings. Jacobs' familiarity with financial stocks dates to the 1980s, when he worked as an analyst at firms like Salomon Brothers and Alex. Brown & Sons. To find out where Jacobs sees new problems emerging in the financials— surprisingly, they're not in the subprime arena— read on.

"Bear Stearns was not the sacrificial lamb to the market gods. And avoiding that meltdown doesn't mean things are getting better— yet that is how financial stocks and the market have acted since."— Sy Jacobs

Barron's: You were early in detecting the serious problems in subprime mortgages. That turned out to be a great call.

Jacobs: About three years ago, we were worried about subprime specifically. And that view very much paid off for us as we were short a host of such companies. More than a year ago, in another interview with Barron's, we said subprime was already in a full meltdown mode, but the idea that subprime was somehow isolated was still popular. Our message was that the mortgage-credit tail was going to wag the capital-market and economic dog. That's coming to pass now.

Looking ahead, what do you see for the financials?

We believe the recent rally in financial stocks— and for the whole market— is a bit of a head fake that will prove to be a bear-market rally.

What's your premise?

After first ignoring subprime, people now are too focused on it and they're missing the broader storm coming— that's the head fake. While the bursting of the housing bubble produced all sorts of headline-making losses for some, it is just starting to drag down the rest of the economy. Separate from subprime, you are seeing diminished ability for consumers to spend their home equity. The securitization market, which banks and finance companies use to get funding, has slowed. [[Slowed!?! IT'S STOPPED!: normxxx]] So we see consumer and business spending slowing; the economy will falter.

In a recent letter to your investment partners, you noted that you were very concerned about the health of construction loans. Could you elaborate on that concern for us?

I spent a week recently in California, visiting some troubled, or soon-to-be-troubled, banks. With home sales down so much, construction lending is becoming a problem. You have a lot of developers and home builders stuck with homes that aren't moving. And they are sitting on lots that have loans against them. Subprime is such a small piece of the banking industry, but construction lending is a core product. If the housing market stays weak for much longer— and it seems to be getting even weaker— construction-loan losses are going to be a big problem.

After the brutal real-estate recession that occurred in the early 1990s, there was a sense that banks had finally learned their lesson and would be much better fortified for the next downturn. I take it you don't think that's true.

I take a pretty cynical view of whether bankers have gotten smarter. We've had a real-estate bull market ever since the early 1990s. I think you are going to see the same thing again. The number of banks that get taken over by the FDIC and disappear may not be as high as it was in the late-1980s and early 1990s because there is strength in the energy patch now. But real-estate lending institutions are the bulk of the community-bank world, and I think you are going to see a lot of banks disappear.

What's your sense of the prevailing views of the financials right now?

People are trying so hard to believe that the Bear Stearns crisis in March was some sort of financial crescendo and represents the bell that gets rung at the bottom, as if that happens. But just because we got saved from what would have happened that Monday if Bear went down doesn't mean we are saved from all the forces that conspired to get Bear Stearns to the brink in the first place. Bear was not the sacrificial lamb to the market gods. It got knocked down by the same winds that are affecting everybody else. Credit destruction is a process— not an incident. And avoiding that particular meltdown doesn't mean that things are getting better— and yet that is how financial stocks in particular and the market in general have acted ever since.

You're a fundamental stockpicker, but are there any interesting trends you see in the financials?

One of our themes on the long side is that local plain-vanilla, over-capitalized community banks, especially thrifts, are in a position to gain back market share in the lending business. And they have real deposit franchises that they can fund themselves with. They have been losing market share to the Countrywide Financials [ticker: CFC] of the world for a generation. Now, though, they are going to gain a lot of that market share back, because they suddenly have a funding advantage, relative to the larger financial firms that have been securitizing their loans. That market has been discredited. We're long lots of micro-cap ways to play this, but they're too illiquid to mention here.

Fair enough. Let's discuss some of your holdings, starting on the short side. [See Table Below: Jacobs' Picks]

The first one is Wells Fargo [WFC], trading at 12 times '08 estimates and 2.7 times tangible book; the group trades at less than two times book. The Wells Fargo name has a storied past and gets the Warren Buffett halo effect because he owns a lot of the shares. But if you look back at the last real-estate recession in the early 1990s, the Wells Fargo side, focused on California, had a lot of credit problems in the real-estate area, and the stock underperformed during that period. The Norwest side, which has more exposure to the Midwest, still has a lot of consumer-credit exposure. Of particular concern is the bank's portfolio of home-equity loans.

What's the big worry there?

Home-equity line of credit (HELOC] is 16% of their portfolio. More than a third of their HELOC exposure is in California, which is now developing very badly on the home-price and employment fronts. And delinquencies and losses are already rising pretty sharply. But they also have a big unfunded exposure to the undrawn lines of credit. Also, despite their reputation for being conservative, their loan-loss reserve at the end of March was lower than their annualized charge-off rate for the first quarter. Given the prospects for rising losses that we see, that's not conservative. We think they will disappoint this year and next and, as a result, their premium multiple will go down.

Wells Fargo, however, is known as a well-run bank. One example of that is the company's reputation for being very effective at cross-selling its products.

We're most concerned with their exposure to home-equity loans at the top of a real-estate bubble. Remember that home-equity lines of credit sit on top of first mortgages. So if home prices depreciate, which is what is happening now, and a home goes into foreclosure, the home-equity line often gets wiped out. The first mortgage holder may get most of their money back, but the home-equity line absorbs all of the loss.

Let's move on to another short position.

BB&T [BBT], which operates in the Southeast. The stock trades at 11 times '08 earnings and 2.5 times tangible book. It's bounced about 30% off its lows in January. They've gotten a pass because, to some extent, their core Carolina and Virginia real-estate markets were among the last to roll into home-price depreciation. So their non-performing assets are still low. But we listened to the Toll Brothers [TOL] conference [call] recently. [Chairman and Chief Executive] Robert Toll graded the markets they operate in and he gave Charlotte an F-minus for current home-building conditions and Raleigh a C-minus. We're also concerned that they have 4% of their portfolio in Alt-A mortgages, which are between prime and subprime, and 20% in construction loans.

As with many of the financials, there was this big relief rally on first-quarter earnings. The thinking was these results weren't so bad, but we think that more credit losses are ahead of us.

How about a different short holding?

Hudson City Bancorp [HCBK], which is based in New Jersey. The shares have gained about 60% from their July '07 lows and now trade at 21 times '08 estimates and two times tangible book. They have a wholesale funding and asset-generation strategy, which allows them to keep expenses low.

Could you elaborate on that?

Basically, they borrow funds from the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York and use repurchase agreements. So they, in effect, purchase money, more so than relying on deposits. In addition, they buy most of their assets, usually through brokers. A big chunk of their assets are first mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. So for the most part, they are not a retail originator of loans, and they are benefiting from the steepness of the yield curve.

And, even with all that, they will earn less than a 10% return on equity this year, so I just don't get the valuation. Furthermore, when you have a wholesale business model, that means you don't really have a valuable franchise that another bank would pay much for. So a recent stock price represented approximately a 100% premium for their core deposits, which is how bank acquisitions typically get priced. And I don't think their deposits are worth nearly that much to a buyer. Everything looks great for them now, if you a call 10% ROE great. But they are not immune to credit risk in a recession and a weak housing market. I also think their loan-loss reserve at 0.15% is very low, relative to others'. When the Fed rate-cutting cycle is over, I don't want to own a spread play with credit risk that's trading at two times book.

Let's move to the long side of the ledger. What financial firms do you like?

One is Hatteras Financial [HTS], based in Winston-Salem, N.C. They are a mortgage REIT. We bought it in a private placement last year and it recently went public at $24 a share. They own all agency adjustable-rate securities, so there is no credit risk here. The market capitalization is about $630 million.

What's the biggest risk for this firm?

I'd say it's yield-curve risk, but, trading at just over one times book value, it's well— factored into the price. We estimate that they will earn $4.50 to $4.75 a share from mid-year '08 to mid-year '09, once the IPO proceeds are invested. As a REIT, they will pay out all— or nearly all— of their earnings in dividends. So at 25 recently, the stock was sporting an expected yield of around 19%. We think the stock gets to 30 at least. Between the appreciation and the yield, it's a great total return.

Could you explain their yield-curve risk in a little more detail?

Like all mortgage REITs, they use leverage. They borrow at short-term maturities so they have been benefiting— and continue to benefit— from falling federal-funds rates. It's very similar to what Hudson City is doing. They are benefiting from falling short-term interest rates because they use the wholesale market to buy funds. And yet, somehow, the market is paying two times book for that, whereas you can buy Hatteras for 1.1 times book— and Hatteras earns a 20% ROE, versus Hudson's 10%.

Last pick, please.

This is a more controversial long holding: MGIC Investment [MTG], in which we used to have a short position.

What made you switch to the long side?

The stock's down from north of 70 in early 2007 to around 12, bringing its capitalization down to about $1.5 billion. One reason we like the company is that it was able to raise more capital recently, something its competitors haven't been able to do. In March, they did a common offering that raised about $500 million— so they've been able to raise liquidity and capital. At the same time, they are raising prices on premiums and tightening underwriting on the business now being written. The new business is being written based on lower home appraisals after the housing bubble burst— and yet they are still showing good growth despite the fact that the whole industry has slowed down.

Our thesis is that once MGIC gets through writing down its old book of business, the new book will be very profitable and valuable. Even applying our bearish mortgage-credit outlook, we don't see more than another $4 or $5 per share of losses in the next two years. So current book value of $24 should bottom in the high teens in '09 and start rising from there. They'll be quite profitable after that, given their better margins and more conservative underwriting of the current book of business. The stock should trade upward of two times book. So we see the stock, currently at around 12, as a double-to-triple over the next few years.

Thanks very much, Sy.

Jacobs' Picks...

Company               Ticker  Price  
Hatteras Financial HTS $24.85
MGIC Investment MTG 11.85
…And Pans
Wells Fargo WFC 27.70
Hudson City Bancorp HCBK 17.79
BB&T BBT 32.83

Source: Bloomberg

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
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Finance In Asia: Pots And Kettles

Finance In Asia: Pots And Kettles

From The Economist Print Edition | 22 May 2008

The credit crisis has cooled Asia's ardour towards Western banks.
But the region stands to gain even more from opening up
than Wall Street does.


Illustration by Satoshi Kambayashi


SHANGHAI— When China's three leading state-run banks finally felt confident enough to list their shares in 2006 and 2007, after years of losses from bad lending practices, the initial public offerings contained two common elements: big Western banks acting first as underwriters and second as strategic investors. What the government most wanted was an endorsement of quality that it felt could come only from the cream of global banking. It was prepared to offer the lucky few the chance to make billions of dollars, in exchange for sharing what it thought was their invaluable risk-management expertise.

The offer of minority stakes was accompanied by a slight crack in the Great Wall that China has built around its highly sensitive securities markets. Last year Credit Suisse, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley all received enough encouragement from regulators to announce agreements with domestic securities firms for some form of tie-up. Meanwhile, China's new sovereign-wealth fund spent $3 billion on a stake in the Blackstone Group, an American buy-out fund, hoping to learn lessons in finance from a master of the craft.

All of this came before the credit crisis sideswiped the big Western financial firms, costing hundreds of billions of dollars in losses, the jobs of senior executives (not to mention those of thousands of more junior employees) and, most important, their reputations for prudent risk management. Optimists in Europe and America say that acknowledging these losses is all part of the healing process. But in parts of Asia there is a chillier interpretation. There you can find the belief that Western banks have failed an important test of soundness and that their regulatory model is not to be trusted either.

As a result, Western bankers say they are greeted more coolly than they were a year ago— not just in China, but in Japan and South Korea too. They point to Seoul's reluctance to endorse HSBC's acquisition of Korea Exchange Bank as one sign of frostiness. In China attitudes are hardening publicly. Credit Suisse, Citi and Morgan Stanley have not yet had their deals approved, and other banks that had hoped to be next now wonder if the approval process has been quietly shelved.

Unlike many developed markets where government decisions are clearly explained, a rejection in China often comes in the maddening form of absolute silence. But strong hints are emerging. A senior Chinese regulator recently described to this newspaper his view of big global investment banks in one unusually graphic word: "shit".

There is particular scepticism about whether large Western banks, or their regulators, truly understand the risks associated with the mountain of derivatives on their balance sheets. Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (and a leading reformer), makes no attempt to conceal his doubts about bank regulation in America— and how flat-footed it was. "After the death, the doctor came," he observes dryly. As a result, he indicates, China is likely to open up to international banks even more slowly than it has already.

Even as Western financial firms have fallen into disrepute, banks in emerging markets are treated as paragons of probity. Jiang Jianqing, chairman of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the world's most valuable bank, recently talked down the merits of investment in American bonds and banks. His bank has refused invitations to invest in global firms. Instead it has bought a large part of Standard Bank of South Africa and controlling shares in banks in Macau and Indonesia.

Some of the reaction is an understandable response to genuine failures. China's sovereign-wealth fund has lost plenty of money on its year-old Blackstone stake and on its investment in Morgan Stanley. But rather than viewing this as an education in the way an unrigged market works, or an opportunity to buy more at a lower price, it considers the investments an embarrassment. So far this year, China has not invested in any stricken Western banks; just in time, Citic, China's leading securities firm, slipped out of a billion-dollar investment in Bear Stearns before it fell into the arms of JPMorgan Chase.

In many ways, these are nerve-racking moments for institutions that have put great store by China. The potential spoils are huge. According to Matthew Austen of Oliver Wyman, a consultancy, the Chinese banking and securities market generates $225 billion in revenues; he reckons that Western firms receive no more than 7% of this (and less than 1% if shareholdings in Chinese companies are excluded). The global firms would like to manage funds, raise capital and trade securities, including shares, debt and derivatives. All these activities are still heavily restricted.

They are not the only ones likely to be hurt by rising protectionism, however. Hank Paulson, America's treasury secretary, was not just talking America's book when he said that opening the Chinese financial system is "absolutely necessary" for China's own long-term economic success. It would not only provide greater equilibrium to global capital flows, but would also bring more efficiency to China's industry. Already, manufacturing firms in southern China are struggling to cope with the rising yuan, because there is no currency-futures market for hedging.

Similarly, Chinese firms are forced into inefficient financing arrangements. They can borrow from state-controlled banks at rising rates that may have little to do with their own creditworthiness, let alone what they plan to do with the money. Alternatively, they can join a long, bureaucratic queue to issue shares. Even the largest ones still rely on the state for permission to raise capital: Ping An, the second-largest insurer, recently pulled a vast secondary share offering after what was believed to be a quiet word from the authorities.

A state-driven financial market means state firms tend to do best. Financing for start-ups remains largely informal— loans from friends outside the financial (and tax) system— which stifles entrepreneurship. Worst of all, today's system provides a truly rotten deal for Chinese citizens trying to put away money for retirement, for their children's education, or other personal needs. They are given a bleak choice of subsidising the financial system through deposits yielding less than inflation or speculating on highly volatile shares.

China's financial firms are by no means model institutions either. A banking crisis, which began in the late 1990s and is still not fully resolved, cost $428 billion, according to the World Bank. In addition, billions of dollars were lost by state-controlled securities firms through unfunded "guaranteed" investment products and inept proprietary trading funded by money absconded from client accounts. China has never revealed the full cost of this disaster. Whatever the collective figure, it gives some perspective to the $335 billion or so of write-downs and credit losses thus far from the subprime crisis.

Clearly, Western banks have every reason to regret their losses. That may be one of the reasons they are not defending their methods more vigorously. Even in the West, where there is plenty of talk of regulation, they are keeping a low profile. Having got so far with China, however, bankers will be remiss if they let the misapprehensions fester. Western finance may be prone to cyclical excess, they can argue, but the state-sponsored model is even more so. At least when troubles hit Western banks, the recognition— and the healing— come far quicker.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
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BIS: Great Depression?

Central Bank Body Warns Of 'Great Depression'

By Gill Montia, Banking Times | 9 June 2008

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the organisation that fosters cooperation between central banks, has warned that the credit crisis could lead world economies into a crash on a scale not seen since the 1930s. In its latest quarterly report, the body points out that the Great Depression of the 1930s was not foreseen and that commentators on the financial turmoil, instigated by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, may not have grasped the level of exposure that lies at its heart.

According to the BIS, complex credit instruments, a strong appetite for risk, rising levels of household debt and long-term imbalances in the world currency system, all form part of the loose monetarist policy that could result in another Great Depression. The report points out that between March and May of this year, interbank lending continued to show signs of extreme stress and that this could be set to continue well into the future. It also raises concerns about the Chinese economy and questions whether China may be repeating mistakes made by Japan, with its so called bubble economy of the late 1980s.

Brian Turner, Editor, Banking Times Continues: Quite a few comments have been made that there is no direct reference to the Great Depression in this month’s BIS report. While this is strictly true, BIS warned in June 2007— just before the Credit Crunch really hit— that the global economy was vulnerable to a major economic set-back because of extraordinary exposure to collateralized credit. BIS directly made references to the 1930’s [then] as an example of a similarly serious credit bubble, and this month’s BIS report describes the conditions of this [as] being lived out.

So, to be pedantic, the warning
"BIS warns of Great Depression" is actually a year old already. What BIS discusses now is the fragility of existing conditions of the fall-out from a massive credit bubble bursting— which has already been made clear across their reports historically can be similarly referenced to the 1930’s, though stated in a typically conservative and non-alarmist language. Even what optimism BIS had about a weak recovery to the end of May 2008 have been dashed by extreme shorting of financial stocks across the US and UK— Lehman Brothers, HBOS, and property developers such as Barratts, have all taken extreme beatings in June 2008.

So back to the headline— BIS have indeed
already warned of [a] repeat of conditions that could be as extreme as the Great Depression, and are now describing that process as we [live] through it. In the meantime, unemployment is already on the rise on both sides of the pond, and the analogy some people have concerns about is still salient, I’m afraid.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
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EM Inflation Meltdown?

Emerging Markets Face Inflation Meltdown

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.co.UK | 18 June 2008

Central Banks Across Much Of Asia, Latin America, And Eastern Europe Will Soon Have To Jam on the brakes or risk a serious crisis as inflation spirals into the danger zone. As the stark reality becomes ever clearer, this year's correction in emerging market bourses and bond markets has now accelerated into a full-fledged rout. Chinese stocks have slumped by almost 50% since October while Mumbai’s BSE index has lost 27% of its value.

Shanghai's composite index touched a fourteen-month low of 2,900 yesterday. It follows moves this week by the central bank raised reserve requirement yet again, draining a further $60bn from the banking system. Chinese stocks have now slumped by almost 50% since peaking in October. In India, Mumbai's BSE index has lost 27% of its value as the exodus of foreign funds accelerates. The central bank has raised rates to 8% to curb inflation and halt a run on the rupee, but critics still say the country waited too long to tackle overheating. The current account deficit has shot up to near 3.5% of GDP. A plethora of subsidies has pushed the budget deficit to 9% of GDP.

Russia, Brazil, India, Vietnam, South Africa, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Chile— among others— have all had to raise interest rates or tighten monetary policy in recent days. Most are still behind the curve. "The inflation genie is out of the bottle: easy money is the culprit," said Joachim Fels, chief economist at Morgan Stanley. "Weighted global interest rates are 4.3%, while global inflation is above 5%. The real policy rate in the world is negative," he said.

The currencies of Korea, Thailand, the Phillippines, and Malaysia have come under pressure this week as investors scramble for dollars in moves that echo the East Asia crisis in 1997-1998. Several countries have had to intervene to slow the currency slide. The sudden shift in sentiment appears to follow comments by Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner, the heads of the US Federal Reserve and the New York Fed, leaving no doubt that Washington has lost patience with the crumbling dollar.

It is almost unprecedented for Fed officials to take a public stand on the Greenback. The orchestrated move is clearly aimed at halting the vicious circle in the oil markets, where crude prices are feeding off dollar weakness— with multiples of leverage. The "strong dollar" campaign has switched into high gear. US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson has conducted an aggressive lobbying drive behind the scenes in the Middle East and Asia. America's friends and foes have been left in no doubt that the enormous strategic might of the United States is now firmly behind the currency. From now on, they cross Washington at their peril.

The markets are now pricing in two rate rises by the Fed this year. Investors no longer doubt that the US— and Europe— will do what is needed to restore credibility. This display of resolve has suddenly switched the focus to the very different universe of emerging markets, where a host of countries have repeated the errors of the 1970s. Richard Cookson, a strategist at HSBC, advises clients to slash their holdings in these regions. "Inflation looks a very real problem in Asia, and the risk is that investors will lose faith in the region's currencies. Although markets have fallen savagely from their peaks, they're still looking pricey. We're lopping exposure even further, to zero," he said.

"Where to put the money? We think corporate debt is stunningly cheap compared with equities. Seven-year to ten-year 'BBB' [rated] corporate bonds in the US haven't been this cheap since the Autumn of 2002," he said. "Until and unless policy makers in the emerging world— especially those in China— tighten policy dramatically, the inflation rates are unlikely to fall much. Our guess is that most don't have much will to tighten pre-emptively," he said.

Russia's inflation is 15.1%, yet interest rates are a mere 10.75%. Vietnam's inflation is 25%; rates are 12%. Fitch Ratings has put the country on negative watch and warns of brewing trouble in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Balkans, and the Baltic states. The long-held assumption that emerging markets are strong enough to shrug off US troubles is now facing a serious test. The World Bank has slashed its global growth forecast to 2.7% this year. The IMF and the World Bank define growth below 3% a "global recession".

There is a dawning realization that China is facing a major storm as inflation (7.7%), the rising yuan (up 5% this year), soaring oil prices, and an economic downturn in the key export markets of North America and Europe all combine to crush profit margins. China uses five times as much energy as the US to produce a unit of GDP. It is acutely vulnerable to the energy crisis. A quarter of the 800 shoe factories in the Guangdong region have shut down in recent months, and several thousand textile workshops are battling to stay afloat. Hong Kong's industry federation has warned that 10,000 firms operating in the South of China may soon go out of business.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
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News & 5 Minute Forecast

Financial News: 5 Minute Forecast

By Agora Financial | 17 June 2008

Global Money Supply Surging… Chris Mayer On How To Invest Accordingly Two energy commodities outperforming crude oil… and how they’ll affect your electric bill Christopher Hancock’s favorite international oil play… Honda unveils zero-emissions car, plans mass production… Corn surges, towns devastated by Midwest flooding… readers ask: Why bother rebuilding?

The U.S. housing sector has taken a turn for the worse… again. After a month's reprieve, housing hurt back with a vengeance... American housing starts have fallen to their lowest level in 17 years, reports the Commerce Department today. Builders broke ground at an annual pace of 975,000 last month. That’s a 3.3% decline from April and a 32% crash from this time last year. Starts on single-family homes fell 1%, to a 17-year low, as well. Building permit applications declined, too, down 1.3%.

Today’s worse-than-expected report was a harsh blow if you’ve been rooting for a housing comeback… after housing starts surprisingly increased in April, the optimistic at heart were hoping the bust had bottomed. As we mentioned back then, the sudden rise was due to apartment and condo construction. Today’s numbers support our more probable thesis— the housing crisis is far from over.

So it’s no surprise that builder confidence has fallen to a record low. The National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo housing market index has sunk to a score of 18, the group reports this week. To make matters even worse, U.S. mortgage rates are currently at an eight-month high. According to data from Freddie Mac, the average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage is 6.3%. Not since October has the cost of borrowing money for a home been so expensive.

"Mortgage rates jumped this week after a number of Federal Reserve officials… expressed concern over a threat of inflation," said Frank Nothaft, Freddie Mac VP and chief economist. "This led some market participants to believe that the Fed will raise rates more aggressively over the year than previously thought." For all the Federal Reserve rate cuts to date (3.25%), mortgage rates have fallen only about 0.5% since this time last year.

The dollar fell all day yesterday. On the heels of yesterday’s European inflation report , traders placed big bets that the European Central Bank will soon begin hiking rates. The euro has surged nearly 2 full cents versus the greenback, but has since backed down a bit. You can buy one this morning for $1.54.

"Check out the table I stumbled across this morning," responds Chris Mayer to our coverage of global inflation yesterday. "It’s from the shareholder letter of QB Partners. It shows you the annual money and credit growth of a number of currencies.

"Doesn’t make you feel too confident about the value of most of these currencies, does it? On a relative basis, the Japanese yen and Swiss franc look like the places to be. The rest of these countries print money at double-digit rates. Many over 20%.

"So it’s a good time to be in tangible assets: land, metals, oil and gas… These things will hold their values against collapsing currencies better than paper assets of any kind (i.e., portfolios of mortgages, pools of credit card debts, etc.). Probably better, also, to be on the ‘necessity,’ rather than the ‘discretionary,’ side of the economy. Invest in stuff people need, rather than, say, luxury watches or premium cat food."

Wholesale prices surged 1.4% in May, reports the Labor Department today. Its producer price index (PPI) soared from a score of 0.2% in April, the biggest monthly gain in six months. All in all, wholesalers paid 7.2% more for goods this May than they did last year. Ouch. Par for the course, food and energy prices rose the most. Energy costs soared nearly 5% in May, while food prices hopped up 0.8%. Most everything was at least a bit more expensive last month… looking over the report, the only significant deflationary movement was in car and truck prices, down 1%.

Combine today’s PPI report with last week’s CPI and you’ve got the fastest rate of producer and consumer inflation in more than six months. Both reports were worse than expected, and both show food and energy prices inflating rapidly. Get ready for electricity to become much more expensive. American utility companies are raising prices up to 29% this year, reports USA Today. We can’t blame them… prices for coal and natural gas, which produce the majority of electricity in the U.S., have been soaring.

With coal prices nearly doubling and natgas futures up 60% since the new year, a 30% hike in consumer utility costs seems conservative. "Gazprom is looking to penetrate the North American market," says Christopher Hancock, our international investing adviser. "Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled natural gas mega biz, hopes to distribute the gas coming from its vast Shtokman field to North America, the most heavily traded gas market in the world. Western companies have been buying Gazprom’s gas and then trading it to sell in the markets where it was most profitable. Now Gazprom wants to garner a piece of that business for itself."

Aside from declaring its latest North American ambitions, Gazprom has also recently pulled off a huge backdoor entry into the Libyan oil market. There’s even talk of a Gazprom listing on the New York Stock Exchange. "One thing’s for sure," says Mr. Hancock. "Gazprom will likely remain the world's most politically influential corporation well into the future. Assuming drilling activity and infrastructure overhauls take place as we expect, we won’t be surprised to see Gazprom’s share price rise, along with its influence."

Oil suffered some big swings yesterday. Crude spiked $6 in morning trading on the news of European inflation and subsequent dollar weakness. In fact, traders pushed oil up to a new intraday record high of $139 and change. But since then, oil’s been trending down steadily. The EU inflation reading, a bad German investor confidence report, nearly double-digit inflation in Asia and the typical malaise here in the states… there’s a feeling permeating the market that demand can’t be sustained. Coupled with the production news out of the Middle East , oil’s been traded back down to $133.

The national average gas price fell today, as well… a little. Retail gas prices reached a record high of $4.08 yesterday, but have since "retreated" two tenths of a cent, to $4.078. Feel better yet? Today’s price is up 36% from this time last year [[But it's still selling for a HUGE discount to oil, based on BTU equivalent units: normxxx]].

Honda unveiled the world’s first production-ready hydrogen-powered car yesterday.

That’s the Honda FCX Clarity. Basically, the thing combines a stash of hydrogen with air in a way that creates electricity, which powers the engine. The only byproducts, says Honda, is heat, water and a golf cart-like hum. In other words, this baby has zero emissions. We’re told it’s got a 270-mile range with a fuel-efficiency equivalent of about 74 miles per gallon [[which, I suppose, neglects to include the cost of the hydrogen production...: normxxx]].

Honda says around 200 FCXs will be made over the next three years. At present, it takes around a quarter of a million dollars to make just one FCX. But Honda has decided not to pass on that cost— the car is available for a three-year lease for only $600 a month. If you’re not a Southern California A-lister, good luck… that’s the only place they’ll be leased, and the first batch has already been spoken for by Hollywood producers, CEOs and Jamie Lee Curtis.

The price of corn edged past $8 a bushel for the first time today. Much of the U.S. Corn Belt is simply underwater. On June 30, the U.S. government will officially report how many millions of acres were lost just to this flooding. Current estimates range from 3-5 million acres, or about 4-6% of the national crop.

The U.S. stock market was a hodgepodge of small gains and losses yesterday. Oil prices soared, but then retreated. Lehman Bros. announced a big loss, but it wasn’t worse than expected. Inflation is getting fearsome, but Chicago futures are pricing decent chances of a Fed rate hike this summer. By the end of this balancing act, the Dow rose 0.3%, the S&P 500 finished where it started, and the Nasdaq lost 0.8%.

In today’s trading, Goldman Sachs is the stealing the show. The world’s largest investment bank beat second-quarter earnings expectations by a handsome margin. Profits from asset management and stock underwriting efforts buoyed earnings to $2 billion in the quarter. That’s about $4.58 a share, much higher than the forecasted $3.42. Profits were down 10% from this time last year, but compared to other investment banks, Goldman seems immune to the credit crisis. Or they are just really, really good at faking it.

Lastly, gold is still around $885. It’s been chasing the dollar up and down since we wrote to you yesterday, but for the most part, the gold story is unchanged.

"I live in southern Louisiana," says a reader. "I remember very vividly several congressmen asking why should we rebuild the areas around the Gulf of Mexico that were ravaged by Katrina and Rita. This was the big discussion of the day. People along both party lines all over the country asked why should we rebuild Louisiana and Mississippi.

"Well, I have a question. Why should we rebuild any of the flooded plains of the Midwest? Didn't it flood over there about a decade ago, and now it’s happened again? Hey, what is good for the goose is good for the gander.

"Just a word of caution to all you people in the Midwest who will eventually get the government help you so desperately want. The government will screw up the process of rebuilding far, far worse than you can possibly imagine. Trust me on this one."

"Over 100 years ago," writes another, "our government tried to halt building any human-inhabited structures in all the flood zones. The idea was to save the government the cost of building and maintaining dikes, bailing out flood-stricken homeowners and keeping insurance for homes affordable. The bill almost passed, but the lobbyists succeeded in looking out for the wealthy landowners.

"It is still time to halt the practice and save this country's taxpayers continually wasted tax dollars. But, with all the publicity and sympathy for flood victims making the news, I guess it would be political suicide to start putting an end to all this stupidity."

Best regards,

Ian Mathias
The 5 Min. Forecast


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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Lehman And The Liars

Lehman And The Liars

By Chan Akya | 13 June 2008

The travails at one of the smaller investment banks in the world, Lehman Brothers, this week helped to increase investor focus on the phalanx of lies that underpin valuations across financial markets. Since I last alluded to the potential problems of this firm (Cheap talk, pricey banks, Asia Times Online, June 5, 2008), events have moved rather quickly; its share price is down from around US$31 to Thursday's close of $22.70.

The reason for the share price decline wasn't so much the article of course, but rather the company's announcement on Monday (June 9) that it expected a $2.8 billion loss for the quarter ended May 31, and that it would also raise $6 billion in new capital, a part of which would come from Asian investors, in particular an unnamed South Korean financial institution. Close on the heels of the share price decline following these announcements, the company fired two senior managers, its chief financial officer and chief operating officer, on Thursday June 12, while allowing the chief executive to keep his job. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to point out that American executive accountability has never been lower than it appears to be at present, but at least remains higher than we can see in Europe or Asia.

Lehman had, along with other investment banks, spent the past few months denying that it needed to raise any further capital, unlike the bigger commercial banks such as Citibank, specifically stating in many forums that it had hedged various problem assets and therefore did not expect to post losses. A couple of months later, the story not only unraveled at breakneck speed, but now all investment banks are showing an increase in their holdings of so-called Level 3 assets, which represent the "we don't know what these are worth so let's just pretend they're worth what we paid for them" school of securities investment pricing.

Given all that, this week's announcement of losses combined with capital raising showed the investment banks in poor light, as it exposed lies on many fronts. In effect, the bank reported losses 'it did not previously expect', requiring capital 'it previously said wasn't needed', and still held 'securities that no one understood'. The obvious question becomes— who's next? In essence, it is a confidence crisis. The problem with this particular genie is that it can never go back into the bottle.

For financial investors, while the Fed's actions since the Bear Stearns deal to improve access to liquidity for the investment banks (see also Trust goes down the drain, Asia Times Online, March 18, 2008) have had the salutary effect of avoiding "bank run" situations, they do not fix the core underlying problem of how they can avoid [further] losses on their existing exposures while attempting to earn revenues from new areas. In any event, the Fed guarantee works only for creditors, not for stock investors. Losses require investment banks to post more capital, in turn diluting existing shareholders even as future expected earnings decline. This is what is known in stock markets as "death spiral valuations", as every fresh loss not only hits the current share price but also creates further dilution due to the issue of new shares to cover those losses.

Needless to say, it is not a very good deal for investors to buy shares in such companies— a fact that is emphasized by Lehman itself, which most recently raised capital at $28 a share— stock that is now trading well below that. The same thing has happened to all Asian and Middle Eastern investors on their investments in US financial stocks— which I characterized as the simplest way to lose money in financial markets today. It is certainly not only Lehman Brothers in the US that found itself in a spot of bother this week. From the other end of the world, Australian company Babcock and Brown has seen its share price halve from A$11 last week to A$5.25 as of Friday's close in Sydney. In common with the Lehman story, a specific loss on taxes soon erupted into a bigger problem as investors discovered a so-called "market capitalization" clause in the company's debt borrowings.

Under such clauses, when the total stock market value of a company declines below a certain point, lenders can choose to cut financial exposure to the firm or demand higher interest payments (or in some cases, both). In the case of Babcock and Brown, which is described as a specialized investment management group, this capitalization level was set at A$2 billion (US$1.87 billion), which must have seemed low enough for creditors and shareholders last year but has been quickly breached this year as financial stocks globally declined.

On the back of the Babcock and Brown story, financial markets are getting more edgy about other such potential death-spiral companies out there. This decline in confidence naturally leads the markets down, as it probably should; but also opens a can of worms in terms of what else is out there that people may be lying about. As it turns out, there are rather a lot of such things.

Inflation Scare

Almost the first thing that everyone looks at now is the inflation scare around the world. Even the US Federal Reserve has acknowledged that inflation poses a key risk to its ability to cut interest rates. As I wrote in my previous article, big bond managers have signaled their displeasure with the situation by selling US government bonds. Yields on the benchmark US Treasury 10-year bonds have increased from 3.9% last Tuesday night to around 4.21% on Friday (June 13) morning.

A number of columnists have pointed out that inflation calculations are filled with lies and assumptions and vastly understate the problem of rising prices in order that central banks can continue to keep interest rates far below where they should be. But, as people finally start reacting to higher prices by cutting their consumption, the elites of both companies and governments are beginning to notice, essentially ignoring the statistics that underplay the problem.

Asia Starts Selling

The other facet of rising US government yields is of course the actions of Asian central banks. Belatedly realizing that their own inflation problems aren't getting better any time soon, Asian central banks have at long last started selling US dollar assets this week to push up the value of their currencies (this helps to cut the prices of imports, which has a big impact on domestic prices). This was part of my set of recommendations in the previous article, and it is actually possible that Asian central banks might do more such intelligent stuff in coming weeks.

Rising interest rates mean that dividends [and earnings] are not worth as much, further driving down stock prices. The financial market impact of rising bond yields though is yet another death spiral, as this quickly feeds into the borrowing costs of companies and individuals, reducing their disposable income further and therefore ushering in still more cuts in consumption [[or increases in prices to pass along: normxxx]]. Companies will have to figure out other means to cut costs, including laying off people, under such circumstances. Some will even have to declare bankruptcy, further hurting the already troubled financial sector.

On that note, it is interesting how the financial markets reacted to the June 12 retail sales figures in the US, which showed a 1% increase against economists' expectations of around 0.5%. The reason for the increase was of course the George W. Bush rebate checks that had been sent to US households. It appears that most Americans took the money and spent it at the mall, or perhaps more likely at the supermarkets to buy food and fuel [[an analysis of the data supports the latter surmise: normxxx]]. Alongside the higher retail sales, the data also showed rising unemployment claims, with more than 3.1 million Americans claiming jobless benefits now. This is likely to worsen in coming months as more companies react to the slowing economy and higher interest rates by cutting capital expenditure and also firing employees.

Lying About Oil

Meanwhile, the price of oil continues to rise, reaching a record of just under $140 a barrel this week, despite increasingly shrill rhetoric from the Fed and the European Central Bank about being mindful of commodity-driven inflation. Seeing that monetary policy is still loose and the value of the US dollar still rather suspect, investors have continued to purchase physical commodities such as oil even as it has doubled in price from this time last year. Americans and Europeans are increasingly turning to smaller cars to cut their fuel prices, leaving princely sports utility vehicles rotting on their lots. All of a sudden, the marketing lies about America's cultural infatuation with big vehicles on the specious grounds of safety and utility have unraveled due to the price of fuel. This story may only just be starting, as more such declines in large inefficient vehicles are forecast, as is the likelihood that people will just stop driving 'luxury' cars that cost too much to maintain.

It is not just in such developed countries that people have begun adjusting to high oil prices. Similar events have taken place elsewhere, and perhaps the most entertaining this week was the news item that the price of donkeys in Turkey has increased sevenfold from €26 (US$40) to €180 in the past few months. The reason is of course that farmers can no longer afford to use their tractors due to fuel costs and have turned back to 2,000-year old hay burning, ass technology. Now that I have broached the subject of asses, the Group of Eight finance ministers' meeting in Osaka, Japan, this weekend should be entertaining for the whole new set of lies that will be promulgated. The only thing that the ministers should watch out for is that financial markets have become much more unforgiving in the past few days, so the old convenient lies may well have the exact opposite effects to those that are intended.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Has The Fed $Flooded$ The World?

Has The Fed Really Flooded The World With Dollars?

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.Co.Uk | 14 June 2008

Professor Charles Goodhart— (Goodhart’s Law, ex Monetary Policy Committee, and now Olympian sage at the LSE)— is too polite to say that the Federal Reserve has made an utter hash of the US economy by slashing interest rates to 2%. But that is clearly what he thinks.



Us M1 Money Supply

"I would have done exactly the same as Bernanke given the financial crisis they were in," he told me this week, sticking to the "mutual admiration" etiquette of central bankers. Then comes the sting. "The M3 money supply is rising very rapidly indeed. There has been a very expansionary increase in the size of balance sheets," he said. The professor warned that yields on 10-year Treasuries (now 3.79%) have shot up so much on inflation fears since the Fed bail-out in March that the effect risks short-circuiting the whole 'monetary rescue'. "They may find that they don’t benefit after all from cutting rates," he said.

Well, yes, this is the great fear. The Fed may now be trapped. The argument goes that the US 10-year rate— set by market forces, and increasingly by the actions of Chinese and Mid-East governments— is the key price setter for the US housing market and corporate debt. Mess with bond vigilantes at your peril. Mr Goodhart warns that the Fed’s "ideological" attachment to core inflation— which strips out food and energy— could lead them up the creek this time. People do have to eat and drive. "The Fed thinks that headline inflation (3.9%) will come back down to core inflation, but this time core may go up to headline," he said. That would be nasty surprise.

"Of course, it is not for somebody sitting 3,000 miles away to judge whether rate cuts are well chosen," he added, tactfully. Quite so, quite so. I flag these comments because they touch on the most neuralgic issue of the day. My own view— if I dare dissent from the professor— is that the M3 surge is a false alarm. Needless to say, the Fed has not helped matters by abolishing the data. Paul Ashworth, US economist for Capital Economics, has reconstructed the M3 figures using the old Fed model. They show that the M3 growth rate has jumped from 8.1% to 14.9% since the credit crunch began in August— high, but nothing like the claims of 30% that are bandied around.

This rise is almost entirely due to a "bearish" flight from stocks and suchlike. Nervous investors have parked their wealth in money funds for safety until the crisis blows over. These money funds are distorting the M3 data (as Prof Goodhart also recognizes). "Everybody keeps saying the Fed is dropping money from helicopters and flooding the economy with liquidity, but it is not true. All that is happened is that the precautionary demand for money has gone up. That is not inflationary in any way," said Mr Ashworth. Indeed, if you look at the narrower M1 money supply, which the Fed does control, it has actually fallen 0.7% over the last year. The monetary base is contracting.

This chart from the Saint Louis Fed sent to me today by a reader came as a shock. The slide is getting worse. Perhaps that is why gold is down $125 an ounce from its peak in March. It reinforces my fear that we are heading into a deflationary crunch. No doubt the Fed, ECB, the Bank of England, et al, will ultimately flood the system with [paper] 'money' and set off another asset bubble. We are not there yet. So let me throw it open to any readers who have a view: do we really face galloping inflation in the Atlantic and Japanese economies (still almost 60% of world GDP), or is deflation lying in wait?

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Investment Strategy by Jeff Saut

Investment Strategy:
"sometimes Me Sits And Thinks And Sometimes Me Just Sits!"


By Jeffrey Saut | 16 June 2008

"A friend of mine, Eric Hanson, who runs Hanson Investment Management, publishes a regular investment letter… (We) recently discussed soccer (known as football in most of the world). According to him, ‘football matches are low-scoring affairs and often decided by a penalty kick’ (and some matches, at the end of the game by a penalty shootout). ‘The goalkeeper is just 36 feet away from the player taking the (penalty) shot and he has all of 0.2 to 0.3 seconds to respond. Not surprisingly, the kicker has the overwhelming advantage here. Eighty percent of penalty kicks score.

"But academics have asked an interesting question recently: even with the long odds, how best can a goalkeeper react to stop a penalty kick? By lunging left, by lunging right or by just sitting tight and staying right in the middle? Ofer Azar, a lecturer in the School of Management at Ben-Gurion University of Negev, in Israel, and two associates studied 311 penalty kicks from major leagues around the world. What they found was that lunging left or lunging right had about the same chance of stopping a penalty kick but simply doing nothing and staying right in the middle has twice the chance of making the stop. Goalkeepers, however, almost never do nothing. They remain in the centre only
6.3% of the time even though statistically this is the right thing to do. Why the preference for action? Goalkeepers say that doing nothing opens them up to criticism— ‘you did nothing!’ Nobody criticizes you if you lunge left or lunge right.’"

"I decided to quote Eric Hanson’s report because every day I get numerous emails from investors around the world who wish to receive ‘buy’ signals on everything from sugar and Chinese stocks to the dollar and gold. In other words, it seems that most investors are very short-term and trading oriented, which, as explained above, is likely to lead to disappointing results. In addition, of all of the emails I receive,
99% concern buying opportunities, which shows that investors are far more concerned about missing further asset price increases— especially equities— than about incurring further losses."
. . . Dr. Marc Faber

"Sometimes me sits and thinks and sometimes me just sits" is an axiom that has saved us a lot of money over the years because we have learned the hard way that when you attempt to "force" a trade, or an investment (lunge left or lunge right), it tends to be a prescription for losing money. Indeed, as Charles Dow wrote, "The successful investor must be willing to ignore two out of every three potential money making opportunities." [[I.e., always err on the side of caution! Remember, it is a string of loss-free returns, rather than a high 'average' return with lots of minuses, that wins the compounding prize! (See my post on "Why Investors' Fail."): normxxx]] Accordingly, since recommending raising some cash at last May’s reaction price "highs," we have been "sitting" awaiting another good trading/ buying-point like the ones we identified at the January and March "lows." As stated, our preferred downside target has been the 1320 - 1330 level, basis the S&P 500 (SPX/1360.03), and late last week the SPX "tagged" the upper end of that envisioned zone.

Conveniently, in last Thursday’s verbal strategy comments, we actually suggested a scale "in" buying approach for trading accounts given we were near our target zone, as well as the fact that our proprietary overbought/oversold Trading Index was more oversold than it has been in years. Almost on cue the SPX carved out a trading-bottom and has subsequently lifted some 30 points. The question now becomes, "How long should any rally last and how far can it carry?"

To this question the astute Lowry’s organization noted in its Friday’s report. "The longevity of a rally is directly correlated to the strength of investor Demand during the rally. If Demand is broad and persistent, the gains could be significant. But if Demand is weak and selective, then the rally might best be used as an opportunity to sell." Since we are only two days into the rally, it is still too early to determine the extent of investors’ "demand," but we are constructive in the short/intermediate-term provided we are not in one of these 17- to 25-session "selling stampedes" (we rather doubt it).

Our near-term constructive stance centers on the sense that what we are likely going to experience is a "W"-shaped economic pattern. To wit, while we have repeatedly stated the economy is slowing, we have also been steadfast in the belief there would be no recession in 2008 (two negative quarters of GDP). That sense was/is driven by the fact that every government-sponsored economic stimulus program since 1948 has worked! And when taken in concert with the Herculean efforts of the Federal Reserve, we have been inclined to give this economic stimulus program the benefit of the doubt.

That said, we have proffered the economic slowdown might be interrupted by improving economic statistics (as we saw last week) spurred by the stimulus package. Moreover, this short-lived economic rebound should give participants the impression that all of our economic troubles are behind us, fostering a rally in the stock market. To us, the envisioned economic rebound would represent the middle part of the "W" pattern. Unfortunately, we think such a strengthening economic sequence will be accompanied by stronger than expected inflation readings, causing the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, thus slowing the economy again; aka the back half of the "W," or an economic double-dip [[we're about due; we haven't seen one in a while, and with a new chairman and a relatively new slate of Fed governors, ...: normxxx]].

Last week the Federal Reserve reinforced our sense that we are in the middle part of the "W" when Ben Bernanke declared "Mission Accomplished" and changed his focus from "downside risks to the economy" to "inflation concerns." Clearly the Fed is worried the inflation "Genie" is climbing out of the bottle; and, if that happens, it is going to be very difficult to put said Genie back. Adding to the inflation worries were last week’s Import Prices, which rose at a 17.8% year-over-year ramp rate (the highest since 1983), with the ex-fuels Import Prices component increasing 6.1% year-over-year led by a 4.6% gain in import prices from China, causing one savvy seer to lament, "the days of importing deflation are over!"

Also bolstering our near-term stock optimism is a sense the "political will" has reached a tipping-point, whereby there is going to be a concerted governmental effort to arrest the vertiginous rise in the price of crude oil [[even the U.N. has gotten into the act; Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has been telling the SA princes that the price of oil is driving the price of food around the world— that's a message that the princes are likely to respond to (and, indeed they have)— since they are deathly afraid of 'popular' uprisings: normxxx]]. You can already see the movement toward this end from proposals to ban speculators from the crude oil trading "pits" to dramatically increasing margin requirements. Notably, history shows that a $10 per barrel drop in the price of oil tends to translate into an additional point of P/E multiple expansion for stocks. Consequently, when we combine the aforementioned gleanings with the fact that it is going to be VERY difficult to have a negative "real" GDP report in 2Q08 given the recent strengthening economic numbers (retail sales, trade numbers, unemployment claims, PMI, etc.), we have got to be optimistic that the equity markets are carving out a near/intermediate-term bottom.

To us, last week marked a major change in the "body language" of the Federal Reserve. Our sense is that the Fed is now going to jawbone the U.S. dollar higher, and attempt to talk interest rates marginally higher, even though we don’t think the Fed will raise rates in the short run. Meanwhile, the politicos are trying to break the price of crude oil and other commodities. All of this is giving the "Street" the sense that the worst is in the rearview mirror; and, that even if Lehman Brothers (LEH/$25.81) defaults, the Fed’s "checkbook" will bail them out in a Bear Stearns déjà vu dance. These perceptions are why I believe we have [only] entered the middle part of the envisioned "W"-shaped economic environment, which should cause stocks to lift.

And, at least the corporate insiders are listening, for insider selling has fallen more than 60% year-over-year, while insider buying is up by about the same amount. Despite this optimism, however, many portfolio managers (PMs) seem to have adopted a new investing mantra— invest not to make money, but rather not to lose money— as many of their 'favorite' [high flying?] stocks have recently experienced "air pockets" on the downside. The PMs know that they have to stay pretty fully invested, so there seems to be a scramble for "safe" stocks. However, even these alleged "safe" stocks are breaking down, as can be seen in the chart patterns of General Electric (GE/$29.15), Pfizer (PFE/$17.99), Home Depot (HD/$27.53/Strong Buy), Eastman Kodak (EK/$12.83), etc. as things continue to get curiouser and curiouser.

The call for this week: In last Monday’s missive we wrote, "For whatever reason, last week’s schizophrenia caused the S&P 500 to break below its May reaction low, rendering a near-term price target into the 1320 - 1330 support zone. If that occurs, we would consider initiating ‘long’ trading positions as we did at the January/March trading ‘lows.’ It should also be noted that our proprietary oversold oscillator is close to rendering its first oversold ‘buy signal’ in years." Later that week, in Thursday’s verbal strategy comments, we told participants to begin a scale "in" buying approach in the indexes (ETFs) of their choice with close trailing stop-loss points. On Friday that "call" looked pretty good, but as Lowry’s notes, "The longevity of a rally is directly correlated to the strength of investor Demand during the rally." While only time will tell if this "lift" can gain momentum, we are optimistic and would point out that unlike the Bear Stearns crisis, gold is not rising and the U.S. dollar is not diving. These are NOT unimportant observations since last week’s news environment was certainly "dollar dour."

[ Normxxx Here:  Well, so much for that interim rally! Or, maybe I'm just being a little too negative here?  ]

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"The Big W?!"

By Jeffrey Saut | 9 June 2008

"It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World" is a 1963 comedy film that begins when the occupants of four vehicles stop on the side of the road to help another motorist who has careened off the highway in a spectacular crash. With his dying breaths Grogan (Jimmy Durante in his last screen appearance) tells the bystanders about $350,000 that is hidden in the nearby city of Santa Rosita "under the big W." With that, Grogan expires, and when the bystanders can’t agree on how to split the money, a slapstick road race begins to the city of Santa Rosita in search of "the big W."

This morning we revisit the "big W," except in this case we are referring to the potential for a "big W"-shaped economic pattern. To wit, while we have repeatedly stated the economy is slowing, we have also been steadfast in the belief there would be no recession in 2008 (two negative quarters of GDP). That sense was reinforced by the fact that every government-sponsored economic stimulus program since 1948 has worked! And when taken in concert with the Herculean efforts of the Federal Reserve, as well as the politicians, we have been inclined to give this economic stimulus program the benefit of the doubt.

That said, we have proffered that the economic slowdown we have been experiencing might just be interrupted, in the short term, by improving economic statistics driven by said 'stimulus' package, low interest rates (actually [increasingly] negative "real" interest rates), surging money supply, the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) [[aka the 'hundreds of billion dollar giveaway': normxxx]], et al. And, this short-lived economic rebound would give participants the impression that all of our economic troubles are behind us, fostering a rally in the stock market. To us, the envisioned economic rebound would only represent the middle part of the "W" pattern.

Unfortunately, we think such a strengthening economic sequence will be accompanied by stronger than expected inflation readings, causing the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates and thus slowing the economy again; to wit, the back half of the "W," or an economic double-dip. To this inflation point, last week Ed Hyman’s ISI organization noted, "The big news is in developing countries where ISI’s 22 country Foreign CPI Composition Index broke above 7%. It had been below this level since early 2002. The central banks are getting the message. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Brazil Central Banks all raised rates yesterday (6-4-08)."

Interestingly, last week showed how quickly perceptions can change on the Street of Dreams. Indeed, on Thursday numerous events (economic, M&A, etc.) gave market participants the sense the worse was behind us with no recession on the horizon. The result was last Thursday’s 214-point Dow Wow that made us feel like a "goat" since we had been telling folks we were confused on the stock market’s near-term direction and therefore recommended NO trading positions. The next day, however, we felt like a "hero" as the unemployment rate leaped to 5.5% (the highest level since October 2004).

Shockingly, the recondite birth/death model, which adds jobs the government "thinks" are being created, but can’t actually count, added 217,000 jobs (before seasonal adjustments) to Friday’s report or the numbers would have actually been far worse. When the employment report was combined with crude oil’s climb to new all-time highs ($138.54/bbl.), it set the stage for Friday’s Flop that left the senior index down an eye-popping 395 points. The late week action caused one old Wall Street wag to exclaim, "Can you spell schizophrenic?!"

Schizophrenic, as well as confusing, for the current investment landscape is like nothing I have seen in over 40 years of observing markets! The environment was, however, summed up about as well as I have seen by one particularly bright portfolio manager at the Muhlenkamp organization when Ken Dupre wrote (as paraphrased by me):

The two most important market trends I see today:

1) Banks and brokerages are being forced to de-lever as they bring their SPE (Special Purpose Entities) on to the B/S (balance sheet):

  • Increased margin requirements are forcing hedge funds to de-lever.

  • De-leveraging will lead to a decrease in consumer, corporate and commercial real estate credit.

This will cause decreased spending for consumers, poor credit businesses and commercial real estate.

2) Legislation:

  • CNBC talked about legislation adding margin requirements to CDSs (Credit Default Swaps, a $45 trillion world market). Many in the commodities market have been using some form of CDS instead of commodities futures because there currently are little to no margin requirements. If rules for CDSs are changed, it would force a lot of selling of commodity CDSs.

  • There are also possible legislative limitations on commodity trading, which would produce similar or add to CDS requirements.

  • It is clear to me that the increase in asset allocation (money flow) to commodities by pensions and the public has been a major contributor to the driving of higher oil and other commodity prices. And if commodity buying dries up (prices looking awfully high), there should be one strong down draft.

I am still uncomfortable with a deep recession call.

  • The world is exhibiting strong economic growth; increased utilization of the vast amounts of under-utilized human capital in China/India (1/3 of world population) will continue to drive strong world productivity.

  • The U.S. consumer has decreased in influence. U.S. GDP has gone from 30% [of the world’s GDP] 15 years ago to 27% in 2006 to probably >25%? (currency down 20% since 2006 and U.S. has under-grown world GDP) today. A 5% decrease on 30% = 17% less influence.

  • The Fed is currently goosing the economy with a 2% discount rate.

  • The U.S. dollar is so cheap: US Steel is suggesting they are the low cost producer; U.S. coal exports are rising; Industrials export strength is growing. U.S. exported 11% of GDP in 2006.

  • Energy and mining companies’ employment is booming.

  • Consumer income (CDI) has continued to grow in the face of our current turmoil.

However, I do see a slow economic growth/recovery while we digest:

  • More RMBS (Residential Mortgage Backed Securities) and related CDO (Collateral Debt Obligations) charges; coming CMBS (Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities) and CDS charges;

  • Deleveraging of bank/brokers/hedge funds;

  • More efficient ways of creating/using energy and raw materials. Current high prices are decreasing demand and fat profits are beginning to grow supply. The breaking of commodity prices will keep inflation in check.

The market is cheap at a 16x P/E multiple (vs. 19 P/E a year ago) on depressed financial earnings, and there is a lot of cash on the sidelines. To me, this suggests a slow, rising, more volatile market. I am also a seasonal man and believe there are always bargains to be found in September/October, so having some cash today, or raising some this summer in rallies, should be useful this fall.

I think Ken Dupre’s comments are "spot on" and would emphasize that the deleveraging of corporate and consumer balance sheets, combined with increased regulation/legislation, suggests an economy that will, at best, "muddle." This is consistent with our continuing thoughts that the government’s increasing movement toward intervention, and over-regulation, is our biggest concern! The only point I would contest in Ken’s comments is whether stocks, in the aggregate, are really "cheap." To be sure, using most interest rate-based valuation methods (Fed Model, Dividend Discount Model, Earnings Yield Gap, etc.) stocks are "cheap." However, using Graham & Dodd type measuring sticks (Price to book, price to dividends, price to earnings, etc.) stocks are more of a neutral value.

Nevertheless, for whatever reason, last week’s schizophrenia caused the S&P 500 (SPX/1360.68) to break below its May reaction low rendering a near-term price target into the 1320 - 1330 support zone. If that occurs, we would consider initiating "long" trading positions as we did at the January/March trading "lows."It should also be noted that our proprietary oversold oscillator is close to rendering its first oversold "buy signal" in years. If the SPX slides into the aforementioned support zone, it would likely tip our oscillator into "buy" mode. In the interim, as stated all last week, we "wait" in the trading side of the portfolio.

For investors, however, we continue to be opportunistic buyers noting that many of our recent investment ideas acted pretty well last week. Indeed, Strong Buy-rated Delta Petroleum (DPTR/$26.01) was up 18% for the week driven by expectations that drilling results from its Paradox Basin wells will make good reading when they are reported in July. Similarly, 10% yielding, Outperform-rated, LINN Energy (LINE/$23.78) was up nearly 5% on the week, while 6.8% yielding Alaska Communications (ALSK/$12.53/Outperform) and 5.8% yielding Embarq (EQ/$47.19/Strong Buy) resisted last week’s market machinations.

The call for this week: Friday’s Dow Dive of 3.24% was the first 3% down day since February 2007 when the senior index was carving out a "bottom." It was also a 90% Downside Day (points and volume were 90% to the downside), following Thursday’s 80% Upside Day, in true schizophrenic style. Also schizophrenically, oil and gasoline soared to new all-time highs, while the energy/economic sensitive D-J Transportation Average "tagged" a new all-time high. Meanwhile, General Motors’ (GM/$16.22) shares fell to a multi-decade low (so goes GM, so goes the economy), consumer net worth is down 1.0% year-over-year, the FDIC insurance deposit fund is close to its minimum statutory level [[there's been a rash of failures among banks NOT 'too big to fail'!: normxxx]], tax rebate checks appear to be driving the federal government’s deficit to over $450 billion, Britain is running dangerously short of electricity [[South Africa is already rationing electricity!: normxxx]], the Gangotri glacier (one of the Himalayan’s largest glaciers) has shrunk by half a mile in the last 25 years (we continue to embrace the theme of companies playing to the rebuilding of the electric/water infrastructures), the Baltic Freight Rate Index registered new reaction highs (read: buy the dry bulk shippers), NYSE short-interest is at record highs [[extraordinarily bullish! : normxxx]], Ed (Johnny Carson’s sidekick) McMahon’s house is in foreclosure, and we keep asking ourselves, "How can inflation moderate from such an allegedly low level (read: 'core' levels)?" Indeed, curiouser and curiouser, which is why we continue to chant, "Sometimes me sits and thinks and sometimes me just sits!" Manifestly, "It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World!"

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""Random gleanings at 39,000 feet over the Atlantic""

By Jeffrey Saut | 2 June 2008

It takes 8 hours and 40 minutes to fly from Amsterdam to Atlanta. To be certain, that is enough time to contemplate the various market events since we departed a few weeks ago. Our parting words of advice were scribed on 5/12/08 in a report titled "Throw Deep." To wit:

"Sometimes you ‘throw deep,’ and sometimes you ‘grind it out.’ We were cautious entering 2008, fearful of the envisioned ‘selling stampede,’ but turned bullish at the late January ‘lows.’ Again we were cautious at the February ‘highs,’ suggesting that a re-test of the January ‘lows’ was in order. Yet we were aggressively bullish at the subsequent downside re-test of those January ‘lows’ in March, believing said re-test would be successful. And, that the ensuing rally would carry the major averages above their respective February ‘highs.’ Regrettably, once again we are cautious now that we have entered our cluster of topside ‘timing points,’ as well as our upside target zone between 1420 and 1440."

Eerily, on the following Monday (5/19) the S&P 500 (SPX/1400.38) peaked at precisely 1440 and quickly shed roughly 5%. The swoon left the SPX in the low 1370s, where it was in a near-term oversold condition, as well as testing its 50-day moving average (DMA). Accordingly, the snap-back rally from that 5/23/08 reaction low should have come as no surprise. The question now becomes, "is the recent rally the beginning of a significant upside move, or is it merely a throwback rally with more to come on the downside?" Unfortunately, the recent rally seems to be more of a withdrawal of selling-pressure rather than earnest renewed buying power. This is reflected by the fact that in the Operating Company Only Advance/Decline figures only 2.6% of the NYSE-listed domestic common stocks are at new 52-week highs, while more than 51% of stocks are down more than 20% from their respective 52-week highs.

Clearly the oversold condition that existed a few weeks ago has been alleviated. Moreover, the two 80% Downside Days (points and volume on the downside) that occurred during the recent decline failed to be offset by any of the ensuing Upside Days, which registered only a 62% reading on the Upside Days according to the astute Lowry’s Service. Additionally, the SPX’s 20-day "low" was breached to the downside in the recent correction (read: negative); and, the SPX was unable to sustain above its 200-DMA. Also, the SPX remains below "The Snake" (aka the 20-month moving average), referred to in our missive dated 5/12/08 (see the addendum at the end of this missive). All of this leaves the technical picture somewhat sketchy.

Our current caution is compounded by the yield-yelp of the 10-year T’note, which broke out above its 200-DMA in our absence, implying higher interest rates. We think longer-dated Treasuries are a SELL and those wishing to hedge their fixed income portfolios against higher rates have a couple of new closed end funds with which to do so (for further information contact our Closed End Fund department). Verily, higher interest rates have profound implications for various asset classes. And that, ladies and gentlemen, is another reason we have, after seven years of steadfast bullishness, recommended reducing/rebalancing stuff-stock positions (read: energy, timber, cement, etc.).

While longer-term we remain bullish on "stuff," with rising interest rates the "cost of carry" to own commodities increases. That linkage was potentially reflected in crude oil’s downside reversal during our travels. While we remain long-term energy bulls, if crude breaks below $120/bbl., professional money will view the recent parabolic price high of $135/bbl. as a near-term peak. As stated, despite these concerns we remain bullish on select energy companies. Last week that strategy was rewarded by Penn Virginia’s (PVA/$63.02) discovery in the Haynesville Oil Shale region, which rallied our stock recommendations playing to Haynesville (for further comments/ideas see our fundamental analysts’ reports).

Turning to the economy, amazingly just a few weeks ago the media was rife with comments that the U.S. economy was heading toward a recession of biblical proportions. We, however, maintained our staunch belief the economy would skirt "your father’s typical recession." Recent data tends to confirm that belief with employment, consumption, inventories, profits, etc. coming "in" on the stronger side. To our way of thinking the question now becomes is the economic slowdown "L-shaped," (down and flat), "V-shaped" (shallow with an economic acceleration driven by the monetary/fiscal stimulation), or a "W" (economic acceleration in the near-term followed by a double-dip slowdown a few quarters from now). I think a "W" scenario is the potential economic pattern for the balance of 2008 and 2009.

Indeed, certain finger-to-wallet indicators suggest the government-induced economic stimulus is going to OVER stimulate the economy in the short-term, leading to a torque-up in the inflation rate, which likely will be followed by a rise in interest rates that should slow the economy; aka, the double-dip, or "W"! Manifestly, many broader measures of inflation are significantly above the yield on 10-year Treasury Notes, rendering a negative "real" interest rate environment, as well as negative "real" returns for Treasury Note investors. This means inflation should continue along an upward trend for the next few years, because historically it takes about two years for monetary policy to achieve its maximum impact on inflation. We don’t think it will be any different this time.

As for the international markets, there is a reason European equities are about as cheap as they ever get relative to the U.S. markets. That reason is the $1.55 U.S. dollar exchange rate to the euro. While we are currently bullish on the U.S. greenback, the expensive euro should leave the European economy "muddling" for quite some time. Consequently, we continue to avoid investing in Europe except for select special situations. By far our favorite country for investment has been, and remains, Brazil. And while we would like to embrace Russia due to its natural resources, we have wrongly avoided investing there [[I think rightly!: normxxx]]. Our concerns center on the fact that Russia has confiscated, with minimal restitution [[and continues to do so: normxxx]], assets that were built with western capital and engineering prowess.

Further, Russia has a demographics problem. The birth rate in Russia is so low that by the middle of this century their population will be less than Yemen’s! As Herb Meyer notes, "Russia has one-sixth of the earth’s land surface and much of its oil. You can’t control that much area with such a small population. Immediately to the south, you have China with 70 million unmarried men of marriagable age, a potential nightmare scenario for Russia." Ergo, we continue to avoid Russia in favor of other emerging countries, many of which have had substantial price corrections year-to-date. Fortunately, we entered the new year wary of most international markets, having rebalanced (read: sold partial positions) our foreign investments late last year. Now, however, given their outsized declines, we recommend gradual re-accumulation. Our favorite way to employ this strategy is by purchasing MFS’s International Diversification Fund (MDIDX/$15.63).

Asset allocation, and sector selection, continue to be the drivers of overall portfolio performance. To this point, we remain under-weighted technology, consumer discretionary, and financials. While many pundits are screaming that financials are "cheap," we just don’t see it that way. For previously stated reasons, we think the financial sector will remain under pressure for years; and would note, the KBW Bank Index (BKX/75.87) "tagged" a new five-year closing low last week. At its peak the financial sector contributed 31% of the S&P 500’s earnings.

For comparison, in the 1980 energy bubble, energy-related companies contributed 26% to earnings, while at the tech bubble’s peak, tech accounted for 16% of earnings. With re-regulation of financial institutions coming, the result should be lower earnings with and attendant P/E multiple compression for the financials. On a market capitalization preference, mid-caps seem to have held up better during the recent stock market decline. And, we continue to invest accordingly.

The call for this week: "Sell in May and go away," is an old stock market "saw" whose long-term track record is compelling. To wit, starting in 1950 and investing $10,000 in the SPX every May 1st and liquidating on October 31st compounds to a shockingly small $10,026 today. Conversely, buying the SPX every November 1st and selling every May 1st compounds to $372,890 (according to Ned Davis Research).

[ Normxxx Here:  But see Sy Harding's site for a definitive accounting of this seasonality.  ]

Yet we have learned the hard way that markets can do ANYTHING. For example, if you sold in May 2003 you missed a 30% rally into year-end. With near-term stronger than expected economic statistics, increasing risk appetites, and commodities normalizing (read: declining, which should be bullish for equities), we think we could be in the middle of the envisioned "W-shaped" economic pattern.

If so, the perception will be that the worst is behind us, and stocks could continue to levitate until we enter the backside of the "W" where a rise in interest rates should squelch any overly robust economic recovery. Consequently, we are currently "out" of trading positions and focusing on investment positions, preferably ones with a yield. Previously mentioned names for your consideration include: 6.6%-yielding Alaska Communication (ALSK/$12.94/Outperform); 11%-yielding LINN Energy (LINE/$22.67/Outperform); Schering Plough’s 7.6%-yielding convertible preferred "B" shares (SGP+B/$196.00), whose terms and details should be checked before purchase; and, 5.8%-yielding Embarq (EQ/$47.32/Strong Buy).

Addendum:

Our caution centers on the belief that all of our economic problems are NOT behind us, the Dow Theory "sell signal" of November 21, 2007, the double-top chart configuration in the SPX at 1560 - 1570, and "The Snake" except in this case we are not referring to Kenny "The Snake" Stabler, but rather to the 20-month moving average (MMA) (aka "The Snake")— that has often represented the demarcation line of bull and bear markets. As can be seen in the nearby chart, the 20-MMA tends to mark the difference between the "bull" and the "bear." When the SPX is above its 20-MMA stocks are in an "up" phase. Even when "the snake" is marginally violated to the downside, but then quickly recaptured to the upside, the bull trend remains in force. However, when it is violated decisively to the downside, and stays there, caution is warranted.



Source: Thomson Reuters

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Buy When Investors Panic...

Buy When Investors Panic... Make A Quick 17%

By Ian Davis | 17 June 2008

Throughout history, investors have fallen into and out of love with risk.

For example, in October 1998, investors were jumping at the chance to buy junk bonds at a measly 2.8% premium to Treasury bond yields. Then, by October 2002, the default rate on junk bonds was spiking. To entice an investor to take on the risk of a junk bond in late 2002, corporations had to offer yields that exceeded Treasury bond yields by more than 10%. In both cases, investment-rating companies rated the bonds similarly. So their risk of default should have been the same. Investors were just valuing the risk differently. In other words, investors become overly cautious during bear markets and overly daring during bull markets.

That's no surprise... But when investors panic, it creates inefficiencies in the market we can use to our advantage. So I wanted to figure out a way to measure exactly how 'serene' or 'panicked' investors are today. My "serenity index" tracks three measures of risk: the emerging-markets spread, the high-yield spread, and the "VIX" volatility index. Emerging-market bonds and high-yield bonds are risky assets. And how risky investors think they are is easy to quantify: It is simply their yield over a risk-free U.S. Treasury bond. The VIX, which measures the premium investors are willing to pay for portfolio insurance, is the most widely used measure of how worried investors are. Putting these three indicators together gives a fairly good picture of the market's mood.

Let's Take A Look At Today's Numbers

The Lehman Brothers Emerging Market Bond Index is yielding only 2.8% more than 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds. This is about half of its 15-year median of 4.5%. So investors today aren't worried about risky emerging-market debt. On the other hand, the Merrill Lynch High Yield Master II Index is yielding 6.18% more then U.S. Treasuries (way above the median spread of 4.5%). So investors today are worried about high-yield bonds. Finally, the VIX is currently 18.4% above its historic median level. This means investors are somewhat worried about risk in the equity market.

So investors may be wary, but they're not quite panicked yet. The following chart shows my serenity index versus the S&P 500 (I flipped the y-axis so the highs and lows line up).

Investors Are Pricing More Risk into the Market
But They're Not Panicked Yet


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


The five blue lines show times when investors have panicked in the past. If you had bought an S&P 500 index fund on these panic extremes and held for just three months, you would have made an average 16.8%. And this indicator is consistent. You would have made money every time.

At worst, if you had bought in October 1987 (right after Black Monday), you would have made 10.3% in three months. And at best— if you had bought in November 2002— you would have made 19.4% in three months. As you can see, investors have become much less serene over the last 18 months... But they have remained relatively calm in the face of a weakening economy. When they finally do start to panic, we'll have a great opportunity for a short-term trade. If history is any guide, it will be a quick 16.8% in three months.

Good investing,
Ian Davis

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Foreclosures Rise 48% As Inflation Surges

US Home Foreclosures Rise 48% As Inflation Surges

By Suzy Jagger, Times Online, New York | 17 June 2008

Americans have not seen the worst of the housing crisis and must grow accustomed to surging inflation, one of Wall Street's leading economists warned today, as the US suffered the sharpest rise in foreclosures on record. Kevin Logan, chief economist at Dresdner Kleinwort, the investment bank in New York, predicted that inflation will continue to rise to as much as 5 per cent by August as food and fuel costs show no sign of slowing.


He also warned that house prices, construction activity and property sales may fall steeply until well into next year. His comments offer little comfort to American homeowners who last month suffered the sharpest rise in forclosures on record. At the same time, 'official' figures from Washington showed that the cost of living had risen by another 0.6 per cent compared with the month before, up to an annual rate of 4.2 per cent.

According to RealtyTrac, the US foreclosure monitor, the number of homeowners falling into serious arrears with their mortgage payments jumped by 48 per cent in May compared with the same period the year before. Last month, banks filed for foreclosure on 261,255 American homeowners, with one in every 483 households across the country having either lost or on the brink of losing their home. (While the rate of foreclosures in Ohio slowed slightly, the crisis deepened in states such as Nevada, California, Arizona, Florida and Michigan.)

In Nevada, one in every 118 households received a foreclosure-related notice last month, more than four times the national rate. In California, one in every 183 households faced foreclosure. The foreclosure process refers to any homeowner who is more than a month in arrears with mortgage repayments, but includes property owners who have been served a default notice, whose home has been repossessed by the bank, or whose property is about to be auctioned.

At the same time, while homeowners struggled to keep pace with their mortgage repayments, Americans also had to cope with the fastest increase in inflation since November. Food prices rose 0.3 per cent last month, while energy costs jumped 4.4 per cent over the same period. Rising inflation has applied pressure on the US Federal Reserve Bank to start increasing interest rates from current levels of 2 per cent in an attempt to stem prices. But Mr Logan concluded: "The probability has shifted yet again. In April, the Fed appeared to say that it had finished cutting rates and might soon raise them, if even by a token amount. Now the signal has changed. There are still real concerns about inflation. But I think the Fed will not move to raise rates until next year— it will not want to run the risk of tipping the economy into a more severe recession."

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Monday, June 16, 2008

ECB Fights Federal Reserve

Morgan Stanley Warns Of 'Catastrophic Event' As ECB Fights Federal Reserve

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph.Co.Uk | 16 June 2008

The clash between the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve over monetary strategy is causing serious strains in the global financial system and could lead to a replay of Europe's exchange rate crisis in the 1990s, a team of bankers has warned. "We see striking similarities between the transatlantic tensions that built up in the early 1990s and those that are accumulating again today. The outcome of the 1992 deadlock was a major currency crisis and a recession in Europe," said a report by Morgan Stanley's European experts.

Just as then, Washington has slashed rates to bail out the banks and prevent an economic hard-landing, while Frankfurt has stuck to its hawkish line— ignoring angry protests from politicians and squeals of pain from Europe's export industry. Indeed, the ECB has let the de facto interest rate— Euribor— rise by over 100 basis points [[1%: normxxx]] since the credit crisis began. Just as then, the dollar has plummeted far enough to cause worldwide alarm. In August 1992 it fell to 1.35 against the Deutsche Mark: this time it has fallen even further to the equivalent of 1.25. It is potentially worse for Europe this time because the yen and yuan have also fallen to near record lows. So has sterling. Morgan Stanley doubts that Europe's monetary union will break up under this pressure, but it warns that corked pressures will have to find release one way or another.

This will most likely occur through property slumps and banking purges in the vulnerable countries of the Club Med region and the euro-satellite states of Eastern Europe. "The tensions will not disappear into thin air. They will find fault lines on the periphery of Europe. Painful macro adjustments are likely to take place. Pegs to the euro could be questioned," said the report. The point of maximum stress could occur in coming months if the ECB carries out the threat this month by Jean-Claude Trichet to raise rates. It will be worse yet— for Europe— if the Fed backs away from expected tightening. "This could trigger another 'catastrophic' event," warned Morgan Stanley.

The markets have priced in two US rates rises later this year following a series of "hawkish" comments by Fed chief Ben Bernanke and other US officials, but this may have been a misjudgment. An article in the Washington Post by veteran columnist Robert Novak suggested that Mr Bernanke is concerned that runaway oil costs will cause a slump in growth, viewing inflation as the lesser threat. He is reported to be irked by the ECB's talk of further monetary tightening at such a dangerous juncture.

Ben Bernanke Is Reportedly Irked By The ECB

The contrasting approaches in Washington and Frankfurt make some sense. America's flexible structure allows it to adjust quickly to shocks. Europe's more rigid system leaves it with "sticky" prices that take longer to fall back as growth slows. Morgan Stanley says the current account deficits of Spain (10.5% of GDP), Portugal (10.5%), and Greece (14%) would never have been able to reach such extreme levels before the launch of the euro. EMU has shielded them from punishment by the markets, but this has allowed them to store up serious trouble. By contrast, Germany now has a huge surplus of 7.7% of GDP. The imbalances appear to be getting worse. The latest food and oil spike has pushed eurozone inflation to a record 3.7%, with big variations by country.

Spanish inflation is rising at 4.7% even though the country is now in the grip of a full-blown property crash. It is falling still further behind Germany. The squeeze required to claw back lost competitiveness will be "politically unpalatable". Morgan Stanley said the biggest risk lies in the arc of countries from the Baltics to the Black Sea where credit growth has been roaring at 40% to 50% a year. Current account deficits have reached 23% of GDP in Latvia, and 22% in Bulgaria. In Hungary and Romania, over 55% of household debt is in euros or Swiss francs. Swedish, Austrian, Greek and Italian banks have provided much of the funding for the credit booms. A crunch is looming in 2009 when a wave of maturities fall due. "Could the funding dry up? We think it could," said the bank.

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Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

When Bubbles Collide

When Bubbles Collide
Unemployment Numbers, Credit Crisis, Oil, Inflation


By John Mauldin | 15 June 2008

I remember in the summer of 2006 I would face my blank computer screen on a Friday and wonder, what I could write about? The media was all Goldilocks, all the time. Today, there is such a target-rich environment. I could probably write three letters a week, there is so much happening that is worthy of our attention. The problem today is trying to decide what not to write about, which means I get emails from readers wondering why I don't mention their areas of particular interest. But at eight pages, I just have to stop. You need a break!

Today, we have to look at the unemployment numbers, and the connection between the credit crisis and the rise in oil of about $16 dollars a barrel in just two days! If there is still room, the dollar is certainly being pushed and pulled by central bankers, who are also worried about inflation. And I doubt we will have room to cover what is a very important rise in inflation in Asia. Yet, it is all connected.

But first, a quick note. I will be in Las Vegas July 10-12 for the annual Freedom Fest Conference, where I will speak several times, and the line-up of speakers is as strong as for any conference I have ever been to: Denish D'Souza will debate Christopher Hitchens; and Steve Forbes, Ron Paul, Stephen Moore (Wall Street Journal), Charles Murray, George Gilder, John Goodman, and about 100 other speakers, each impressive in their own right, will be there, as will 1,500 freedom-loving attendees. You can go to the site and click on the list of speakers to register. Mark Skousen is the driving force behind the conference, and he does it right. I hope to see you there.

Unemployment Jumps to 5.5%, On Its Way to 6%

The headline number said the US lost 49,000 jobs in May, somewhat fewer than expected. The details were much uglier. It is no surprise that construction saw losses of 34,000, but "goods production" also saw a drop of 57,000 and manufacturing was down 26,000. What was up? Health care (34,000), bars and restaurants (11,000), and government added 17,000 (though, as Phillippa Dunne and Doug Henwood of The Liscio Report noted, the gain was all from local governments, as federal and state governments shed jobs).

So, with all the large losses and very few gains, how did we show a loss of only 49,000 jobs? As long-time readers will guess, it is our old friend, the [infamous] birth/death model, which is the estimate of new jobs created by new and small businesses, which are ['missed by'] the survey. Contrary to some opinions, it is not a conspiracy by a government agency to "cook the books" in an attempt to show a number better than it really is. (If it was, they are doing a really bad job!) It is simply a moving-average projection of the past few years. Like any trend-following system, it will be wrong (sometimes badly) at the inflection points of the change in the trend.

Thus, the Bush administration was right to be upset when the birth/death model significantly understated the growth in jobs during the recovery from the last recession, as Democrats talked about the "jobless recovery." (Subsequent revisions showed that in fact there were lots of jobs being created.) And now? As the economy rolls through a recession, the system is overstating the number of jobs created. It is just a function of the model. The BLS is very open with the numbers it uses, if you care to dig into them. [[And a pretty crude model that is not adjusted for the second and even third derivative!: normxxx]]

In October the BLS will announce new benchmarks and apply them in March 2009, although they will only be applied through March 2008. The number of lost jobs through last March will be revised significantly upward, just about the time the recovery is underway. And also in time to help modestly understate the jobs being created in the recovery. As my friend Dennis Gartman likes to say, anybody who trades on the employment numbers deserves the spanking they get.

For the record, "March was revised down by 7,000, and April by 8,000. We've now had four consecutive months of downward first revisions, and also four consecutive downward second revisions— strings that usually support the picture of a weakening employment trend." (The Liscio Report)

And the birth/death model? This month it added in an estimated 217,000 new jobs. Looking into the details, the model suggested that 42,000 construction jobs were added. The actual survey showed lost jobs in construction, but the birth/death model added more construction jobs than were lost. Given the current economic climate, that is highly improbable. Ditto for the 77,000 in leisure and hospitality. Do we really think 9,000 jobs were added in financial services or another 9,000 in small manufacturing start-ups?

The reality is that we probably saw a decrease in jobs of at least 100,000. The market was upset with 40,000. What will it do when the monthly number does print 100,000 later this year? And it likely will. The Federal Reserve projects that unemployment will rise to 6%. That means there are a lot more jobs to be lost. And that is if unemployment stops at 6%, which would be a very mild recession indeed.

There are two unemployment surveys. One is for businesses, called the establishment survey, and for whatever reason that is the one most people pay attention to. When they do the household survey, they found that the number of employed people fell by 617,000 last month, spiking the unemployment rate to 5.5%. Some on CNBC said it was just teenage unemployment showing up in the numbers, but that is not true. Teens, according to Phillippa, accounted for just 0.2% of the rise. Adult unemployment rose to 4.8% and accounted for 0.3% of the rise. (By the way, technically, for the three people with no social life actually watching the scorecards, the household survey dropped 250,000 jobs; but after you adjust for factors in the establishment survey and seasonally adjust, you get 617,000.)

One of the best indicators of the direction of employment is temporary employment. If the workload is shrinking, the first thing you do is lay off your temporary help, or simply do not hire them. Normally, unemployment is a lagging indicator, but temporary help is at least a coincident, if not a leading indicator. Temporary employment is down 5.7% year over year and is showing continued monthly deterioration with each passing month since last October. That does not bode well either for future employment or consumer spending. We will watch to see when temporary help begins to rebound, to give us a hint that a recovery may be in our future.

What The Tax Numbers Show

Philippa Dunne & Doug Henwood write The Liscio Report. They focus on interpreting the employment numbers and doing in-depth research on tax collections at the state level, plus a lot of interesting "inside" information not typically known by the public. When you see an analyst talking about tax collections at the state level, there is a high likelihood that the source of the number is actually the work of Dunne and Henwood. I find their letter very useful, as I get analysis very quickly after the report comes out, and you always get "the rest of the story" not revealed in the press releases and the media. If I ran a trading desk I would want their reports on my desk.

I called Phillippa about a report they sent out this week. Basically, sales tax and income tax collections at the state level are either down or flat. You can do all the surveys and polls you like, but one of the rules of life is that no one pays a penny more in taxes than they have to. The flip side of that premise is that sales tax collections are a VERY good barometer of economic activity.

Phillippa was kind enough to send me a chart to share with my readers. They have a diffusion index which tracks how well states are doing in meeting their projections for tax receipts. This does not show the level of receipts, as a state could be "positive" in this index if it projects lower receipts and meets that target. In general, states have been lowering their projected income.

As it turns out, this index is a fairly consistent indicator of the direction of retail sales, as the graph below will attest. The green bar line is their sales tax diffusion index, and the red bars are retail sales growth. Their index has dropped precipitously in the last few quarters, leading retail sales down. And it suggests there is more pain in retail sales to come.

But wait, didn't we read yesterday that retail sales were up? "Wal-Mart sales, for stores open at least one year, increased 3.9%; Costco US showed a 7% US gain and a 15% foreign gain. BJ's Wholesale Club sales surged 13.4% on gasoline and food sales. BJ reports gasoline sales jumped 6.6% and perishable food sales surged 11% but general merchandise was flat!!!" (The Bill King Report)


Click Here, or on the image, to see a larger, undistorted image.


Retailers that did not have food and gas to boost their sales showed considerable weakness. GAP was off 14%, JCPenney down 4%, and Limited Brands down 6%. Even the high-end stores like Saks (-9%) were down, and Nordstrom projects that June will be down 22%. Given the sales tax numbers, I would not be buying the retail stocks on the dips. There is an old saying about trying to catch a falling knife. Auto sales have fallen precipitously on the lack of demand for trucks, which were the most profitable item for car manufacturers. Is it any wonder they are cutting back and closing plants?

Wages declined by 0.2 in April in nominal terms, and forget about it in real, after-inflation numbers. David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch notes that the 0.2% decline in real spending on durables and semi-durables was the 6th decline in a row, which has never happened in the 49 years that such data has been tracked. He also notes there has never been a time when consumer spending on durables (like cars and appliances) and semi-durables (like clothing) have contracted for two quarters when the economy has not been in a technical recession.

But there are other reasons for the slowdown in consumer spending. Since 2001 [[i.e., once 'W's' new tax program was well in place: normxxx]], the average income of the bottom 90% of wage earners dropped by 0.9%, from $32,371 to $32,080 in 2006, in constant 2006 (inflation-adjusted) dollars. The further down the income scale, the more pressure on the consumer. (source: Center for American Progress) The top 10% have seen their incomes increase from $221,000 to $254,000, a rise of 15%. Side bet: we will see the average income of the top 10% come down in 2008 and 2009.

From Goldman Sachs: "We estimate that the US government ran a budget deficit of $160 billion in May, about $92bn wider than in May 2007. Most of this reflects tax rebates (about $50bn) and calendar effects (about $27bn). The remaining $15bn is true deterioration, reflecting reduced tax revenue growth as the economy stagnates. In particular, withholding of income and payroll taxes was flat and corporate payments (usually tiny in May) fell."

In short, wherever you look, tax receipts are down. That means income and sales are down. There is no spin that trumps tax receipts. And Phillippa told me that her sources at the various states she surveys are not optimistic about a real recovery in the latter half of the year. I would not want to own any stock whose earnings are tied to the US consumer. Between rising input prices and falling sales, earnings are going to be squeezed. [Recent gyrations] in the Dow [are] just a precursor to the direction of the market, until consumer spending starts to recover. But, this time, there will be no large mortgage equity withdrawals to bail out the economy. We will see a slow growth/no growth Muddle Through Economy for at least another 12 months [[Note; this is the optimistic scenerio! : normxxx]].

What's Up With Oil?

The price of a barrel of oil has been gyrating violently recently, with moves exceeding 13% in a day. Is it those nasty speculators? Are fundamentals at work? Is the world worried about Israel bombing Iran? There are numerous factors involved, but the combination produced a kind of perfect storm in the trading pits. Let's look at several items and see if we can find a connection.

First, there is a real connection between the price of dollar and the price of oil. In dollar terms, oil rises as the dollar falls and vice versa. The weak dollar policy that this country has had (in spite of denials) is having an effect. This week, Ben Bernanke took the very unusual stance of commenting on the weakness of the dollar and its possible role in inflation. Typically, the value of the dollar is the responsibility of the US Treasury Department, and the Fed does not get involved. You can bet that Secretary Paulson knew in advance and approved Bernanke's statement. That put a bid under the dollar and hit oil and commodity prices in general.

No one should think that the Fed or the Treasury is getting ready to intervene in the market, which would be a rather futile effort. Rather, it was a clear signal that the Fed is "on hold" and is unlikely to lower rates further in the current environment. Since the market felt that the next move from the European Central Bank (ECB) would be to lower rates in response to a weakening environment in Europe, that served to push the dollar higher against the euro.

Note that a German 2-year bond [bund] pays 4.64%, and the US 2-year note pays 2.39%. That difference helps put a bid under the euro. Also, note that interest rates in Europe are starting to get flat across the curve. Then, as the US markets opened on Thursday, Jean Claude Trichet, the president of the ECB, shocked the markets. Let's let Dennis Gartman rewind the tape for us:

"Mr. Trichet made it clear that a number of ECB policy committee members actually support raising rates very quickly, and he suggested that the committee could move to raise rates as soon as the next policy meeting in the first week of July! Mr. Trichet said yesterday that

"'after having carefully examined the situation, we could decide to move our rates (by) a small amount in our next meeting in order to secure the solid anchoring of inflation expectations.... I don't say it's certain. I say it's possible [for] we had a number of us thinking that, all taken into account, all information, analysis of risks, we had a case for increasing rates... A number of us considered that there was a case for increasing rates, but later some amongst us considered there was not necessarily that case... [yet].'

"Mr. Trichet went on further to say that the ECB is on
"heightened alertness" about inflation. At recent meetings Mr. Trichet has made it clear that the decision to keep policy steady was unanimous, but yesterday he said the decision was a consensus, and was not a unanimous decision. That obviously suggested that some on the committee were already voting to tighten, and that, we must admit, caught us off-guard. At the question and answer period following the meeting, Mr. Trichet was asked, following his statement that the decision to hold rate steady was a 'consensus,' why the committee had not moved to raise rates. He said that firstly the committee had to signal to the market that it was on the alert; that the debate had shifted from dead center to the edge; that the needle on the monetary tachometer was moving off of top-dead centre. We do not wish to parse things too severely, but it does seem that the committee is prepared to move at the next meeting, and that is a material change from our perspective, for we had thought that the Bank was poised to do nothing for several more months, and that the next move would instead have been to ease, not tighten. Clearly we had that wrong, and now the facts have changed."

It is not just Dennis who was caught off guard. The entire currency and commodity futures trading markets were surprised (including your humble analyst). The euro exploded up from $1.5395 to $1.5555 in a matter of minutes. Oil rose $6. Gold and grains moved violently. Soybeans "gapped," as commodities of all sorts responded to a suddenly weakening dollar. If Trichet wanted to "signal" the market, it worked. He got everyone's attention very quickly.

There was a lot of short covering in the various markets, but especially in oil. But let's dig deeper.

I have been pondering for a few weeks about whether the 'long-only' commodity index funds are really affecting the markets. Basically, these funds have become a huge part of the commodities market [[And, you can rest assured that the hedge funds will DEstabilize any market they enter! : normxxx]]. It is clear that enough buying and in size will affect any market, but these funds do not take delivery. They "roll" their exposure as they get close to expiration, so they are not involved in the spot price. In theory, the spot price should be a function of 'immediate' supply and demand.

But, it is not that simple, as Louis Gave reminded me. Looking at recent CFTC data, investors known as "commercials" were long 827 million barrels of oil. In the early part of the decade it was 3-400 million barrels. Commercials are supposed to be those who are hedging their production of oil. But large oil companies rarely hedge, and smaller producers only hedge a portion of their oil (see more below). Has supply increased over 100%? I think not.

Where is the increase in commercial interest coming from? The clear answer is long-only commodity index funds and ETFs. They simply buy baskets of commodities at whatever the price is, speculating on the rise in the price of the overall commodity market. It is a one-way trade. Jim Rogers is probably the most famous exponent of such trades, but there are scores of funds which mimic what he does. But there are limits to how much exposure speculators can buy, because the CFTC will allow a speculator to buy only so much of any given market, to keep large players from getting a corner on the market and driving up prices, a la the Hunt brothers and silver in 1980. These limits are known as "position limits."

There are no position limits for commercials who are hedging. They are in theory hedging their physical exposure to a given commodity they are selling or buying. Think of a farmer and General Mills. Both want to lock in the price of wheat so they can plan for the future. Speculators are useful in that they provide liquidity to the markets. In fact, they are essential to a properly functioning market. The CFTC created a loophole when they allowed 'investment banks' to be classified as commercial investors. So, when a long-only commodity index fund wants to buy a million barrels of oil, they can go to the investment bank, who will sell them a "swap" on the price of oil, and then immediately hedge their exposure in the futures market.

The long-only index fund can now create positions far in excess of the position limits that are enforced upon normal speculators. These funds can grow to be huge— multi-tens of billions of dollars. Even though they are really speculators [[because they are not actually hedging current or future real inventory: normxxx]], they are not included in the data as speculators. Because they get their exposure from an investment bank, they are ultimately listed as a commercial. In total, they represent an enormous part of the commodities markets. But they are providing liquidity, so what's the problem? They are not actually hoarding the commodities. The price is still set at the spot price. But… But…

But that is not the whole story. They are making it difficult, if not dangerous, to short the market. When massive buying comes into the market, it moves the market and sends the signal to the market that prices are rising. Momentum players move in, and prices rise some more. In fact, as the price of oil has risen from $90 to $100 and higher, normal speculative open interest has declined, as who can afford to fight the tape? At the least, I would expect the CFTC to require those "commercials" that are really long-only index funds to provide transparency. Politicians are demanding that something be done. It is entirely possible that they will impose position limits on the long-only funds. As I said last week, when the elephants are dancing, the mice should leave the floor. And Congress and the regulators are very serious elephants indeed. Let's hope they do whatever they are going to do quickly.

I think smaller investors should take the profits they have made over the last few years in these funds and move to the sidelines until it becomes clear what the rules are going to be. Let me also make it very clear that I am only talking about long-only commodity index funds. Funds that are managed by commodity trading advisors which can go both long and short have the potential to profit from volatility (and of course, they can also lose). In these types of markets, I like funds which are "long vol." (To be long volatility means you have the potential to benefit from volatile markets.)

Now, let's look at how the credit crisis is contributing to the problem. Let's say you are a small oil producer or grain company. You go to the futures market and hedge your oil production or the grain in your silos; and if the price goes up, you don't care, because you are going to deliver the grain at a cost you already know. But there is the matter of that margin call, and you need to borrow from your local bank to meet that call. You are hedged. Your profits are locked in at some point in the future. But the margin clerk is calling today. And your bank is having a small problem with its capital base.

What is the cover story in a recent Wall Street Journal? "Real Estate Woes of Banks Mount." Banks, mostly smaller ones, may have to write off as much as $165 billion in bad real estate loans made to developers and commercial builders. Regulators are "encouraging" banks to raise capital and increase their lending standards. So banks have less capital to lend. Your banker looks at you when you ask for more money to meet those margin calls, and says, "There are two types of problems. Mine, and not mine. Yours is of the latter variety." And you have to cover your hedges. Enter the margin clerk (the person who calls you and tells you to come up with more money or they will sell out your position at whatever the market price is.)

When Bubbles Collide

So, what happens? Bernanke talks the dollar up and commodities and oil go down. Two days later a French president of the ECB gets inflation religion and the markets react swiftly. Commodity prices rise and more money comes into the market. Traders start covering their shorts as quickly as possible. Then this morning, the margin clerks of the world go to work and oil spikes as the pits smell blood. Morgan Stanley issues a call for $150 oil in July. The euro rises to $1.5778! Interest rates drop. The stock market falls large at the open.

And rumors of an attack on Iran? An Israeli politician says that Israel would need to bomb Iran to keep them from getting a nuclear weapon, just as it becomes clear Obama might be the next president and would not act to prevent such a problem? Who can aggressively short in this environment? In a conversation with Dennis Gartman this afternoon, he commented that it felt like the NASDAQ at the turn of the century. But is it 1999 or 2000? The oil market will continue to go up until it doesn't, and no one knows when that is. It will continue to rise until all the shorts that are not strong hands have been covered. The margin clerks are in control, and they will have their way. Was it all over today? I rather doubt it.

I wonder if some of the majors aren't tempted to sell some of their production at $138? I mean, really. If you don't think that is a reasonable price, and they tell us they don't, then why doesn't Exxon just go in and start taking all the bids they can? They and the other majors would be the ultimate strong hand. But then, what do I know? Central banks, short covering, a respected analyst issuing a near-term call for a $20 rise in oil, conspiracy theories and Iran, long-only funds buying, everyone scared to short, margin calls, and a credit crisis all give us the perfect storm.

Add to that ugly employment numbers, and the Dow drops. The S&P 500 violates all sorts of technical signals to the downside. Three quick points. I think oil is lower at the end of the year. Inflation in Asia and rising subsidies are going to force more and more Asian countries to allow the price of oil to rise and send the proper signals to consumers to use less oil. Over the next decade, oil will be much higher, but I think the pressure over the next year will be to the downside [[and lots lower by 2012: normxxx]]. But don't ask me how high it can go in the near term. Ask the margin clerks.

America on a Diet

Second, [[all grains, and corn-fed beef and poultry, but especially : normxxx]] corn are going to go higher. Bad weather has meant that not enough got planted, and that will probably hurt yields in the fall. This is going to mean even higher meat prices and ethanol prices. Corn ethanol is such a bad idea. This is what happens when government decides to mess with the market.

Anecdotal inflation note: I eat two chicken fajita pitas without cheese from Jack-in-the Box for lunch about three times a week (after the gym!). I throw away the pita bread and just eat the chicken at my desk. The last three days the price has been the same, but the amount of chicken is noticeably smaller, perhaps 25% smaller. Where's the hedonic price adjustment in the BLS statistics for that? A friend of mine notes that the filet from his favorite steak house is now seven ounces instead of eight. But the steak is still the same price. Maybe portion control will finally get America to go on a diet.

Finally: George Friedman told me that the Saudis are taking in something like $10 billion a week! The entire gulf is awash in dollars. He thinks it may have nowhere else to go but to the stock markets of the world. We'll see. Unintended consequences.

ß§

Normxxx    
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The contents of any third-party letters/reports above do not necessarily reflect the opinions or viewpoint of normxxx. They are provided for informational/educational purposes only.
The content of any message or post by normxxx anywhere on this site is not to be construed as constituting market or investment advice. Such is intended for educational purposes only. Individuals should always consult with their own advisors for specific investment advice.

Sunday, June 15, 2008

Why Investors Fail

Why Investors Fail

By John Mauldin | 15 June 2008

Like the children from Lake Wobegon, I am sure all my readers are above-average investors. But I am also sure you have friends who are not, so in this chapter we will look at the reasons why they fail at investing, and how they should analyze funds and determine risk. Hopefully this will give you some ways to help them. I will show you a simple way to put yourself in the top 20% of investors. This should make it easier to go to family reunions and listen to your brother-in-law's stories.

A big part of successful Bull's Eye Investing is simply avoiding the mistakes that the large majority of investors make. I can give you all the techniques, trading tips, fund recommendations, forecasts, and so on; but you must still keep away from the patterns which are typical of failed investors.

What I want to do in this section is give you an "aha!" moment: that insight which helps you understand something about the mysteries of the marketplace. We will look at a number of seemingly random ideas and concepts, and then see what conclusions we can draw. Let's jump in.

Investors Behaving Badly

The Financial Research Corporation released a study prior to the [2001-02] bear market which showed that the average mutual fund's three-year return was 10.92%, while the average investor in those same periods gained only 8.7%. The reason was simple: investors were chasing the hot sectors and funds. If you study just the last three years, my guess is those numbers will be worse. "The study found that the current average holding period was around 2.9 years for a typical investor, which is significantly shorter than the 5.5-year holding period of just five years ago.

[While the research below is from a few years ago, recent studies show exactly the same, if not worse, results. Investors in general are not getting any better.]

"Many investors are purchasing funds based on past performance, usually when the fund is at or near its peak. For example,
$91 billion of new cash flowed into funds just after they experienced their best performing quarter. In contrast, only $6.5 billion in new money flowed into funds after their worst performing quarter." (from a newsletter by Dunham and Associates)

I have seen numerous studies similar to the one above. They all show the same thing: that the average investor does not get average performance. Many studies show statistics which are much worse. The study also showed something I had observed anecdotally, for which there was no evidence. Past performance was a good predictor of future relative performance in the fixed-income markets and international equity (stock) funds, but there was no statistically significant way to rely on past performance in the domestic (US) stock equity mutual funds. I will comment on why I believe this is so later on.

"The oft-repeated legal disclosure that past performance is no guarantee of future results is true at two levels:

1. Absolute returns cannot be guaranteed with any confidence. There is too much variability for each broad asset class over multiple time periods. Stocks in general may provide
5-10% returns during one decade, 10-20% during the next decade, and then return back to the 5-10% range.

2. Absolute rankings also cannot be predicted with any certainty. This is caused by too much relative variability within specific investment objectives. #1 funds can regress to the average or fall far below the average over subsequent periods, replaced by funds that may have had very low rankings at the start. The higher the ranking and the more narrowly you define that ranking (i.e. #1 vs. top-decile [top
10%] vs. top quartile [top 25%] vs. top half), the more unlikely it is that a fund can repeat at that level. It is extremely unlikely to repeat as #1 in an objective with more than a few funds. It is very difficult to repeat in the top decile, challenging to repeat in the top quartile, and roughly a coin toss to repeat in the top half." (Financial Research Center)

This is in line with a study from the National Bureau of Economic Research. Only a very small percentage of companies can show merely above-average earnings growth for 10 years in a row. The percentage is not more than you would expect from simply random circumstances. The chances of you picking a stock today that will be in the top 25% of all companies every year for the next ten years are 1 in 50 or worse. In fact, the longer a company shows positive earnings growth and outstanding performance, the more likely it is to have an off year. Being on top for an extended period of time is an extremely difficult feat.

[ Normxxx Here:  Moral: If you find a fund you really like (e.g., with a good 10 year track record and little or no turnover of top management), wait until just after that off year (or at least until after they show signs of recovery, once you figure out the reason for their bad result), and then invest!  ]

Yet, what is the basis for most stock analysts' predictions? Past performance and the optimistic projections of a management that gets compensated with stock options. What CEO will tell you his stock is overpriced? His staff and board will kill him, as their options will be worthless. Analysts make the fatally flawed assumption that because a company has grown 25% a year for five years that it will do so for the next five. The actual results for the last 50 years show the likelihood of that happening is exceedingly small.

Tails You Lose, Heads I Win

I cannot recommend highly enough a marvelous book by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, called Fooled by Randomness. The sub-title is "The Hidden Role of Chance in the Markets and in Life." I consider it essential reading for all investors, and would go so far as to say that you should not invest in anything without reading this book. He looks at the role of chance in the marketplace. Taleb is a mathematician and stock market 'quant' who is obsessed with the role of chance, and he gives us a very thorough treatment. He also has a gift for expressing complex statistical problems in a very understandable manner. I intend to read the last half of this book at least once a year to remind me of some of these principles. Let's look at just a few of his thoughts.

Assume you have 10,000 people who flip a coin once a year. After five years, you will have 313 people who have come up with heads five times in a row. If you put suits on them and sit them in glass offices, call them a mutual or a hedge fund, they will be managing a billion dollars. They will absolutely believe they have figured out the secret to investing that all the other losers haven't discerned. Their seven-figure salaries prove it. The next year, 157 of them will blow up! With my power of analysis, I can even predict which ones will blow up. It will be the very ones in which you invest!

Ergodicity

In the mutual fund and hedge fund world, one of the continual issues of reporting returns is something [a dirty little secret] called "survivorship bias." Let's say you start with a universe of 1,000 funds. After five years, only 800 of those funds are still in business. The other 200 had such dismal results, they were unable to attract money, and simply folded. If you look at the annual returns of the 800 funds, you get one average number. But if you add in the returns of the 200 failures, the average return is much lower. The databases for most market statistics are based upon only looking at the survivors. This sets up false expectations for investors, as it raises the average.

Taleb gave me an insight for which I will always be grateful. He points out that because of chance and survivorship bias, investors are only likely to find out about the winners. Indeed, who goes around trying to sell you the losers? The likelihood of being shown an investment or a stock which has flipped heads five times in a row are very high. But chances are, that hot investment you are shown is a result of randomness. You are much more likely to have success hunting on your own. The exception, of course, would be my clients… (Note to regulators: that last sentence is a literary device called a weak attempt at humor. It is not meant to be taken literally.)

That brings us to the principle of Ergodicity, "...namely, that time will eliminate the annoying effects of randomness. Looking forward, in spite of the fact that these managers were profitable in the past five years, we expect them to break even in any future time period. They will fare no better than those of the initial cohort who failed earlier in the exercise. Ah, the long term." (Taleb)

Why Investors Fail

While the professionals typically explain their problems in very creative ways, the mistakes that most of us make are much more mundane. First and foremost is chasing performance. Study after study shows the average investor does much worse than the average mutual fund, as they switch from their poorly performing fund to the latest hot fund, just as it turns down. Mark Finn of Vantage Consulting has spent years analyzing trading systems. He is a consultant to large pension funds and Fortune 500 companies. He is one of the more astute analysts of trading systems, managers, and funds that I know.

He has put more start-up managers into business than perhaps anyone in the fund management world. He has a gift for finding new talent and deciding if their "ideas" have investment merit. He has a team of certifiable mathematical geniuses working for him. They have access to the best pattern-recognition software available. They have run price data through every conceivable program, and come away with this conclusion:

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Actually, Mark says it more bluntly: Past performance is pretty much worthless when it comes to trying to figure out the future. The best use of past performance is to determine how a manager behaved in a particular set of prior circumstances. Yet investors read that past performance is not indicative of future results, and then promptly ignore it. It is like reading statements at McDonalds that coffee is hot. We don't pay attention. Chasing the latest hot fund usually means you are now in a fund that is close to its peak, and will soon top out. Generally that is shortly after you invest in it.

What do Finn and his team tell us does work? Fundamentals, fundamentals, fundamentals [[this enables you to identify those (frequently stodgy) stocks that will do well over the long run— you can then use TA to determine entry points (and exit points, if you also want to use a small percentage for (play) 'trading'): normxxx]]. As they look at scores of managers each year, the common thread for success is how they incorporate some set of fundamental analysis patterns into their systems. This is consistent with work done by Dr. Gary Hirst, one of my favorite analysts and fund managers. In 1991, he began to look at technical analysis. He spent huge sums on computers and programming, analyzing a variety of technical analysis systems. Let me quote him on the results of his research:

"I had heard about technical analysis and chart patterns, and looking at this stuff I would say, what kind of voodoo is this? I was very, very skeptical that technical analysis had value. So I used the computers to check it out, and what I learned was that there was, in fact, no useful reality there. Statistically and mathematically all these tools— stochastics, RSI, chart patterns, Elliot Wave, and so on— just don't work. If you code any of these rigorously into a computer and test them they produce no statistical basis for making money; they're just wishful thinking. But I did find one thing that worked. In fact almost all technical analysis can be reduced to this one thing, though most people don't realize it: the distributions of returns are not normal; they are skewed and have "fat tails." In other words, markets do produce profitable trends. Sure, I found things that work over the short term, systems that worked for five or ten years but then failed miserably. Everything you made, you gave back. Over the long term, trends are where the money is."

Becoming A Top 20% Investor

Over very long periods of time, the average stock will grow at about 7% a year, which is GDP growth plus dividends plus inflation. This is logical when you think about it. How could all the companies in the country grow faster than the total economy? Some companies will grow faster than others, of course, but the average will be the above. There are numerous studies which demonstrate this. That means roughly 50% of the companies will outperform the average and 50% will lag. The same is true for investors. By definition, 50% of you will not achieve even the average, which is pretty abysmal as noted; 10% of you will do really well; and 1% will get rich through investing. You will be the lucky ones who found Microsoft in 1982. You will tell yourself it was your ability. Most of us assign our good fortune to native skill and our losses to bad luck.

But we all try to be in the top 10%. Oh, how we try. The FRC study cited at the beginning shows how most of us look for success, and then get in, only to have gotten in at the top. In fact, trying to be in the top 10% or 20% is statistically one of the ways we find ourselves getting below-average returns over time. We might be successful for a while, but reversion to the mean will catch up. Here is the very sad truth. The majority of investors in the top 10-20% in any given period are simply lucky. They have come up with heads five times in a row. Their ship came in. There are some good investors who actually do it with sweat and work, but they are [far less than] the majority. Want to make someone angry? Tell a manager that his (or her) fabulous track record appears to be random luck or that they simply caught a wave and rode it. Then duck.

By the way, is it luck or skill when an individual goes to work for a start-up company and is given stock in their 401k which grows at 10,000%? How many individuals work for companies where that didn't happen, or their stock options blew up (Enron)? I happen to lean toward Grace, rather than luck or skill, as an explanation; but this is not a theological treatise. Read The Millionaire Next Door. Most [the vast majority of] millionaires make their money in business and/or by saving lots of money [[rather slowly, in usually stodgy (but reliable) investments: normxxx]] and living frugally. Very few make it simply by investing skill alone. Odds are that you will not be that person.

But I can tell you how to get in the top 20%. Or better, I will let FRC tell you, because they do it so well:

"For those who are not satisfied with simply beating the average over any given period, consider this: if an investor can consistently achieve only slightly better than average returns each year over a 10-15 year period, then cumulatively over the full period they are likely to do better than roughly 80% or more of their peers. They may never have discovered a fund that ranked #1 over a subsequent one- or three-year period. That "failure," however, is more than offset by their having avoided options that dramatically underperformed. Avoiding short-term underperformance is the key to long-term outperformance.

"For those that are looking to find a new method of discerning the top ten funds for 2002, this study will prove frustrating. There are no magic short-cut solutions, and we urge our readers to abandon the illusive and ultimately counterproductive search for them. For those who are willing to restrain their short-term passions, embrace the virtue of being only slightly better than average, and wait for the benefits of this approach to
compound into something much better…"

That's it. You simply have to be only slightly better than average each year to be in the top 20% at the end of the race. It is a whole lot easier to figure out how to do that than chase the top ten funds. Of course, you could get lucky (or Blessed) and actually get one of the top ten funds [[but then give it all back and then some in some subsequent year— such funds are NOT likely to prove very consistent in the long run…: normxxx]]. But recognize it for what it is and thank God (or your luck if you are agnostic) for His blessings.

I should point out that it takes a lot of work just to be in the top 50% consistently. But it can be done. I don't see it as much as I would like, but I do see it.

Investing in a stock or a fund should not be like going to Vegas. When you put money with a manager or a fund, you should think as if you are investing in their management company. Ask yourself, "Is this someone I want to be in business with? Do I want him running my company? Does this company have a reasonable business objective? What is their edge that makes me think they will be above average? What is the reason I would think they could discern the difference between randomness and good management?"

When I meet a manager, and all he wants to do is talk about his track record, I find a way to quickly close the conversation. When they tell me they are trying to make the most they can, I head for the door. Maybe they are the real deal, but my experience says the odds are against it. It's about not settling for being mediocre. Statistics and experience tell us that simply being consistently above average is damn hard work. When a fund is the number one fund, that is [always] random. They had a good run or a good idea and it worked [[i.e., everything fell into place! : normxxx]]. Are they likely to repeat? No.

But being in the top 50% every year for ten years? That is NOT random. That is skill. That type of consistent solid management is what you should be looking for.

By the way, I mentioned at the beginning that past performance was statistically useful for ascertaining relative performance of certain types of funds like bond funds and international funds. In the fixed-income markets (bonds) everyone is dealing with the same instruments. Funds with lower overhead and skilled traders who aggressively watch their trading costs have an edge. That management skill shows up in consistently above-average relative returns. Likewise, funds which do well in international investments tend to stay in the top brackets. That is because the skill set for international fund management is rare and the learning cost is high. In that world, local knowledge of the markets clearly adds value.

But in the US stock market, everybody knows everything everybody else does. Pas